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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Images of Workers in Modem Labor Cases-
"The danger of violence"
T HiS exploration of the labor jurisprudence of nearly one hundred
years ago began with a very simple and very modem question: Why
do some judges today assume that workers on a picket line are likely to
provoke violence? The question seems important for several reasons
which I will elaborate below. First, the notion that labor picketing is
inherently violent and intimidating is expressed in recent Supreme Court
cases which have significant legal or symbolic implications for labor un-
ions. Second, there is evidence of a revival of interest in restoring the
labor injunction to its former prominence in the arsenal of legal remedies
available to employers faced with picket lines and other forms of collec-
tive action. Third, the presence in modem labor jurisprudence of unex-
amined assumptions about the violent nature of workers may inhibit the
ability of courts to accept innovative and creative roles for unions in the
structure and governance of the workplace.
1. The "Unfounded Speculation" of the Supreme Court. At least
some contemporary Supreme Court justices have perceived labor picket-
ing as inherently violent and threatening. For example, in the 1978 case
of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters,1 Justice Powell wrote that "[t]he 'danger of violence' is inher-
ent in many-though certainly not all-situations of sustained trespas-
sory picketing. One cannot predict whether or when it may occur, or its
degree."2 In the same case, Justice Blackmun wrote that to prohibit
states from enjoining trespassory picketing would result in an "unaccept-
able possibility of precipitating violence."
3
The Sears case, however, involved peaceful picketing by union mem-
bers on the walkways and parking area outside a department store. There
was no evidence that the picketing was violent or intimidating to custom-
ers entering the store. As Justice Brennan wrote in dissent, the "sugges-
tion" made by Blackmun and Powell that prohibiting state jurisdiction of
1. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). The Sears case changed a long-standing federal labor preemption doc-
trine-the so-called Garmon doctrine--that would have previously denied state courts jurisdiction
over peaceful trespassory picketing. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959). The result of the Sears case is that state courts may, in certain circumstances, enjoin labor
picketing that is arguably subject to the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
2. 436 U.S. at 213 (Powell, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1988/89]
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peaceful trespassory picketing "results in a substantial risk of violence
... can be dismissed as the most unfounded speculation." 4 The fact that
the Sears picketers were technically on private property, which was open
to the public, rather than a public sidewalk, does not provide a satisfac-
tory explanation for the presumption that their picketing was "poten-
tially explosive."5
Distinctions between the legality of labor picketing and handbilling
continue to persist in Supreme Court jurisprudence, apparently because
of the belief that picket lines are associated with violence or the threat of
violence. In the recent DeBartolo case,6 the Supreme Court held that the
secondary boycott provisions of the National Labor Relations Act7 do
not prohibit a union from engaging in peaceful handbilling for the pur-
pose of urging consumers to boycott a neutral employer.8 The Court,
however, was careful to note that "the union peacefully distributed the
handbills without any accompanying picketing or patrolling."9 Justice
White, who wrote the DeBartolo opinion, articulated this revealing dis-
tinction between picketing and handbilling:
The loss of customers because they read a handbill urging them not to pa-
tronize a business, and not because they are intimidated by a line of picket-
ers, is the result of mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no
more than what its customers honestly want it to do.10
Explicit in this statement are assumptions that picketing is more
than "mere persuasion'-it is "intimidation"-and that customers who
boycott a store in response to a picket line may not be expressing their
"honest" economic preferences. Implicit is much more: assumptions
about the violent nature of workers, the inherent dangers of labor picket-
ing, the malevolent intentions of unions, and the inability of communities
to respond rationally to the message of a peaceful picket line. While it is
4. Id. at 227.
5. Id. at 213 (Powell, "., concurring) (text & *note).
6. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392
(1988).
7. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 8, 61 Stat. 141 (1947) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982)).
8. In DeBartolo, a construction union peacefully distributed handbills on public property at the
entrances to a shopping mall. The union had a dispute with a building contractor retained by a
department store to build a store in the mall. The handbills asked customers to refrain from shop-
ping at any stores in the mall "until the Mall's owner publicly promises that all construction at the
Mall will be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits." 108 S.
Ct. at 1394-95 (quoting union handbill).
9. Id. at 1395.
10. Id. at 1400.
[Vol. 37
IMAGES OF VIOLENCE
true that labor picketing is sometimes accompanied by violence and
threats of violence-by employees, employers, police, or bystanders-vi-
olence is certainly not inevitable or inherent in labor picketing. Yet such
assumptions, revealed through images of worker violence, underlie the
legal doctrine which today regulates the forms of economic activity of
unions. In this Article, I will discuss the development of these assump-
tions in late nineteenth and early twentieth century labor cases.'1
2. Reevaluation of the Anti-Injunction Statutes. In the late 1970s,
the Industrial Research Unit of the Wharton School obtained funding for
a four-year study of union violence. The book, Union Violence, 2 which is
the product of the study, has as its thesis the proposition that "the law
generally reflects an attitude of indifference to the effects of labor vio-
lence." 13 The authors, Thieblot and Haggard, catalog and describe nu-
merous contemporary incidents of strike violence and the legal responses
to them and conclude that certain laws should be changed. In particular,
the authors urge repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act of
193214 and the analogous state "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts."15 In
much the same way that Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene intended
their 1930 book, The Labor Injunction, to be a brief for the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Thieblot and Haggard apparently intend their
work, Union Violence, to be a brief for its undoing.16
The starting point for the Thieblot and Haggard argument is an at-
tack on the credibility of Frankfurter and Greene's work, 7 as well as the
"conventional wisdom" that inspired it. 8 This conventional wisdom is
11. The assumptions about the violent worker and his relationship to the community seem to
have their genesis in the criminal conspiracy cases in the first half of the nineteenth century. These
early labor cases articulated legal doctrines that greatly influenced later state and federal cases deal-
ing with problems of labor combinations which restrained trade through strikes, pickets, and boy-
cotts. Perhaps as important as the legal doctrine was the perception-that workers were transitory,
irresponsible, and dangerous-which was expressed quite openly in the cases and provided a key
element in the doctrinal analysis. See Holt, Labour Conspiracy Cases in the United States, 1805-1842:
Bias and Legitimation in Common Law Adjudication, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.L 591 (1984).
12. A. THIEBLOT, JR. & T. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: THE RECORD AND THE RESPONSE
BY COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE NLRB (1983).
13. Id. at 17.
14. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70-73 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
15 (1982)).
15. A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, supra note 12, at 496-98. See generally Haggard, Private
Injunctive Relief Against Labor Union Violence, 71 Ky. L.J. 509 (1983); Stewart & Townsend, Strike
Violence: The Need for Federal Injunctions, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1966).
16. See A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, supra note 12, at 199.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 198.
1988/89]
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the belief that from the late 1800s to 1932, "federal judges were inclined
to decide labor controversies according to their own predominantly con-
servative social and political views, and rendered decisions which were
generally hostile to the union's use of economic power."19 It seems ap-
propriate to reexamine some of the labor cases from this early period in
order to assess the conventional wisdom.
Thus, in this Article, I intend to demonstrate that the labels con-
servative and antilabor are not very useful for understanding some of the
significant labor injunction cases and the judges who wrote them. Indeed,
the conventional wisdom does not go far enough, because it fails to ac-
count for the emergence of the foundations of modem liberal labor ideol-
ogy within labor cases of the late nineteenth century. The judicial
assumptions about labor violence that Thieblot and Haggard describe as
idiosyncratic and time-bound, are in fact pervasive and continuous. For
example, Thieblot and Haggard write that "(ait one point in its history,
[in 1921], the Supreme Court seemed to be of the view that the manner in
which labor unions usually picketed was inherently intimidating and co-
ercive."'2 The Sears and DeBartolo cases21 suggest that this view of labor
picketing was not an anomaly of the 1921 Supreme Court. Furthermore,
as this Article will show, the attitudes about worker violence expressed
by the Supreme Court in 1921 were forged during the early judicial ca-
reers of two important members of that court: Chief Justice William
Howard Taft and Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. In my con-
clusion, I suggest that the struggles of the judiciary to articulate the rela-
tionship between labor violence and economic coercion continue even
today.22
3. The Future of Labor Unions. If it is true that late nineteenth
century attitudes about workers and worker violence persist in modem
labor jurisprudence, the possibilities for reconceptualizing and changing
the relationship between employers and employees are greatly limited.
19. Winter, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-
LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 71 (1960), quoted in A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, supra note 12, at
198.
20. A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, supra note 12, at 226. The authors are here referring to the
case, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), discussed
infra Part VI.B.
21. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
22. See, eg., Atleson, The Legal Community and the Transformation of Disputes: The Settle-
ment of Injunction Actions (publication forthcoming in 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 41 (1989)) (discussing
lawyers'.and state court judges' assumptions about picket line violence in the context of labor injunc-
tion cases in the 1970s in Buffalo, New York).
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Employees cannot become partners with employers in the managing of
the enterprise if it is assumed that at critical moments they are likely to
become deviant, irrational, and violent. In other words, the assumptions
underlying the notion of shared authority and decision making in the
workplace are in direct contradiction to the implicit assertion that work-
ers need to be controlled when they engage in certain types of collective
action, such as picketing. As the problems of the future role of unions in
their relationship to corporations have moved to the forefront of legal
scholarship,23 it seems relevant to explore the way in which the contra-
dictions between conflicting images of workers became embedded in la-
bor jurisprudence.
B. Images of Workers from the Past
Some of the most significant labor picketing and boycott cases from
the 1890s to the 1920s present a fairly consistent picture of the "typical"
employee. He was almost always male, single, white, but probably for-
eign born with an unpronouncable last name, uneducated, unskilled,
rootless, shiftless, irrational, unpredictable, aggressive and thus prone to
violence, and sympathetic to socialist, revolutionary ideas.24 He was
poor, although his poverty was rarely discussed, and he was definitely
lower class, although judges, many of whom were members of the upper
class, were uncomfortable acknowledging class divisions.
It should be self-evident that the foregoing description does not ap-
propriately portray the typical worker now, in the last quarter of the
twentieth century, nor the typical labor picketer of today.25 It is less ob-
vious that this was a gross distortion of reality in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century when the machinery of capitalism surged forward in
boom and bust cycles, periods marked by excesses of both wealth and
poverty, and massive dislocations in populations. This part of the history
of the American labor movement was marked by episodes of violent
worker protest of a kind which, when they occur today, seem anoma-
23. See, eg., Klare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate A Workplace Democracy Per-
spective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 39 (1988); Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Chang-
ing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilitiei, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 73 (1988).
24. In 1894, William Howard Taft asserted that "[i]mpatience with the existing social order and
contempt for the security of private property have found strongest expression among those who do
manual labor for a living .... In the large cities where foreign labor is congested, we find bodies of
avowed socialists." Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 MICH. L.J. 215, 219, 231 (1894).
25. For example, in the union picket lines of the 1980s one sees school teachers, nurses, airline
pilots, flight attendants, air traffic controllers, bank tellers-men and women from diverse ethnic and
racial backgrounds who are educated, middle class, and highly trained.
1988/89]
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lous. 6 Nevertheless, the fact that there were some workers who fit, more
or less, into the general outlines portrayed by some judges was not an
adequate rationalization for sweeping all workers within the universal
stereotypes. Nor were the acts of violence which occurred in labor dis-
putes during those turbulent years a sufficient justification for the aggres-
sive use of the courts to suppress two of the most economically potent
forms of collective action by workers-the picket line and the secondary
boycott.
In this Article, I describe the images of worker violence found in
several labor picketing and secondary boycott cases that represented key
doctrinal developments at either the state or federal level. The preoccu-
pation with violence which is seen in these labor cases from the 1890s to
the early 1920s can only partly be explained by the reality of labor vio-
lence which at times existed outside the courtroom. 7 Much of the so-
called labor violence throughout the early history of the American labor
movement was a response to direct acts of violence against workers by
employers and their agents, detectives, police, militia, and federal troops,
as well as to the more diffuse structural violence of the workplace. The
debate about whether worker violence at any particular time and place
was rational or irrational, offensive or defensive, purposive or situational,
coherent or random, justifiable or indefensible, depends on the facts and
one's own social vision. I do not wish to enter the debate about either the
causation of real worker violence or the justifications for it. I want in-
stead to show how images of worker violence were created and used by
several judges to shape legal doctrine independent of underlying factual
events.2" In the process of such image making, these judges often sepa-
rated the idea of worker violence from the reality of worker violence, and
thereby avoided confronting legal and moral questions of causation and
justification. Thus the image of the violent male worker became part of a
code language that expressed more abstract concepts and meanings. The
code words-words that connoted the fear of worker violence-appear
to have been used by some judges with the understanding that they
would be read and heard by an audience whose shared political and eco-
nomic views would enable them to decipher other levels of meaning.2 9
26. Contra A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, supra note 12.
27. See, e.g., Taft & Ross, American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Outcome, in 1
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 221 (H. Graham & T.
Gurr eds. 1969).
28. See, eg., C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON & A. HYDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR
LAW 186-89 (2d ed. 1982).
29. By "code words" I do not mean to imply a contrived conspiratorial language with secret
[Vol. 37
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In the labor cases discussed in this Article, a debate emerged among
judges over whether violence was inevitable in all labor activity, just in
certain situations, or just in the case before the court. If violence was
found or presumed, could it be controlled and who should control it?
The focus on violence masked the issues which were at the heart of the
debate: What assumptions should a court make about the nature of em-
ployees, their forms of political expression, and the effectiveness of their
economic power? During this period, judicial doctrine and legislative en-
actments dealing with labor picketing and secondary boycotts displayed
tensions and contradictions which are symptomatic of American labor
law even today."0 The judges who have used images of worker violence in
labor cases have, over time, both drawn from and contributed to shared
cultural perceptions that danger lurks in the picket line.31 Furthermore,
the power of images of violence to shape judicial decision making and to
be manipulated by judicial decision makers is as real today as it was in
meanings. What I will attempt to demonstrate is that the invocation of images of violence was used
to suggest notions of economic harm to property interests, civil and social disorder, socialism, com-
munism, and anarchy. The power of such code language is that it translates complex and abstract
ideas into terms that are accessible and readily communicated to others.
30. Labor picketing and boycott activity are today so circumscribed with rules and limitations,
both explicit and implicit, both externally imposed and self-imposed, that they are no longer as
effective a means of expression or economic persuasion as they once were. Part of the agenda of the
New Deal labor legislation was to channel collective action into "orderly and peaceful" mechanisms
for resolution of disputes involving interstate commerce. See National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)); Norris-LaGuardia
Act, ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982)). Numerous judicial decisions
have limited the scope of picketing and strike activity under the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 because of violence. See, eg., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939)
(holding that the sit-down strike is unprotected activity). Congress outlawed the secondary boycott
in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Labor Man-
agement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 8, 61 Stat. 141 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (1982)). In the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the NLRA, Congress imposed
limits on the ability of unions to engage in recognitional and organizational picketing. Landrum
Griffin Labor Reform Act, Pub. L. 86-257, tit. VII, §§ 704(a)-(c), § 705(a), 73 Stat. 542-45 (1959)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1982)).
31. I believe that this shared perception has contributed to the decline of unionism in the United
States today and, in part, explains the paradox that the American labor movement has been both
more militant and more conservative than its European counterparts. See P. EDWARDS, STRIKES IN
THE UNITrED STATES, 1881-1974, at 3 passim (1981). Although a comparative study of the role of
American and European judicial attitudes toward violence in labor picketing would be appropriate
to address fully my assertion here, it is beyond the scope of this Article. Edwards and others have
attempted to describe and account for "American exceptionalism"--the distinct ways in which the
development of the American labor movement has differed from the development of labor unions in
Western European countries. Id. at 219-53. My purpose here is to add another small piece to the
puzzle of "American exceptionalism" and to leave to others to determine whether this piece fits well
within the body of comparative law.
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the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Although this Article
will not explore the modem manifestations of the imagery of violence in
labor law, much can be learned from the way in which the images of the
violent worker in the early judicial opinions came to assume legitimacy in
the legal regulation of the economic activity, and thus power, of unions.
The exploration of these themes begins in Part II where I discuss
some of the reasons that employers, who sought legal intervention as a
means of resolving labor disputes in the decades spanning the turn of the
century, often preferred the jurisdiction of federal courts over state
courts. In particular, in the 1890s the federal antitrust laws greatly ex-
panded the possible bases of federal jurisdiction, and when coupled with
the equitable remedy of the injunction, became the most significant em-
ployer weapon in labor disputes.
Part III focuses on an 1894 decision, In re Phelan,32 written by a
young federal judge, William Howard Taft. The Phelan case was the re-
sult of a contempt trial of a labor leader who had violated a federal in-
junction in the Pullman strike. This case is significant for two reasons: It
prefigures the analysis of the role of violence and economic coercion in
federal labor cases over the next three to four decades, and it was written
by a man whose presence and attitudes came to dominate federal politics
and the federal judiciary from 1908 until the end of the 1920s.33
In Part IV, I analyze the images of violence in two Massachusetts
labor cases-Vegelahn v. Guntner3 4 and Plant v. Woods3 5-- to demon-
strate representative attitudes of state court judges. These cases articulate
the common law analysis of labor activity which provided much of the
conceptual framework for the federal labor cases brought under the fed-
eral antitrust laws. Vegelahn and Plant are particularly important be-
cause in both cases Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote influential dissenting
opinions which formed the analytical framework for his later opinions
and dissents in Supreme Court labor cases.
The Supreme Court's use of images of violence in the regulation of
labor disputes under the federal antitrust laws and federal common law
are examined in Part V, in the secondary boycott cases, Loewe v.
Lawlor36 and Duplex v. Deering,37 and in Part VI in the labor picketing
32. Thomas v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. (In re Phelan), 62 F. 803 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894).
33. William Howard Taft was President of the United States from 1909 to 1913 and Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1921 to 1929. See infra note 73.
34. 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
35. 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
36. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
37. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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cases, American Steel Foundries38 and Truax v. Corrigan.39 In these
cases, two other men emerge as pivotal judicial figures-the conservative,
Justice Mahlon Pitney, and the liberal, Justice Louis Brandeis-who join
Chief Justice Taft and Justice Holmes in articulating the boundaries of
collective action of workers.
In my conclusion, in Part VII, I bring together the strands of judi-
cial doctrine, language, and perceptions as they were interwoven in both
state and federal cases-from common law restraint of trade, to protec-
tion of property in federal receivership, to protection of interstate com-
merce under the federal antitrust laws. The exposition of these labor
cases, as well as the portrayal of the ideas of the judges who wrote them,
illustrates the relationship of the imagery of the violent worker to the
legal regulation of the economic coercion of the picket line and the secon-
dary boycott.
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL INJUNCTIONS
A. Judicial Attitudes about Labor Violence-
"No such thing as peaceful picketing"
For nearly half a century following the passage of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act in 1890, 0 the federal courts and, ultimately, the Supreme
Court had numerous occasions to comment on labor violence and the
role of labor picketing and boycotting under the federal antitrust laws.
The fear of labor violence, real or imagined, was an important theme
running through the federal antitrust cases of the period. The conse-
quence of much of the doctrinal development under the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act of 191441 was that for many years the federal anti-
trust laws were used to police and punish labor activity that was either
actually violent or perceived by judges to threaten violence. And, indeed,
federal injunctions and treble damage awards frequently proved to be
more effective against labor organizations than state civil and criminal
sanctions.
The preoccupation with violence was evident in the paradigmatic
images of workers which were injected into the discourse of the federal
antitrust cases. Again and again, these images were used to explain and
38. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
39. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
40. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)) [hereinafter
Sherman Act].




justify restraints on union activity. The judges' apparent concerns about
protecting persons and property from physical harm and damage, tradi-
tionally a function of state laws and courts, sometimes shaped their eco-
nomic analysis of the federal antitrust laws. Economic harm became
blurred with physical harm; peaceful economic coercion became
synomous with coercion through violence. The talk of violence both
masked and revealed the judges' real fears: fears of greater union strength
and autonomy, of class warfare, of anarchy, of loss of control, of change.
Many on the federal bench shared a deep distrust of any form of
collective action by workers, but picket lines and boycotts became the
objects of special opprobrium.42 Typical of the views of many federal
judges, were the attitudes expressed in District Judge McPherson's de-
scription of picketing in the 1905 case of Atchison T & S.F Railway v.
Gee:
This picketing is done by details of pickets .... At all hours when men are
going to and from work, morning, noon, and evening, the workmen must
go through and by pickets, sometimes two, four, six, and more, at a place.
At times the paths and walks are obstructed. At times the pickets are near
by, making grimaces, and at times acting as if violence were intended, and
at times uttering profanity and vulgarity. There is and can be no such thing
as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or
peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching. When men want to converse or per-
suade, they do not organize a picket line.4 3
For engaging in such picketing, four workmen were found guilty of con-
tempt of an earlier injunction, issued by the same judge, restraining them
from intimidating strikebreakers. Judge McPherson justified his punish-
ment of the contemnors on the basis that "this court has a concern that
peace and quiet prevail, and that a state of serfdom shall not exist, by a
so-called system of 'picketing' of one crowd of men over another."'
Despite his disapproval of the union's methods, even Judge McPher-
son had to acknowledge
[t]hat the employees have the legal right to quit or strike at pleasure, and
the company the legal right to discharge at pleasure, simple as the proposi-
tion is, is too often forgotten. And that the employees have the legal right to
42. See, eg., Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912, 917, 921 (8th Cir. 1897); Oxley Stave Co. v.
Coopers' Int'l Union, 72 F. 695, 699 (C.C.D. Kan. 1896); Farmers' Loan & Trust v. Northern Pac.
1KR., 60 F. 803, 821 (C.C.E.D. Wisc. 1894); Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 F. 135,
143, 146 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1891). For a discussion of the persistent hostility of federal and state court
judges toward picketing well into the mid-twentieth century, see Jones, Picketing and Coercion. A
Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. Rtv. 1023 (1953).
43. 139 F. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905).
44. Id. at 585.
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organize and maintain a union is equally simple, but just as often forgotten
by many. No court, federal or state, nor, indeed, any informed man, longer
denies the foregoing.45
But the right to organize a union and to strike was meaningless if the
strikers' jobs were taken by strikebreakers. Such "rights" were even more
hollow when, as in the case before Judge McPherson, the employer dis-
charged his union employees through a lockout and hired nonunion em-
ployees in their places, as a means of warding off a threatened strike. Yet
the legality of the employer's behavior was not the technical question
before Judge McPherson's court, and he pretended not to be deciding
"[w]ho is in the right and who is in the wrong," while doing precisely
that.4
6
B. The Abuses of the Labor Injunction-
"Government by injunction"
The attractions of federal jurisdiction were considerable for employ-
ers engaged in blocking union activities. Not only did federal substantive
law provide remedies and theories of liability unavailable in some state
courts, but enforcement of federal injunctions permitted the use of
United States marshals, and in appropriate cases, presidential authoriza-
tion of the use of federal troops. Since the local police force or militia
might be ineffective or sympathetic to union organizers-and less than
diligent in enforcing the peace during outbreaks of violence-the United
States marshals and federal troops could be expected to carry out the rule
of law efficiently and professionally.47
Federal judges were not insensitive to the delicate balance of local
political power which might diminish the usefulness of local police and
local courts to unpopular, union-busting employers. Often federal judges
were more than willing to use the power and authority of the federal
courts to aid employers in altering the local balance of power. For exam-
ple, in the Atchison case, the local authorities apparently ignored the
union's picketing because there had been no physical violence. Neverthe-
less, Judge McPherson observed that
there would not have been the slightest occasion for bringing this case, had
45. Id. at 582. Quotations in this Article have been modified to use the contemporary spelling of
"employee."
46. Id.
47. See J. COOPER, THE ARMY AND CIVIL DISORDER: FEDERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
LABOR DIsPuTES, 1877-1900, at 5-11, 25 (1980). In an address to the 1894 graduating class of
Michigan Law School, Taft stated, "In several states the open sympathy of peace officers with law-
breaking strikers has been most demoralizing to the cause of order." Taft, supra note 24, at 228-29.
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there been any sincerity and honesty of purpose by the local authorities to
maintain peace and order. Intimidation, force, violence, and brutality were
all winked at, because of the belief on the part of certain peace officers that
they would be kindly remembered on future election days .... 48
While the local police "winked at" the picketing, the federal court con-
demned it for its inherent brutality and vulgarity. Rejecting the possibil-
ity of peaceful picketing, Judge McPherson relied on the injunction to
serve a police function.
The injunction was a formidable weapon against unions. As Frank-
furter and Greene documented in The Labor Injunction, employers could
obtain temporary restraining orders in federal and state courts swiftly, ex
parte, without notice or hearing, and often on the strength of bare allega-
tions in a complaint, unsubstantiated by affidavits.49 Notice and an op-
portunity to be heard would come at a later proceeding, at the time of
issuance of a temporary or preliminary injunction, and a full hearing
before a judge would be required for issuance of a permanent injunc-
tion." By the time these later proceedings could be brought, however,
the temporary restraining order frequently would have effectively de-
feated the union activity, obviating the need for legal intervention. Some
restraining orders became permanent or "perpetual" injunctions, bar-
ring, in perpetuity, named defendants-union officials and employees-
from engaging in proscribed activity against the plaintiff employer.
Federal judges often used contempt trials to enforce their equity ju-
risdiction over labor. 1 Persons brought before the court for contempt
proceedings, for violation of a temporary restraining order, or a prelimi-
nary or final injunction, had to face the same judge who issued the decree
and risk punishment "at the discretion of the judge" ranging from "a
substantial fine to months in jail."52 Justice Brandeis used the occasion of
his dissent in Truax v. Corrigan to describe the consequences of "govern-
ment by injunction":
Charges of violating an injunction were often heard on affidavits merely,
without the opportunity of confronting or cross-examining witnesses. Men
found guilty of contempt were committed in the judge's discretion, without
either a statutory limit upon the length of the imprisonment, or the oppor-
tunity of effective review on appeal, or the right to release on bail pending
48. 139 F. at 583.
49. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 53-55 (1930).
50. Id. at 54.
51. See ia at 231 app. I (listing contempt proceedings and convictions in 118 federal cases
during the early decades of the twentieth century).
52. Id. at 58.
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possible revisory proceedings. The effect of the proceeding upon the individ-
ual was substantially the same as if he had been successfully prosecuted for
a crime; but he was denied ... those rights which by the Constitution are
commonly secured to persons charged with a crime.53
Through the use of injunctions and contempt proceedings, criminal
remedies were imposed in instances where they could not be successfully
obtained on the basis of violations of statutes or common law crimes. The
equity courts became, in effect, a police arm of the state, and the threat of
incarceration for contempt added persuasive authority to injunctions.
For the individual worker or union official, this threat could have
deep, personal significance, as Eugene Debs and other labor leaders
learned in 1894 when the United States government used the Sherman
Act to defeat the Pullman boycott.5 4 Debs was convicted under an "om-
nibus injunction ' 5 which prohibited, among other activities, compelling
or inducing "by threats, intimidation, persuasion, force, or violence" any
employees of "said railroads" to "refuse or fail to perform any of their
duties" or "to leave the service of such railroads."56 Despite the fact that
Eugene Debs and the other leaders of the American Railway Union di-
recting the strike "had been repeatedly cautioning the strikers against
any form of violence or intimidation," isolated episodes of violence broke
out as the strike spread to railyards across the country. 7 Although the
53. 257 U.S. at 366-67; see also id. at 366 n.34 (listing articles cited by Brandeis concerning the
evils of "government by injunction").
54. Debs was imprisoned for six months for contempt of an injunction brought under the Sher-
man Act. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894). The injunction was upheld in the
Supreme Court on the different and broader grounds that the United States government had power
to remove obstructions to the free passage of interstate commerce and the mails. In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564 (1895). Historian Robert V. Bruce noted that ex-President Rutherford B. Hayes in the mid-
1880s reflected upon the growing power of the railroads and corporations,
[a]nd ... came to the conclusion that "the governmental policy should be to prevent the
accumulation of vast fortunes; and monopolies, so dangerous in control, should be held
firmly in the grip of the people." By 1894, John Sherman's antitrust act was on the
books. Its first great triumph was now at hand--sending Eugene Debs to prison.
R. BRUCE, 1877: YEAR OF VIOLENCE 320 (1959) (quoting 4 DIARY AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD
BIRCHARD HAYES 383 (C. Williams ed. 1925)).
55. Arnold Paul noted that "[t]he Debs injunction, later to be known as the 'omnibus injunc-
tion,' occasioned surprise at the time for its breadth and scope and has been considered by many
historians as unprecedented." A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTI-
TUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 139 (1960). For an account of the Debs litigation, see id.
at 131-58.
56. The injunction is reprinted in F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 49, at 253, 254-
55 app. IV. See also A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 139-40.
57. A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 140; see N. SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DENS: CITIZEN AND
SOCIALIST 132-33 (1982); see also United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724, 757-62 (C.C.N.D. IM. 1894),
affld sub nom. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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police had been able to maintain control in the Chicago railyards, and
the state militia had not been called out, President Cleveland sent in fed-
eral troops on July 4, 1894, over the Illinois governor's objections.58 The
death and violence that ensued is a well-known chapter in labor history.
During the succeeding weeks as the strike collapsed in disarray, Debs
was arrested twice, eventually convicted, and sentenced to six-months
imprisonment for contempt of court. 9
The United States Strike Commission, which President Cleveland
appointed in late July of 1894, reported that the responsibility for most of
the strike violence lay with the railroad companies, not the strikers. 60 But
Circuit Judge Woods found Debs and others to be in contempt of court
because, through their leadership of the strike, they had encouraged
"threats, violence, and other unlawful means of interference with the op-
erations of the roads. ' 6 Judge Woods wrote:
Strikes by railroad employees... have been attended generally, if not in
every instance, with some form of intimidation or force .... Under the
conditions of last summer, when there were many idle men seeking employ-
ment, it was impossible that a strike which aimed at a general cessation of
business upon the railroads of the country should succeed without violence;
and it is not to be believed that the defendants entered upon the execution
of their scheme without ap reciating the fact, and without having deter-
mined how to deal with it. 6
The assumptions that railroad strikes were inherently violent, par-
ticularly in times of depression and high unemployment, and that the
violence that ensued during strikes was the responsibility of the strike
leaders, posed a serious dilemma for union organizers at the turn of the
century. Successful strikes required a high degree of organization, expert
management, and strong leadership. Some union leaders recognized that
union-instigated violence was antithetical to the strike objectives and
might lead to charges of criminal and tort liability.63 Thus labor violence
that occurred during strikes could be in defiance of explicit union direc-
tives, and could occur spontaneously, sporadically, and in response to
58. A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 140-41; see also G. CLEVELAND, THE GOVERNMENT IN THE
CHICAGO STRIKE OF 1894, at 40-41 (1913), reprinted in THE PULLMAN STRIKE (L. Stein ed. 1969).
59. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724.
60. A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 153.
61. United States v. Debs, 64 F. at 765.
62. Id. at 757. See A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 154; see also id. n.44 (listing additional cases
arising out of the Pullman strike which also applied the Sherman Act to labor).
63. See United States v. Debs, 64 F. at 759-60; see also R. GINGER, EUGENE V. DEnS: A BIoG-




what were perceived as acts of provocation by employers, their private
guards and strikebreakers, the police, state militia, or federal troops. In
fact, in some violent labor episodes such as the Pullman strike, many of
the participants in the violence were not union members or employeesf"
The paradox for union leaders was that the more they assumed leader-
ship over strikes and attempted to curb violent behavior, the more they
became responsible for any violence that occurred. Responsibility inevi-
tably meant culpability. The blame for all violence was placed on the
most effective and powerful union leaders, not on the immediate events
that precipitated the violent events, nor certainly on the general social
and economic conditions that caused the workers to strike in the first
place. Thus, ironically, strikers whose leaders were jailed on contempt
charges may have been more prone to violent and irresponsible behavior,
in part because of their lack of direction and organization, in part be-
cause of their frustration with the futility of peaceful methods. 5
Whether the particular strike or picketing activity was peaceful and
orderly, or violent and disorderly, the bills of complaint requesting the
equitable relief, and the restraining orders and injunctions issued in re-
sponse, often contained formulaic recitations that violence had occurred
or was threatened." It was not necessary to prove that workers or union
organizers were responsible for actual acts of violence, or even credible
threats of violence. The assumption that violence was "inevitable" in a
strike, or "inherent" in a picket line, was a sufficient basis for issuing
injunctions against workers and their union leaders. The assumption was
not, however, universal. The parameters of the debate were revealed in a
contempt case decided in 1894 by a federal court judge who later became
president and then chief justice of the United States.
64. Samuel Gompers wrote of the Pullman boycott that "[e]ven papers that had never been
friendly to labor conceded that no effort was spared to precipitate violence and then to give the
impression it was due to strikers. Thus an opportunity was created for sending in troops." 1 S.
GOMPERS, supra note 63, at 408. See generally S. BUDER, PULLMAN: AN EXPERIMENT IN INDUS-
TRIAL ORDER AND COMMUNITY PLANNING, 1880-1930, at 180-85 (1967).
65. See, e.g., J. COOPER, supra note 47, at 5-6.
66. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 49, at 61-65.
67. Bills of complaint were rarely accompanied by supporting affidavits and a majority of re-
straining orders "were granted without notice to the defendants or opportunity to be heard." Id. at
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III. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER RAILROADS IN RECEIVERSHIP:
JUDGE TAFT AND THE PHELAN CASE
A. Introduction-"A kind of police court"
By the time of the Pullman strike in 1894, the federal courts had
issued numerous injunctions in railway labor disputes in cases that did
not require the innovative assertion of jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act.68 The recurring economic problems of the early 1890s had forced
many railroads into receivership. As custodians of the assets of the rail-
way corporations which were held in trust by court-appointed receivers,
federal judges, sitting in equity, had jurisdiction over the operation of the
railroads and the protection of railroad property. When labor unrest de-
veloped, the receivers often found it expedient to petition the courts for
injunctions either to break up strikes or as a form of insurance against
disabling strikes which were anticipated.69 Given the obligation of the
federal courts to protect the corporate assets under their jurisdiction
from "irreparable mischief"---which could mean either physical harm
to railroad property or economic harm to railroad interests-the "blan-
ket injunctions"71 were generally granted in the sweeping form
requested.
One such receivers' petition for equitable relief resulted in a deci-
sion, Thomas v. Cincinnati, NO. & T.P. Railway-known as In re Phe-
lan 72 -by William Howard Taft.73 Judge Taft's views are particularly
noteworthy because he later wrote, as chief justice, the majority opinions
in two significant Supreme Court cases in which key assumptions about
68. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 49, at 23 & n.98.
69. See, eg., A PAUL, supra note 55, at 117-22 (discussing Farmers' Loan & Trust v. Northern
Pac. R.R., 60 F. 803 (C.C.E.D. Wise. 1894)).
70. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1894).
71. See A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 118 n.30.
72. 62 F. 803 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894).
73. In 1892, after serving as a judge of the Superior Court of Ohio and solicitor general of the
United States, William Howard Taft was appointed judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. As president from 1909 to 1913, Taft continued the aggressive trust-busting under
the Sherman Act that President Roosevelt had initiated. See 1 H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFr 144 (1939). In 1921, President Warren G. Harding nominated Taft as
chief justice. Taft served in that position until illness forced his departure in December 1929. He
formally resigned on February 3, 1930, and died shortly thereafter. 2 id. at 1078-79.
In this Article, I use Taft as a representative judicial figure of the period. I do so in part because of
his prominence as an author of judicial opinions and also because of his available writing, as both
judge and politician, on legal matters, including the politics of law. It is, of course, risky and difficult
to claim that his views were typical, but they were widely disseminated and heard. And they were
influential to the extent he occupied important public positions. Historians often use representative
figures to help capture historical periods and images, and I assume the risks of doing so here.
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labor violence were articulated: American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Central Trades Council 4 and Truax v. Corrigan.7 s The 1894 railroad re-
ceivership case foreshadows the later Supreme Court cases and reveals
the struggle of one judge to define the legality of collective action by
workers and the role of violence in the federal law then governing labor
activity.
In the last week of June in 1894, while Judge Taft, a member of the
Sixth Circuit, was sitting as a district judge for the Southern District of
Ohio, he watched the American Railway Union, through its leadership
of a rail strike and boycott of all trains carrying Pullman cars, "tie up"
the railroads of Cincinnati and "paralyze all traffic of every kind" in and
out of Cincinnati.76 As part of the "Debs Rebellion," the railway strike
and boycott in Cincinnati, as in other locations in the West and Midwest,
prompted swift responses to the receivers' petitions by the federal judici-
ary. Because of the fortuitous circumstance that the Cincinnati, New Or-
leans & Texas Pacific.Railway Company, "more commonly known as the
Cincinnati Southern Railroad,"" happened to be in receivership under
federal court jurisdiction, the receiver petitioned the court, on July 2, for
assistance in stopping the strike. Within one day, Judge Taft had the
strike leader, F.W. Phelan, arrested for conspiracy to interfere with the
court receiver's operation of the railroad. On July 5th, Phelan began his
trial for contempt of court.
For a week, Judge Taft heard testimony and took evidence in the
contempt proceedings against Phelan, the American Railway Union offi-
cial who had been sent to Cincinnati by Debs to organize and supervise
the local trainmen in their strike and boycott efforts. Phelan was accused
of having conspired with Debs to "tie up" the Cincinnati Southern Rail-
road, "and other roads in the western states" until demands of the Pull-
man Palace Car Company employees for reinstatement of strikers and
higher wages were met.7 8 He was also accused of inciting and directing
the strike against the railroad, and of making "inflammatory speeches"
to railroad employees, urging them "to quit the service of the receiver"
and "prevent others from taking their places, by persuasion if possible,
by clubbing if necessary."7 9
74. 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
75. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
76. Thomas v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. (In re Phelan), 62 F. 803, 812-13 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1894).





Phelan, however, denied that he was "in any sense responsible for
the strike of the receiver's employees... or for the paralysis of business
which followed." 80 He claimed repeatedly and "with much emphasis"
that he "at no time advised any man to strike.""1 Although he admitted
he was directed to be in Cincinnati during the time of the boycott, Phelan
placed a different, more benevolent interpretation on his activities. Taft
wrote concerning Phelan's testimony that
[hie says that he came here with no direction except to visit the employees
of the Pullman Company at a branch factory at Ludlow, to explain to them
the merits of the controversy between their employer and their fellows at
Chicago, and then, if they struck, to see that they appointed committees
who should keep order among them, and look after the sick .... [B]ut he
strenuously denies he was here for the purpose of laying on the boycott or
inciting a general strike. He would have the court believe that what oc-
curred was wholly spontaneous, and not through his agency, and that his
business was, if there should be such coincidental spontaneity resulting in a
strike; to prevent disorder, and to look after the sick.82
Taft rejected Phelan's characterization of his activites, finding his
testimony "evasive and wanting in sincerity."83 He also disbelieved the
versions of events given by the railroad employees who testified in Phe-
lan's behalf. Taft commented that the employees "show nothing save that
their loyalty to their chief is greater than their regard for the sanctity of
their oaths." 4 He went on to note that "nearly all" of Phelan's witnesses
"would have the court believe that Phelan was merely a peacemaker in
this community, with no responsibility for the strike, and no purpose to
incite it or continue it."'85
This was a world seen from two startlingly different perspectives.
The events of the summer of 1894 were careening out of control, and the
general strike and boycott in the Cincinnati railroads were a response to
far more than the words of one man, or two. To the trainmen, Phelan
was a sort of peacemaker, a person who could bring order and clarity out
of the chaos and confusion which they experienced during those years of
economic dislocation. In a way, too, it was not Phelan's strike; it was
their strike. They could not have viewed themselves as mere pawns in a
sinister conspiracy between Phelan and Debs. Rather, they almost cer-
80. Id. at 809.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 808.
83. Id. at 814.




tainly viewed themselves as people of will who had taken responsible ac-
tions to help improve the working conditions of members of their
union-the Pullman Company employees.86  Although Phelan had
given the Cincinnati railway workers information, direction, and leader-
ship, they had not responded out of fear and irrationality, but out of
understanding and reason. They recognized the argument for the eco-
nomic interdependence of working people and the importance of union
solidarity. They were attempting to assert their notion of community
through their participation in the strike and the boycott of the Pullman
cars.
8 7
Taft was deeply disturbed by the Phelan contempt trial and his own
judicial role as protector of the Cincinnati Southern Railway property.
Privately he revealed his views of Phelan and the Pullman boycott in
correspondence with his wife, Helen Herron Taft-Nellie-who was
staying at the Taft summer residence in Canada. He wrote:
[W]hat has worried me more than anything else is this railway boycott. I
have a force of fifty deputy marshals on one side of the river and of seventy-
five on the other. Men are constantly being arrested and brought before me
and I am conducting a kind of police court. I issued a warrant for Phelan,
the head strike man here and Debs's assistant, and he was brought in yes-
terday afternoon. All the labor men are engaged in holding meetings every
night. Last night... I was the object of fiery denunciations in many meet-
ings. I hate the publicity that this business brings me into.88
From Canada, Helen Taft expressed intense interest in the outcome of
the Phelan case, which she had followed in the newspapers. She wrote
her husband, "'It was so exciting I could not read fast enough .... I
shall be so anxious to hear what you will do about Phelan.' "89 Historian
Judith Icke Anderson has written the following account of Taft's letters
to his wife during the Phelan trial:
[Ie wrote to Nellie, ... "The situation in Chicago is very alarming and
distressing and until they have had much bloodletting, it will not be better."
When word came that thirty men had been wounded by federal troops, he
wrote coldly that "though it is bloody business, everybody hopes that it is
86. See N. SALVATORE, supra note 57, at 137 (discussing Debs's view of the Pullman boycott as
a "practical exhibition of sympathy").
87. See, eg., Zieren, The Labor Boycott and Class Consciousness in Toledo, Ohio, in LIFE AND
LABOR: DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN WORKING CLASS HISTORY 131, 134 (C. Stephenson & R.
Asher eds. 1986).
88. Letter from William Howard Taft to Helen Herron Taft (July 1894), quoted in 1 H. PRIN-
OLE, supra note 73, at 135.
89. Letter from Helen Herron Taft to William Howard Taft (July 1894), quoted in J. ANDER-
SON, WILLIAM HOwARD TAFT: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 64 (1981).
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true .... There are a lot of sentimentalists who ought to know better, who
allow themselves to sympathize with the wild cries of socialists." In another
letter Taft told Nellie: "They have killed only six of the mob as yet. This is
hardly enough to make an impression." 90
Taft's biographer, Henry Pringle, recounted that "[o]n the eve of
Phelan's trial, Judge Taft was troubled by no doubts as to the man's
guilt. 'I do not know,' he told his wife, 'just what the evidence... will
show, but I am pretty sure he will have to be found guilty from his own
published utterances.' "91 While Taft was "'a good deal in doubt'"
about what he " 'ought to do'" with Phelan, he expressed to his wife his
desires" 'not... to make a martyr of him nor.., to be so easy with him
as to encourage him or his fellow conspirators to think that they have
nothing to fear from the court.' "92
Taft's public judicial observations, however, were only slightly more
restrained than his private comments to his wife. In his opinion deciding
Phelan's fate, he presented the labor leader as an outsider and a trouble-
maker, a threat to the community. Perhaps recalling the bloody nation-
wide railway strike of 1877,93 Taft wrote that "[t]he gigantic character of
the conspiracy of the American Railway Union staggers the imagina-
tion."94 According to Taft, the local trainmen were "incited" by Phelan
to strike, and prevented from returning to work by his "secret terror-
ism." 95 Far from being responsible for their own actions, they were
manipulated and terrified into responding to Phelan's commands. Their
claim that they boycotted the Pullman cars out of sympathy for the situ-
ation of the Pullman strikers or out of shared economic interests was
illogical to Taft because "there was no natural relation between Pullman
and the railway employees."96
Judge Taft's views of Phelan's role in the strike, the functioning of
"secret terrorism" through threatened violence, and ultimately, the ille-
gitimacy of the strike and boycott, were developed through his analysis
of three questions. The first two were questions of fact, the last a question
of law. First, was Phelan sent to Cincinnati by Eugene Debs and the
90. IM at 63.
91. Letter from William Howard Taft to Helen Herron Taft (July 4, 1894), quoted In I H.
PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 135.
92. Letter from William Howard Taft to Helen Herron Taft (July 4, 1894), quoted in I H.
PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 135-36.
93. See, e.g., R. BRUCE, supra note 54.
94. Phelan, 62 F. at 821.
95. Id. at 805, 815.
96. Id. at 820.
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American Railway Union to enforce a boycott of Pullman cars by incit-
ing a general strike of all Cincinnati railway employees, including the
employees of the Cincinnati Southern which he knew was in the hands of
the court receiver? Second, did Phelan advise "intimidation, threats, or
violence in carrying out the boycott"9 7 in any of the speeches which he
gave to railway employees and local union officials? Third, "[t]he real
question," was "whether the act of Phelan in instigating and inciting the
employees of the receiver to leave his employ was without lawful excuse,
and therefore malicious. 9 8
B. The Outsider as Instigator of the Strike-
"Knock it to them hard as possible"
In responding affirmatively to the first question regarding Phelan's
responsibility for the general railway strike in Cincinnati, Judge Taft did
not have to rest his finding of fact on just the lack of credibility of the
union's witnesses and his own assumptions about Phelan's role in inciting
and continuing the strike. From a series of telegrams exchanged between
the two union officials, Taft also had evidence of the relationship between
Debs and Phelan, and Phelan's own view of his functions in Cincinnati:
Debs to Phelan:
"June 27, 1894.




"I cannot keep others out if Big Four is excepted. The rest are
emphatic on all together or none. The tie-up is successful."
Debs to Phelan:
"June 29, 1894.




"Knock it to them hard as possible. Keep Big Four out, and help
get them out at other places."
Phelan to Debs:
"July 2, 1894.
"Going out all around. Firemen a unit. Will soon be an avalanche
to us. Working outside points."
Debs to Phelan:
97. Id. at 813.








"Advices from all points show our position strengthened. Baltimore
and Ohio, Pan Handle, Big Four, Lake Shore, Erie, Grand Trunk, and
Mich. Central are now in fight. Take measures to paralyze all those that
enter Cincinnati. Not a wheel turning on Grand Trunk between here and
Canadian Line." 99
This was indeed, as Taft wrote, a strike of "gigantic character."'' 0
For Debs, Phelan, and the striking trainmen, the strike was empowering.
It was at once an act demonstrating the strength, solidarity, and vitality
of their fledgling union and an act affirming their determination to allevi-
ate the miserable working conditions of some of the most vulnerable
members of their class. For Taft, the strike was disabling, a threat to the
order and hierarchy of society. It was nothing less than "the starvation of
a nation" 10 1 by cutting the supply lines of food and goods. The disjunc-
tion between the two perspectives grew out of different understandings of
the immediate and ultimate goals of the union activity.
Given the existence of the strike, its massive scale, and Phelan's
clear leadership role in coordinating the Cincinnati boycott with the boy-
cott in other locations, as well as Taft's view of the malevolence of the
strike, it is inconceivable that Taft would not have found Phelan respon-
sible for inciting the strike. The business community of Cincinnati
needed a scapegoat, and Judge Taft needed to assert the authority of the
federal courts and the primacy of law and order. It would have been
politically unwise and pragmatically difficult to institute civil or criminal
proceedings against the large number of local trainmen who played a
crucial role in the strike. Those who in fact participated in sporadic inci-
dents of violence may have been impossible to identify, much less convict
of criminal conduct. The railroad employers had, in any event, imposed
their own sanction-discharge-against the strikers.
Judge Taft had to demonstrate the legitimacy and power of the
court as caretaker of the railroad property in a way that would reaffirm
the court's role as arbiter of community values. Blaming Phelan, an out-
sider, would allow the community to heal more quickly from the wounds
of the strike. The local community leaders-including the railroad em-
99. Id. at 812.




ployers-satisfied that the strikes were externally caused, could more
readily forget the troubling incident and ignore any question of their own
culpability in the events. Punishing Phelan also avoided the potential risk
of making local citizens into martyrs.
As Judge Taft recognized, his jurisdiction was limited. He could
only punish Phelan for contempt of court. The power to punish con-
tempts existed
to secure present and future compliance with [the court's] orders... and
not to impose punishment commensurate with crimes or misdemeanors
committed in the course of the contempt, which are cognizable in a differ-
ent tribunal or in this court by indictment and trial by jury. I have no right,
and do not wish, to punish the contemner for the havoc which he and his
associates have wrought to the business of this country, and the injuries
they have done to labor and capital alike, or for the privations and suffer-
ings to which they have subjected innocent people, even if they may not be
amenable to the criminal laws therefore.10 2
Through his protestations, Taft made clear what Phelan's six-month
jail sentence meant. It was both a penalty to Phelan and a warning to
labor leaders. Judge Taft attempted to distance himself from the sentence
by claiming that "[t]he punishment for a contempt is the most disagreea-
ble duty a court has to perform, but it is one from which the court cannot
shrink."'1 3 But Taft was absolutely unambiguous in his assessment of
what was at stake in the case: "If orders of the court are not obeyed, the
next step is unto anarchy."'" Phelan, unrestrained, was an anarchist in
Taft's vision of the world.
Taft had told the 1894 graduating class of the Michigan Law School
that "if the present movement against corporate capital is not met and
fought, it will become a danger to our whole social fabric."'05 Those who
wished to preserve law, order, and private property, he said, "must make
their views and voices heard above the resounding din of anarchy, social-
ism, populism and the general demagogy."'0 6 Taft observed that the role
of lawyers and the courts was critical, because in the past "charter guar-
anties" had been established for
the benefit of the poor and the lowly against the oppressions of the rich and
powerful. Today it is the rich who seek the protection of the courts for the
102. Id. at 823.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Taft, supra note 24, at 231. See also A. MASON, WILLIAM HowARD TAFr: CHIEF JUS-
TICE 46 (1964).
106. Taft, supra note 24, at 231.
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enforcement of those guaranties .... Today, if a judge would yield to the
easy course, he would lean against the wealthy and favor the many. While
this seems to be a change, it is not really so. The sovereign today is the
people, or the majority of the people. The poor are the majority. The appeal
of the rich to the constitution and courts for protection is still an appeal by
the weak against the unjust aggressions of the strong.10 7
C. Threats, Intimidation, and Violence-"Secret terrorism"
The equation of some forms of worker collective action with anar-
chy, and the view of union leaders as anarchists, was most clearly ex-
pressed in Taft's discussions of the real or presumed role of violence in
worker protests. The goal of the anarchist was to overthrow the rule of
law; the method was violence. Although evidence of violence was not
always necessary to establish the illegality of certain forms of collective
action, such as the secondary boycott or mass picketing, the imagery of
violence confirmed the unlawful, anarchistic motives of the union lead-
ers. In a contempt trial, establishing the presence of actual violence or
threats of violence was not subjected to the constitutional burdens of
proof required for a criminal conviction.10 8 The words and actions of
union leaders could be tied to violence by the slenderest of threads.
In the Phelan case, Judge Taft apparently wanted to demonstrate
that Phelan had advised the use of violence and intimidation, because
this fact would confirm Taft's view of Phelan as an anarchist and would
justify a harsh jail sentence. For three pages of his opinion, Taft linked
Phelan to the violence of the strike by tenuous evidence. Phelan was
charged with having said, at a June 28th union committee meeting "be-
hind closed doors" where "no newspaper reporters were permitted to be
present," "that it was the duty of every A.R.U. man to quit work, to
induce and coax other men to go out, and, if this was not successful, to
take a club, and knock them out."'"I 9 According to the testimony of two
witnesses, Phelan's statement "elicited much applause" and "shortly
before or after, Phelan advised them to be law-abiding citizens."110
The two critical witnesses who were present at the June 28th meet-
ing were J.O. Sweeney, a timekeeper of the Big Four Railway, whom
Taft considered to be "a wholly disinterested witness,"' 1  and E.W. Dor-
mer, a detective from the Field Detective Agency of St. Louis employed
107. Id
108. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.





by the Cincinnati Southern Railroad. Dormer, working as a brakeman
under the assumed name of Williams, had apparently taken an active
part in the strike, including efforts "to involve some of his fellow strikers
in a trespass on the company's property." '112 Nevertheless, Taft found
that Dormer's "character has not been attacked otherwise than by show-
ing his assumption of a false appearance and name." ' a
Since the credibility of Phelan and his union committee members
was already in question, Phelan's "positive denials" of the version of
events as characterized by Sweeney and Dormer carried little weight
with the court. 4 Phelan's testimony about his June 28th remarks was
quoted by the court:
"I told nobody to take a club, and do anything with anybody .... I
said, 'You constitute yourselves a committee of one, each of you, and go to
the people,-the community in which you live. Go to the boys ... and
explain to them this trouble. Talk to them about it. Beseech them to listen,
because I want them to get the idea before they would condemn us about it;
but do not take a club, and knock them in the head about it.' The peculiar-
ity of the speech elicited applause, but I am afraid it was taken the other
way."t1 1
5
Whether, as a matter of fact, Phelan said "do take a club" or "do not
take a club" in his speech was not as important as what Phelan intended
by his words and how, in the context of his speech, the listeners-union
committee members-understood his meaning. There was no evidence
that the union trainmen present at the meeting, if they heard Phelan to
say "take a club and knock them in the head," took the words in their
literal sense as a call to violent action. There was ample evidence that
Phelan may, indeed, have used such words as a rhetorical flourish to
engender excitement, sympathy, and solidarity. Taken out of context, out
of shared meanings and understandings, and placed under the stark
lights of the courtroom, the rough, militant, and aggressive language of
union organizers could be interpreted as exhortations to violence. Figura-
tive speech could be understood as literal discourse; humor and sarcasm
as threats; passion and fervor as cold-blooded deliberation and
provocation.
Phelan admitted having said, "'He who is not with us in the strug-
gle is against us, and will be so regarded.' "116 He did not deny speaking
112. Id. at 814.
113. Id.
114. Id.




"in scathing terms of the Pullmans," and saying that "'[w]e want no
weak-kneed individuals with us; we want warriors.' ,,117 Nor did Phelan
deny Dormer's testimony that, at another closed union committee mem-
ber meeting on June 29th, Phelan said, "'We must stand solidly together
in this hour of trial, and, if anybody returns to work, or takes the place of
strikers, seize them by the back of the neck, and throw them out.' ,,)18
Under examination, Phelan said he was not able to recollect this last
remark, but he offered the explanation that " '[i]f I did say it, I meant to
throw them out of the organization.'" 119
Phelan's excuse for what the court viewed as "personal intimida-
tion" was that "in a speech remarks slip out that one does not intend." 2 '
The dilemma for Phelan was that if he denied that he said words which
incited violence, he was not believed, and if he admitted that he said such
words, which he understood to have a different meaning in context, his
explanation was not believed. It is no wonder that Phelan was seen as an
evasive witness, nor that union members called to testify in such trials
might have had a difficult time establishing their credibility. Taft could
not have understood the acts and intentions, the language and motiva-
tions, of the workers within the social and economic context of the work-
ing-class community. He thus linked the union leaders to violence and
severed the violence from the context in which it developed. When the
evidence of union responsibility for violence was slim or nonexistent, im-
agination sufficed.
Judge Taft used his imagination to fill gaps left in the testimony
about Phelan's speeches. Taft wrote:
It is doubtless true that Phelan did tell his men to be law-abiding, that he
did tell them to stay out of saloons, and off the company's property, in
public, and that he did not wish his followers to subject themselves to the
punishment of the law .... [A]nd this has doubtless prevented many open
assaults and trespasses. But I do not doubt that at the same time he en-
couraged in them a vicious and malicious disposition towards those of their
fellows who did not join with them in this boycott, by expressions of the
kind testified to by Sweeney and Dormer, and most evasively denied by
Phelan, slyly slipped in where they could be given a double meaning if
questioned.
The expressions were for the purpose of bringing into operation that
secret terrorism which is so effective for discouraging new men from filling
the strikers' places, and which is so hard to prove in a court of justice unless
117. Id.





it results in open assault. That Phelan openly discouraged conflict with the
law is to his credit as a strike organizer, for he wished public sympathy; but
that he wished the aid of that secret terrorism, which is quite as unlawful,
seems to me to be established.
121
It was thus through his encouragement of "secret terrorism," not
his public speaking and organization, that Phelan became responsible for
some threats, "an assault," and the "[i]nsulting and aggressive language"
used during the strike.1 2 2 The effectiveness of the strike and boycott in
shutting down railway operations was itself evidence of the existence of
"secret terrorism," even without evidence of direct violent attacks. Thus,
Taft believed that the employees participated in the strike out of fear of
union reprisals. He wrote:
Threats are hard to prove. If effective, they not only keep away the employ-
ees from service, but the witness from the stand. The receiver has been
obliged to keep a large force of the United States deputy marshals on both
sides of the river and on his engines and trains in order to induce his em-
ployees, new and old, to remain in his service. I cannot presume that such
protection was invoked by the employees because of groundless fears.
1 2 3
The notion that armed forces were "invoked" solely by employees
for their protection against unruly and violent union trainmen was
presented as a justification for either government intervention or the hir-
ing of private guards and detectives. Protection of strikebreakers' access
to work was characterized as protection of the individual's liberty of con-
tract or right to accept work on any mutually acceptable terms, free of
third-party coercion. However, this rhetoric also shielded the employer's
property interests.1 24 The guards and marshals were protecting employer
access to the labor market of strikebreakers who were essential for con-
tinued productivity during a strike. The true coercion and "terrorism"
were revealed in Judge Taft's statement that the United States marshals
were needed to "induce" both "new and old" employees "to remain in
service." '12 5 The responsibility for violence also lay with the powerful
combination of the government and the railroad corporations determined
to keep the trains running by the use of United States marshals, the hir-
121. Id. at 815.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Access of employees to their workplace was characterized as a property right of the em-
ployer. See infra text accompanying notes 366-76. See also infra text accompanying notes 399-401,
531-33 (discussing Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917)). See generally
Hurvitz, American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial Property Rights: Boycotts Courts,
and the Juridical Reorientation of 1886-1895, 8 IND. REL. L.J. 307, 343 (1986).
125. Phelan, 62 F. at 815 (emphasis added).
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ing of strikebreakers, the firing and blacklisting of union trainmen, and
the use of undercover detectives to discredit legitimate union activity. 126
In Judge Taft's mind, however, the railroad receiver was merely re-
acting to Phelan's "secret terrorism." Difficult as such terrorism was to
prove, the best evidence that it existed was the railway's use of armed
marshals to keep the trainmen at work. Although the boycott itself was
held to be an unlawful interference with property in the hands of the
receiver, and was a contempt of court, Phelan's "secret terrorism" and
his "suggestions leading to intimidations" were "aggravations of the con-
tempt." 27 Phelan's link to the strike violence provided the needed justifi-
cation for a sentence which would be understood as both punishment and
deterrence. The focus on worker violence also served to undercut the
legitimacy of the strikers' motives and of their concept of community.
Taft did not perceive the acts and provocations of the government and
railroad corporations as violence, but as legitimate social control. 128
Thus, the different understandings of violence were linked to conflicting
views of community.
D. The Strikers' Objectives-"The starvation of a nation"
Judge Taft was undoubtedly uncomfortable in resting the contempt
conviction solely on evidence of Phelan's statements about violence and
his responsibility, as an outside instigator, for the strike. The alternative
public persona of Phelan, as rational organizer and proponent of peaceful
strike methods, had to be accounted for and discredited. Taft accom-
plished this by finding the motives for the strike and boycott unlawful on
the theory that Phelan could have been held civilly liable for the rail-
road's losses, even if there had been no violence. Taft observed that if the
railroad had not been in receivership, it could have attempted to recover
damages for injuries resulting from Phelan's "malicious or unlawful in-
terference" with its business by his act of inducing employees to leave its
service.129
126. Professor Salvatore has written that in Chicago "the presence of federal troops incited the
violence they were purportedly called to suppress." N. SALVATORE, supra note 57, at 132.
127. 62 F. at 815.
128. Cf M. BLUMENTHAL, R. KAHN, F. ANDREWS & K. HEAD, JUSTIFYING VIOLENCE: AT-
TrrUDES OF AMERICAN MEN (1972) (a study of attitudes and beliefs about violence, based on re-
search on American men in the 1960s).
129. Phelan, 62 F. at 816 (relying on Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Sherry v. Perkins,
147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888)). It is interesting to note that Taft later found the authority of
Walker unpersuasive when the plaintiffs in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council used
the case, along with others, to support their argument that the "interference of a labor organization
by persuasion and appeal to induce a strike against low wages" was "without lawful excuse and
[Vol. 37
IMAGES OF VIOLENCE
According to Taft, Phelan "did the [railroad] trust a very substan-
tial injury by stopping all traffic for a time, by making it necessary for the
receiver to pay heavy expenses for unusual police protection, and by put-
ting him to much trouble and expense in securing new employees." 130
Given the likelihood that Phelan was judgment-proof, a jail sentence
based on a finding of contempt of court was an even more fitting price to
pay than any possible civil damage award. Indeed, in light of the diffi-
culty of convicting Phelan of criminal charges related to the strike vio-
lence, Judge Taft's sentence for contempt of court was perhaps the only
way that Phelan could be made to pay for his acts.
Judge Taft acknowledged that workers were, in certain circum-
stances, justified in inflicting economic harm on their employers through
withdrawal of their labor. The question of law in any specific instance of
collective action was whether the imposition of economic harm that
would otherwise be actionable was somehow privileged. Taft "conceded"
that the receiver's employees "had the right to organize into or to join a
labor union which should take joint action as to their terms of employ-
ment."13 Taft also recognized the inequality in bargaining power be-
tween the large employer and the single employee, which compelled legal
justification of collective action undertaken "for lawful purposes. '"132
Taft wrote:
It is of benefit to them and to the public that laborers should unite in their
common interest and for lawful purposes. They have labor to sell. If they
stand together, they are often able, all of them, to command better prices
for their labor than when dealing singly with rich employers, because the
necessities of the single employee may compel him to accept any terms of-
fered him. 133
In this paragraph, Taft suggests a basic tension between competing
images of workers. Workers who "unite in their common interest" and
"stand together" are purposive, autonomous individuals capable of rec-
ognizing mutual interests and acting in a coherent, unified way to achieve
common goals. Workers who "have labor to sell" are people whose hu-
manity-their identity as autonomous individuals-is separate from their
labor-a commodity which they sell on the market. As they enter the
malicious." 257 U.S. 184, 210, 208-09 (1921). Taft discounted the relevancy of Walker because of the
procedural posture of the case: "The element of malice was supplied by averment of the complaint,
and was, of course, admitted by the demurrer." Id at 210. See infra text accompanying notes 371-73.
130. 62 F. at 816.





market to sell their labor, they act as independent, autonomous beings of
full free will and liberty. Once their labor is contracted for, however, they
become the commodity-dehumanized and devalued as anything other
than a factor of production. Finally, workers whose "necessities" may
force them "to accept any terms offered" are impoverished, dis-
empowered, weak and dependent persons whose social and economic sta-
tus is a bare step above slavery.
It is difficult to reconcile these competing images of workers with
each other and with the image of workers as violent and irrational. No-
tions of workers as rational, dependent, or dehumanized, clashed with
Taft's vision of workers who inspire fear through "secret terrorism," who
"paralyze" a railroad maliciously, and whose actions, if not restrained,
will lead to "anarchy." Taft managed to tie the images together through
his imposition of his own narrow definition of workers' "common inter-
est" and "lawful purposes"-legitimate only when defined as pure eco-
nomic concern with their own personal terms of employment. Phelan's
leadership of a peaceful strike against the receiver over the amount of
wages paid to the receiver's workers would not have been contempt,
"even if the strike much impeded the operation of the road. ' 134 In other
words, peaceful, purposive acts by workers to ameliorate their depen-
dency and inequality as sellers of the commodity of labor were justified
under certain conditions. As long as the workers' goals were directly re-
lated to improvement of their own working conditions with their own
employers, economic harm to those employers was justified. This notion
of justifiable economic harm was based on a view of workers' proper
goals as being egocentric, not community-oriented.
The mistake of Phelan and the striking trainmen of the Cincinnati
Southern Railroad was to take action for a community goal-to assist
the Pullman workers in their strike against the Pullman Company. Taft
believed that there was no logical or "natural" connection between the
railway workers and the Pullman Company workers.13 5 Taft wrote:
The employees of the railway companies had no grievance against their em-
ployers. Handling and hauling Pullman cars did not render their services
any more burdensome. They had no complaint against the use of Pullman
cars as cars. They came into no natural relation with Pullman in handling
the cars. He paid them no wages. He did not regulate their hours, or in any
way determine their services. Simply to injure him in his business, they
were incited and encouraged to compel the railway companies to withdraw
134. Id.
135. Id. at 818.
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custom from him by threats of quitting their service, and actually quitting
their service. This inflicted an injury on the companies that was very great,
and it was unlawful, because it was without lawful excuse.136
Thus, the railroad employees' motive in striking their employers was to
impose harm on the Pullman Company. As Taft noted, the distinction
between "an ordinary lawful and peaceable strike" and a boycott "is not
a fanciful one" because "[e]very laboring man recognizes the one or the
other as quickly as the lawyer or the judge." 137 Whereas the strike
against an employer to improve working conditions-the classic primary
strike-was lawful, "[b]oycotts, though unaccompanied by violence or
intimidation, have been pronounced unlawful in every state of the United
States where the question has arisen, unless it be in Minnesota; and they
are held to be unlawful in England."' 13
Taft's views on the distinction between a strike of a primary em-
ployer and a strike against a secondary employer to enforce a boycott of
the primary employer's business or products-the so-called secondary
boycott-had been articulated earlier in his first labor case on the federal
bench. In 1893, in the Ann Arbor case,139 Taft had granted a permanent
injunction compelling the Grand Chief of the Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Engineers, P.M. Arthur, to withdraw an order to the engineers that
they follow Rule 12 of their organization. Rule 12 required that the
members of the Brotherhood refuse to handle the trains of any connect-
ing railroad company involved in a dispute with one of the Brotherhood's
local unions. When a strike was called on the Toledo, Ann Arbor Rail-
road, Arthur ordered members of the Brotherhood, who worked for
eleven railroad companies in Ohio and adjacent states, to comply with
Rule 12.14 Alpheus Mason wrote that "[t]he result was practically a pa-
ralysis of the business of interstate commerce in this section of the
country." 141
Taft found that Arthur's order to the engineers was part of a crimi-
nal conspiracy interfering with the obligations of the railway carriers,
under section 10 of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1877,142 to accept
136. Id.
137. Id. at 818-19.
138. Id. at 819.
139. Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co. (Ann Arbor), 54 F. 730 (C.C.N.D. Ohio
1893). See also Mason, The Labor Decisions of Chief Justice Taft, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 592-96
(1930) (discussing Ann Arbor case); A. PAUL supra note 55, at 110-16.
140. See Mason, supra note 139, at 593.
141. Id.
142. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 10, 24 Stat. 383 (1887) (amended by ch. 382, § 10, 25
Stat. 855, 857-58 (1888)) (repealed 1978).
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and transfer the freight cars of connecting railway companies. Although
Taft admitted that the strike of the Toledo, Ann Arbor engineers was
lawful, he denounced the strike of the engineers on the connecting rail-
ways. Taft wrote:
What the employees threaten to do is to deprive the defendant companies of
the benefit thus accruing from their labor, in order to induce, procure, and
compel the companies... to consent to do a criminal and unlawful injury
to the complainant. Neither law nor morals can give man the right to labor
or withhold his labor for such a purpose.
1 43
In effect, Taft defined the legitimate boundaries of the union com-
munity as its functions within a geographically small locale for the pur-
pose of direct and immediate economic advantage to its members. In
rejecting broader conceptions of the union~community, such as concerted
activities undertaken for long-term economic and altruistic purposes and
spanning states, regions, or even the nation, Taft revealed his inability to
accept what unions were beginning to understand: their conception of
community interests had to be as broad as the economic reach of the
corporations.
Taft's injunction in the Ann Arbor case directed Arthur to rescind
the order to the engineers to comply with Rule 12 of the Brotherhood.
The injunction also commanded the engineers in the Brotherhood to
carry out their duties as required by the Interstate Commerce Act-to
exchange interstate freight with the Toledo, Ann Arbor line. Taft's order
appeared to compel personal service, although he denied this by arguing
that the engineers "may avoid obedience to the injunction by actually
ceasing to be employees of the company. ' 144
Thus, Taft's view of the broad public character of the railway engi-
neers' work, 145 and the narrow scope of their legitimate union concerns,
justified enjoining their boycott. Nevertheless, despite his condemnation
of the secondary boycott, Taft, in both the Ann Arbor and Phelan cases,
acknowledged the legitimacy of a peaceful, primary strike. Although
Taft apparently understood that such strikes could not be enjoined, his
views were not universally accepted. Not long after the Ann Arbor case,
the judge in another federal receivership case ordered railway employees
to continue working or be subjected to contempt proceedings. In this
case in late 1893, Circuit Judge Jenkins issued injunctions against the
receivers' 12,000 employees "so quitting.., as to cripple the property, or
143. Ann Arbor, 54 F. at 738.
144. Iad at 743. See also A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 114.
145. 54 F. at 742-43.
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to prevent or hinder the operation of [the] railroad." 46 Jenkins observed:
It is idle to talk of a peaceable strike. None such ever occurred. The
suggestion is an impeachment of intelligence .... It has well been said that
the wit of man could not devise a legal strike, because compulsion is the
lead1 idea of it. A strike is essentially a conspiracy to extort by violence
On appeal, in October 1894, the sweeping scope of Jenkins's injunc-
tions was limited by the Seventh Circuit. Like Judge Taft, the court of
appeals endorsed the view that "as a matter of law" a strike of employ-
ees, "having for its object their orderly withdrawal in large numbers or in
a body from the service of their employers, on account simply of a reduc-
tion in their wages," is neither "illegal or criminal."1 48 More impor-
tantly, the court recognized the limits of equity jurisdiction to compel
personal service through injunctions. Justice Harlan149 wrote in the opin-
ion that "[i]t would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him
to work for or to remain in the personal service of another. One who is
placed under such constraint is in a condition of involuntary servitude
,150
In the late nineteenth century, as these judges attempted to articu-
late theories that would define the boundaries between legal and illegal
collective worker action, they also struggled to come to terms with the
new, aggressive role of the federal courts in labor disputes. Consequently,
the judges had to acknowledge and justify the use of the coercive power
of the injunction as a means of controlling worker behavior. Implicit was
the assumption that the free market had somehow gone awry. Where the
coercion of employer economic power and governmental force failed to
halt many strikes and boycotts, the injunction served well. But the courts
did not take such responsibility lightly. Taft, like others on the federal
bench, turned to the common law as the source of authority for ex-
tending equitable remedies into the terrain of the labor market.
The scope of lawful collective labor action recognized in receiver-
146. Farmers' Loan & Trust v. Northern Pac. R.RI, 60 F. 803, 807 (C.C.E.D. Wise. 1894),
discussed in A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 116-22.
147. Fanners' Loan, 60 F. at 821, quoted in Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 326 (7th Cir. 1894).
148. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. at 327.
149. Justice John Marshall Harlan was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1877 and served as
an associate justice for thirty-four years. His decision in Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, was written
while he was sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
150. 63 F. at 317-18. Historian Arnold Paul has written that Harlan's opinion "finally arrested
the spreading scope of the labor injunction at the threshold of compulsory labor." A. PAUL, supra
note 55, at 122 n.37.
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ship cases was thus limited very early by reliance on notions of unlawful
interference with business interests drawn from common law restraint of
trade cases, 51 as well as the ideas about the appropriate economic inter-
ests of workers that came from those cases. The federal district court
judges, in their role as overseers of the railroads in receivership, were in a
unique position to exercise control over many union leaders through the
use of contempt powers. When, in the early 1890s, the lower federal
courts began to see the first labor cases brought under the Sherman Act,
the federal judges who had handled receivership cases were accustomed
to their role as protector of community order from the potentially violent
and disruptive influence of outside labor agitators. Even more signifi-
cantly, these federal judges had developed a keen appreciation of the eco-
nomic hardships imposed on the railroads through strikes, even in the
absence of violence and destruction of railroad property.
The Sherman Act was embraced somewhat hesistantly at first. 152 In
the Phelan case, in two conclusory paragraphs which appear to be almost
an afterthought, Judge Taft included the new statutory basis of equity
and criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Sherman Act as
an additional reason for finding Phelan in contempt of court. Taft noted
that Phelan and Debs's "conspiracy" was a "combination in... the teeth
of the act of July 2, 1890.'11 Taft also indicated that he and his col-
leagues on the federal bench were following with great interest the new
trend to use the Sherman Act against labor."5 4 By the early twentieth
century, the United States Supreme Court had confirmed the use of the
federal antitrust laws as a weapon against organized labor.' 55
IV. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
TO THE ANTITRUST LABOR CASES:
THE HOLMES DISSENTS IN VEGELAHN AND PLANT
As the federal antitrust law evolved into a mechanism for re-
straining labor activity in the early twentieth century, it drew its ration-
ale and rules from the common law restraint of trade cases. The
151. See Phelan, 62 F. at 819-21 (discussing English and American cases outlawing the
boycott).
152. After Judge Billings's decision in United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council,
54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893), discussed infra text accompanying notes 245-47, other judges in the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits quickly followed suit. A notable exception to the trend was Judge Put-
nam's decision in the First Circuit. United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893).
153. 62 F. at 821-22.
154. Id.
155. See infra Part V.
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condemnation of the secondary boycott and the suspicion of the picket
line were clearly established features of the common law by the turn of
the century. In 1894, Judge Taft in the Phelan case demonstrated both
his expertise in the common law and his confidence in its suitability for
solving the labor problems of the railroads under his court's receivership
jurisdiction.
Twenty years later, in his book The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme
Court, Taft, then a professor at Yale Law School, reaffirmed his belief in
the common law as a basis for interpretation of the federal antitrust laws.
In response to the "ignorant but enthusiastic critics" of the Supreme
Court who decried its "power to say what are the good trusts and what
are the bad trusts, according to [its] economic and political views," ' 6
Taft defended the reasonableness, consistency, and certainty of the com-
mon law as applied to the antitrust cases. Taft wrote:
What the court has said in effect is this:
"It is evident what the Congress had in its mind from the language it
uses. We know from current history the evil it sought to remedy. It has
used terms that had a well-understood meaning at common law-to wit,
restraint of trade, monopoly, combination, and conspiracy. It is a settled
rule of all American and English courts in construing statutes and constitu-
tions that common-law terms are to receive common-law meaning unless
there is good reason to the contrary. .. "
That is not assuming legislative power at all. It is only exercising the
function that courts have exercised in applying a well-measured and definite
yardstick to contracts incidental and ancillary for now more than three
centuries. 15
7
The contribution of the Sherman Act, according to Taft, was to
make restraints which were "only void and unenforceable at common
law, positively and affirmatively illegal, actionable, and indictable."
1 58
Furthermore, Taft wrote, "[w]hether Congress intended it or not, it used
language that necessarily forbade the combinations of laborers to restrain
and obstruct interstate trade." '159 From Taft's perspective, the positive
law of the Sherman Act as applied to labor did no more than make into
federal law with federal jurisdiction and remedies what had long been
recognized in the states and in England. With the common law came the
assumptions about the inherent dangerousness of labor activity-the
156. W.H. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRuST AcT AND THE SUPREME COURT 114 (1914 & photo. re-
print 1970).
157. Id. at 114-15.
158. Id. at 21.
159. Id. at 2.
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risks of unrestrained labor organization and power. When arguments
about the economic harms of concentrated labor power were not compel-
ling enough to permit its restraint, the courts-both federal and state-
invoked the specter of violence to buttress their reasoning about the un-
lawfulness of either the means or the ends of labor activity.
The common law means/ends analysis of labor activity, traceable to
Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Commonwealth v. Hunt,160 predominated
the federal antitrust labor cases just as it had predominated the state la-
bor cases arising under common law restraint of trade.161 The means-
methods-of union activity were legitimate only if they came within nar-
row boundaries of socially acceptable behavior and did not threaten the
employer, his patrons, or his other workers with physical or economic
harm. The ends--objectives--of union activity were legitimate only if
they came within a limited range of local, self-interested economic gains
and did not interfere with the employer's freedom of contract.
The important role that judicial assumptions about worker violence
played in the common law development of the means/ends analysis of
labor activity is illustrated in the Massachusetts cases of Vegelahn v.
Guntner 162 and Plant v. Woods.1 63 Coming at the end of a decade or so
that witnessed the Haymarket riots, the Homestead Strike, and the Pull-
man boycott, these two cases articulated a conservative vision of the
worker's place in the new industrial order that was being created out of
new forms of corporate wealth and a seemingly endless supply of immi-
grant labor. The judges who wrote the majority opinions in the two cases
shared a preoccupation with worker violence that was not justified by the
facts before the court, even if it could be explained by the tenor of the
times. In dissenting opinions, however, Oliver Wendell Holmes disagreed
in each case with the majority's determination of the appropriate means
and ends of labor activity and the significance of violence in that analysis.
A. Vegelahn v. Guntner-'A patrol of two men"
"The principal question," wrote Judge Allen in Vegelahn, "is
whether the defendants should be enjoined against maintaining the pa-
trol." 1" The defendant union in the case was engaged in a strike for the
purpose of raising its members' wages. To support their strike demands,
160. 4 Met. Ill (Mass. 1842).
161. See generally Holt, supra note I1.
162. 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
163. 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
164. 167 Mass. at 97, 44 N.E. at 1077.
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the union members "conspired to prevent [the employer] from getting
workmen, and thereby to prevent him from carrying on his business."
165
The court conceded that the workers' objectives--"to secure better
wages for themselves"-were legitimate but did "not justify maintaining
a patrol in front of the plaintiff's premises, as a means of carrying out
their conspiracy."' 16 6 The court even acknowledged that "[a] combination
among persons merely to regulate their own conduct is within allowable
competition, and is lawful, although others may be indirectly affected
thereby."' 167
What the union members did that was unlawful was take their dis-
pute with their employer to the street in front of his factory-to the
workers who had not yet joined the strike and the workers who
threatened to break it.
The means adopted were persuasion and social pressure, threats of personal
injury or unlawful harm conveyed to persons employed or seeking employ-
ment, and a patrol of two men in front of the plaintiff's factory, maintained
from half past six in the morning till half past five in the afternoon, on one
of the busiest streets of Boston. The number of men was greater at times,
and at times showed some little disposition to stop the plaintiff's door.168
Because "it was found that the patrol would probably be continued, if
not enjoined," and because it was used "in combination with social pres-
sure, threats of personal injury or unlawful harm, and persuasion to
break existing contracts," the court believed a sweeping injunction, bar-
ring all picketing, was justified. 69 The picketing, in any form, was "an
unlawful interference with the rights both of employer and of em-
ployed."' 70 Even the goal of raising wages did not justify this direct
means of interfering with the employer's and the strikebreaker's freedom
of contract.
Holmes disagreed with the scope of the preliminary injunction
which the majority of the court wanted to affirm in its original language.
The modified final decree proposed by Holmes would have enjoined the
union from interfering with the employer's business
by obstructing or physically interfering with any persons in entering or
leaving the plaintiff's premises... or by intimidating, by threats, express or
implied, of violence or physical harm to body or property, any person or
165. Id.
166. Id at 98, 44 N.E. at 1077.
167. Id. at 98, 44 N.E. at 1077-78.





persons who now are or hereafter may be in the employment of the plaintiff,
or desirous of entering the same, from entering or continuing in it ....7'
This much of the proposed final decree was also consistent with the pre-
liminary injunction that had been issued pendente lite. Holmes noted
that "it must be assumed that the defendants obey the express prohibi-
tion of the decree," and "[i]f they do not, ... [they] are liable to summary
punishment.'
172
But the preliminary injunction "goes further" than the proposed fi-
nal decree, Holmes wrote, and it was the added prohibitions that Holmes
found "most objectionable."' 17 The preliminary injunction, Holmes ob-
served, "forbids the defendants to interfere with the plaintiff's business
'by any scheme... organized for the purpose of... preventing any per-
son or persons who now are or may hereafter be... desirous of entering
the [plaintiff's employment] from entering it.' ,,174 In effect, this would
prohibit "social intercourse, and even organized persuasion or argument,
although free from any threat of violence, either express or implied.' 175
Holmes knew the facts of the case well because the hearing on the
merits of the plaintiff's case for issuance of a final injunctive decree was
held before him. He drafted his report for the court with care, so that the
facts and their import could not be misconstrued. 176 Holmes observed,
"There was no proof of any threat or danger of a patrol exceeding two
men, and as of course an injunction is not granted except with reference
to what there is reason to expect in its absence, the question on that point
is whether a patrol of two men should be enjoined."' 7 7
Holmes was careful "to insist a little" that he disagreed with the
majority on "a difference of principle between the final decree and the
preliminary injunction which it is proposed to restore."' 178 But this "dif-
ference of principle" revealed starkly different views of how workers be-
have. Holmes wrote:
It appears to me that the judgment of the majority turns in part on the
assumption that the patrol necessarily carries with it a threat of bodily
171. Id. at 96, 44 N.E. at 1077.




176. Holmes wrote that "I assume that my brethren construe [the report] as I meant it to be
construed, and that, if they were not prepared to do so, they would give an opportunity to the
defendants to have it amended in accordance with what I state my meaning to be." Id.
177. I .
178. Id. at 104-05, 44 N.E. at 1080.
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harm. That assumption I think unwarranted.... Furthermore, it cannot be
said, I think, that two men walking together up and down a sidewalk and
speaking to those who enter a certain shop do necessarily and always
thereby convey a threat of force. 179
Unlike his "brethren" on the court, Holmes was not prepared to
assume that two workmen or union representatives on a picket line or
"patrol" would inevitably either exhibit violent behavior or instill fear
and dread of "bodily harm" in their audience. He felt that this presumed
too much of both the workers and their audience, and it injected the
court, through its use of equitable powers, into situations that were not
only innocuous, but were part of the patterns of the daily "social inter-
course" between workers, their employers, and their communities.
Holmes went on to say:
I may add, that I think the more intelligent workingmen believe as fully as I
do that they no more can be permitted to usurp the State's prerogative of
force than can their opponents in their controversies. But if I am wrong,
then the decree as it stands reaches the patrol, since it applies to all threats
of force.18 0
But the Vegelahn court was concerned about the economic coercion
of the two-man picket, not just its perceived threat of force or potential
for physical violence. Judge Allen wrote for the majority:
Intimidation is not limited to threats of violence or of physical injury to
person or property. It has a broader signification, and there also may be a
moral intimidation which is illegal. Patrolling or picketing, under the cir-
cumstances stated in [Judge Holmes's] report, has elements of intimidation
like those which were found to exist in Sherry v. Perkins.181
Sherry v. Perkins had upheld an injunction against "[t]he act of dis-
playing banners with devices, as a means of threats and intimidation, to
prevent persons from entering into or continuing in the employment of
the plaintiff." 182 The banners used by the striking workers in Sherry were
held to be "a standing menace to all who were or wished to be in the
employment of the plaintiff."1 ' The Vegelahn court believed that work-
ers picketing, patrolling, or displaying banners were engaging in illegal
"moral intimidation." From the "context" of Sherry, however, Holmes
inferred that the "'threats and intimidation'" of the workers' banners
were part of a scheme of "threats of personal violence, and intimidation
179. Ia at 105, 44 N.E. at 1080.
180. Id
181. Id. at 98, 44 N.E. at 1077.
182. 147 Mass. 212, 214, 17 N.E. 307, 309 (1888).
183. Id, 17 N.E. at 310.
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by causing fear of it."18 4
Holmes thus attempted to limit the legal connotation of words such
as "threats," "intimidation," and "compulsion" to instances of "force or
threats of force." ' He believed that the "persuasion" of the two-man
patrol in Vegelahn was legal as long as it was peaceful,18 6 even though
some may have described it as "moral intimidation." 187 As Judge Field
had noted in a separate dissenting opinion in Vegelahn:
[I]f [the patrol] is merely a peaceful mode of finding out the persons who
intend to go to the plaintiff's premises to apply for work, and of informing
them of the actual facts of the case in order to induce them not to enter into
the plaintiff's employment, ... I doubt if it is illegal, and I see no ground for
issuing an injunction against it. 18
Key to Holmes's analysis of the legality of the peaceful two-man
patrol was his belief that the economic damage it caused was privileged.
Holmes wrote that "the policy of allowing free competition justifies the
intentional inflicting of temporal damage, including the damage of inter-
ference with a man's business, by some means, when the damage is done
not for its own sake, but as an instrumentality in reaching the end of
victory in the battle of trade." ' 9 Rejecting the "suggestion" that "the
conflict between employers and employed is not competition," Holmes
argued that "[c]ertainly the policy is not limited to struggles between
persons of the same class competing for the same end." Rather, "[it ap-
plies to all conflicts of temporal interests."' 190
Holmes concluded his argument with the following discourse on the
economic realities of liberal capitalism and the role of law within that
framework of free competition:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between
the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of
society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least
possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Com-
bination on the other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle
is to be carried on in a fair and equal way ....
If it be true that workingmen may combine with a view, among other
things, to getting as much as they can for their labor, just as capital may
combine with a view to getting the greatest possible return, it must be true
184. 167 Mass. at 107, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 106-07, 44 N.E. at 1081.
186. Id.
187. Id at 98, 44 N.E. at 1077.
188. Id. at 103, 44 N.E. at 1079.
189. Id at 106, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
190. Id at 107 (quoted language does not appear in 44 N.E.).
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that when combined they have the same liberty that combined capital has
to support their interests by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal or re-
fusal of those advantages which they otherwise lawfully control. I can re-
member when many people thought that, apart from violence or breach of
contract, strikes were wicked, as organized refusals to work. I suppose that
intelligent economists and legislators have given up that notion to-day. I
feel pretty confident that they equally will abandon the idea that an organ-
ized refusal by workmen of social intercourse with a man who shall enter
their antagonist's employ is wrong, if it is dissociated from any threat of
violence, and is made for the sole object of prevailing if possible in a contest
with their employer about the rate of wages.191
Holmes depended on the authority of earlier cases such as Walker v.
Cronin'92 and Commonwealth v. Hunt 93 to illustrate that he was firmly
within the tradition of the common law. Nevertheless, he directly chal-
lenged his colleagues on the bench to confront the economic and social
policies inherent in their analyses of common law rules. In 1894, the
same year that Taft was marshaling the rules of the common law to con-
demn Phelan's participation in the Pullman boycott, Holmes had pub-
lished his paper, "Privilege, Malice, and Intent."' 9 4 There, in discussing
the legality of boycotts and combinations under the common law,
Holmes had written: "Behind all is the question whether the courts are
not flying in the face of the organization of the world which is taking
place so fast, and of its inevitable consequences."' 95 Two years later,
Holmes reiterated this theme in Vegelahn:
It is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most
superficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means combi-
nation, and that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means
an ever increasing might and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to
set our faces against this tendency. 196
B. Plant v. Woods-"The degree offear and dread"
By the late 1890s, as both the state and federal courts were con-
fronted with the task of deciding what forms of collective worker activity
should be legal in the vast and rapid "organization of the world" taking
place around them, they continued to rely on the familiar common law
191. Id at 108-09, 44 N.E. at 1081-82.
192. 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
193. 4 Met. 111 (Mass. 1842).
194. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. Rnv. 1 (1894), reprinted in 0. HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 117 (1920).
195. Holmes, supra note 194, at 8-9; 0. HOLMES supra note 194, at 129.
196. 167 Mass. at 108, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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categories to shore up their vision of the future. The narrowness of their
view of community was revealed in their limited definitions of worker
interests. Doctrinally, this was expressed in legalization of certain peace-
ful union activities for local, immediate, and direct economic goals.
Union activities undertaken for more far-reaching, diffuse, and indirect
communitarian goals were illegal. Thus, even a judge like Taft could ac-
knowledge the legality of a peaceful local strike for the purpose of raising
the wages of the local union members. On the other hand, a sympathy
strike or boycott in support of other workers' attempts to improve wages
and working conditions, such as the Pullman boycott, even if it had been
peaceful, was for an indirect purpose. What the Cincinnati Southern
Railway workers hoped to attain through their collective action was ille-
gal in part because it "had no effect whatever on the character or reward
of their service." '197
Under the same analysis of direct versus indirect benefits, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the 1900 case of Plant v. Woods
held a strike for a closed shop to be "without justification, and therefore
... malicious and unlawful." g19 8 The court in Plant recognized that cer-
tain union activity that restrained trade was privileged. But its definition
of the permissible objectives of strikes or boycotts was "to get the hours
of labor reduced or their wages increased, or to procure from their em-
ployers any other concession directly and immediately affecting their
own interests." '199 As Holmes, now chief judge, noted in dissent:
[The union's] purpose was not directly concerned with wages. It was one
degree more remote. The immediate object and motive was to strengthen
the defendants' society as a preliminary and means to enable it to make a
better fight on questions of wages or other matters of clashing interests. I
differ from my brethren in thinking that the threats were as lawful for this
preliminary purpose as for the final one to which strengthening the union
was a means.
20
Holmes understood that, from the perspective of the union member,
the closed shop was a means to the perfectly legitimate end of improved
working conditions. Nevertheless, to characterize the closed shop as a
"means" to a lawful end, rather than as a remote, indirect, and therefore
unlawful, "end" clearly would not have saved the closed shop. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would have found the closed shop un-
197. In re Phelan, 62 F. 803, 818 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894).
198. 176 Mass. 492, 502, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015.
199. Id. at 501, 57 N.E. at 1015.
200. Id at 505, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
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lawful whether it was characterized as a means to an end or an end in
itself. The evil in the closed shop was in the violence that the court as-
sumed to be inherent in any demand for a closed shop that was accompa-
nied by a threat of a strike.2"1
The court observed that the threat to strike for a closed-shop
means more than that the strikers will cease to work. That is only the pre-
liminary skirmish. It means that those who have ceased to work will, by
strong, persistent, and organized persuasion and social pressure of every
description, do all they can to prevent the employer from procuring work-
men to take their places. It means much more. It means that, if these peace-
ful measures fail, the employer may reasonably expect that unlawful
physical injury may be done to his property; that attempts in all the ways
practised by organized labor will be made to injure him in his business, even
to his ruin, if possible; and that, by the use of vile and opprobrious epithets
and other annoying conduct, and actual and threatened personal violence,
attempts will be made to intimidate those who enter or desire to enter his
employ .... 202
The Massachusetts court recognized the importarice to the union of
achieving a closed shop in light of the competing economic interests of
the employer, rival unions and nonunion workers. The court assumed
that violence would inevitably ensue if peaceful efforts were unsuccessful.
In the hearing below, the master found that the union representatives
were "courteous in manner" and "made no threats of personal violence."
But he also found that "from all the circumstances under which [the]
requests [for a closed shop] were made,... the defendants intended that
[the] employers... Should fear trouble in their business.. ." if they did
not acquiesce to the requests.203
The Massachusetts high court accepted the master's inconsistent
findings, noting that "[h]owever mild the language or suave the manner
in which the threat to strike [for a closed shop] is made, ... the employer
knows that he is in danger of passing through such an ordeal as that
above described [of violence and intimidation], and those who make the
threat know that as well as he does." 2' Despite objective evidence of
peaceful behavior by union representatives, and the fact that the "ordeal"
201. "Plant represents a determination that the defendant union pursued an unlawful objective,
although the court's stress on the possibly terrible consequences of the union's threat suggests the
difficulty of distinguishing between unlawful means and ends." J. ATLEsON, R. RABIN, G.
ScnrzKi, H. SHERMAN, JR. & E. SILvERSTEIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOY-
MENT 33 (2d ed. 1984).
202. 176 Mass. at 496-97, 57 N.E. at 1013.
203. Id at 495, 57 N.E. at 1012.
204. Id. at 497, 57 N.E. at 1013.
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the employer might face consisted of economic, not physical, harms, the
court invoked images of "physical injury... to [the employer's] prop-
erty" and "actual and threatened personal violence" to strikebreakers or
customers.2 °5
In an attempt to define unlawful union objectives, the court in Plant
resorted to a discussion of unlawful means based on a physicalist notion
of harm. The judges saw economic harm to some parties as an unavoida-
ble consequence of fair competition which served larger societal goals of
efficiency and utility. But physical harm to person or property, when em-
ployees or unions or their sympathizers could be held responsible for giv-
ing the "signal" for violence, could not be tolerated under any
circumstances.20 6 Thus the achievement of the court in Plant was to
equate some forms of peaceful behavior with violent behavior and to
equate economic harm with physical harm. Because most peaceful labor
activity, regardless of its objectives-whether direct or remote-was in-
tended to cause or threaten economic harm to the employer, the common
law judges were free to argue that almost any labor activity was suffused
with the threat of violence.
Despite the insistence of many who, like William Howard Taft, saw
the common law as logical, reasonable, coherent, and consistent, the law
provided no basis, no authority, no rationale for distinguishing between
labor activity which would necessarily lead to violence and that which
would not. The court in Plant invoked the freedom of contract of the
rival union members-"the right to dispose of one's labor with full free-
dom" 2 7 -as the right which deserved special legal protection. The court
noted that "this is not a case between the employer and employed, or, to
use a hackneyed expression, between capital and labor, but between la-
borers all of the same craft, and each having the same right as any one of
the others to pursue his calling. 2M
8
The court's argument was disingenuous, for the economic cost of
the closed shop would be borne by the employer as well as the rival union
members who would either have to join the dominant union or find work
elsewhere. The closed shop meant a union monopoly over hiring as well
as greater union power to bargain for higher wages. The persistence and
resources which employers devoted to defeat closed shops and to keep
their workplaces either "open" or "closed to union members" through
205. Id. at 496-97, 57 N.E. at 1013.
206. Id. at 497, 57 N.E. at 1013.
207. Id. at 498, 57 N.E. at 1013.
208. Id. at 497, 57 N.E. at 1013.
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lockouts, discharges, and "yellow dog" contracts belie the notion that the
closed shop was not "a case ... between capital and labor."20 9
But there may be a clue here about the source of the court's assump-
tions about the violence inherent in a demand for a closed shop. Judges
might have believed that rival union disputes were likely to have a
greater potential for violence because they set one labor organization
against another for scarce resources. Indeed, the court in Plant charac-
terized the dispute as "a contest for supremacy between two labor unions
of the same craft, having substantially the same constitution and by-
laws."210 The fallacious conclusion was that supremacy was attained
only through "molestation,"21 1 or through "fear and dread" '2 12 of violent
consequences, not through appeals to reason or demonstrations of com-
mitment and solidarity through a unified withdrawal of labor. The "con-
test for supremacy" between two unions was a trial by combat between
two irrational and violent foes. The stronger union was stronger because
it could effectively "signal" violence, not because it was larger, better
organized, more experienced, better funded, or could deliver more bene-
fits or provide more services to its members. The weaker union was the
innocent victim, which, if it responded at all on behalf of its members,
necessarily responded with violence, not through its own strategies of
organization, persuasion, and solidarity. The employer was a helpless by-
stander with no economic resources or power, who was forced either to
suffer the "probable consequences" of the dominant union's "wanton or
malicious acts" or bend to its will by inducing workers-to join the domi-
nant union or lose their jobs.2 13
To assume that the prevailing union achieved its "supremacy" with
"courteous" and "mild" words that were secret signals-"which might
reasonably be expected to lead to [violent] results"2 44---was to assume
that unions and workers were not capable of peaceful, rational behavior
when they engaged in collective action. In effect, the court saw in the
union representative's words the "secret terrorism" that Judge Taft im-
puted even to Frank Phelan's most innocent utterances in the Pullman
boycott.215 However, the presumption of violent intentions and conse-
quences in peaceful union activity struck at the heart of the liberal ideol-
209. Id.
210. Id. at 494, 57 N.E. at 1012.
211. Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015.
212. Id. at 497, 57 N.E. at 1013.
213. Id. at 497, 498, 57 N.E. at 1013.
214. Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
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ogy of freedom of contract. The court failed to see the contradiction in
protecting one set of workers because they exercised their "right to dis-
pose of [their] labor with full freedom" '216 and condemning another set of
workers because they were behaving in a responsible, rational manner to
protect the interests of the members of their community.
The successful functioning of a contractual system of ordering rela-
tions depended on the premise that all individuals were autonomous, ra-
tional, self-interested actors. When the individual entered into
contractual relations with another, there existed a degree of trust that
each would in good faith carry out his or her promises. The trust came
from evaluation of the objective behavior of the other individual in that
relationship, in prior similar relationships, and in the world outside the
relationship. Judicial attitudes about worker violence implied that work-
ers could never be trusted because their objective behavior-their words
and organized activity--could always be a masked "signal" for violence.
Words and actions of actors other than workers, in places other than the
work environment, were taken at face value, and in good faith, to mean
what they appeared to mean. Words and actions of workers in the
workplace were distrusted because the workplace context, and the infer-
ior status of workers in that context and in society at large, called forth
ambiguous and malevolent meanings. Furthermore, the class notion
which presumed that workers were ignorant and dependent, alien and
different, led to the conclusion that workers were incapable of perceiving
their own self-interest. This assumption in turn justified paternalism.217
Although judges in cases like Plant and Phelan frequently talked
about the freedom of other workers to enter into the employment rela-
tionship on any terms they were willing to accept, without coercion by
union members or organizers, that "freedom of contract" was a conve-
nient fiction. Workers could not at the same time be (1) rational, autono-
mous, self-interested actors, (2) irrational, violent, self-destructive actors,
(3) incompetent, dependent, self-less victims, and (4) inane, fungible, de-
humanized commodities. Yet these four contradictory images were wo-
ven through the analysis of the common law restraint of trade and
federal antitrust cases.
It was not the freedom of contract of other workers which the courts
were protecting, but the freedom of employers to have unrestrained ac-
cess to a cheap labor pool. Nevertheless, the libertarian and utilitarian
216. Plant, 176 Mass. at 498; 57 N.E. at 1013.
217. See generally Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez.Faire Constitutionalism:
United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAw & HIST. REv. 249 (1987).
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ideology underpinning freedom of contract doctrine assumed that work-
ers operated in the labor market with the same rationality and capability
for self-interested, economic decision making as employers. 218 The com-
mon law judges at the turn of the century did not assert a priori that
employers, either as individuals or in associations in firms or organiza-
tions, would coerce others through implicit threats of violence. But some
of these judges did imply that workers, particularly when they formed
labor organizations, often achieved their goals through violence or
threats of violence. And unlike laborers, employers who both owned and
managed capital and the labor "contract," were rarely portrayed as vic-
tims, 219 and never as commodities.
The victimization and commodification of workers were generally
addressed through the inequality-of-bargaining-power critique of free-
dom of contract.22° The fact that workers were victimized by the struc-
ture of the economy-scarce jobs and large pools of labor-and forced to
"commodify" their labor, led to their inequality of bargaining power in
the labor market. The libertarian and utilitarian response, typical of the
late nineteenth century faith in the fairness of contractualism, was that
inequality of bargaining power always existed between two parties to a
contract, but did not amount to duress.221 According to this argument,
the inequalities in bargaining power of workers did not prevent them
from acting in the market as autonomous, self-interested actors, nor did
it prevent them from making choices that improved their economic well-
being.
But the assumption that workers harbored violent thoughts and in-
218. The tenacity of this view is demonstrated in Richard Epstein's assertions about the contin-
ued viability for modem labor relations of late nineteenth century laissez-faire economics and the
common law doctrines of freedom of contract. See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A
Critique of the New Deal Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983).
219. But see, eg., supra text accompaning notes 105-07 (Taft's speech to 1894 graduating class
of Michigan Law School).
220. See, eg., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding-Utah law imposing eight-hour
day on miners).
221. Richard Epstein, for example, writes that
"[t]o insist... that there be economic equality before there can be contract is to destroy
the usefulness of contract by imposing a set of exacting conditions that can never be
satisfied or even approached. To confuse economic inequality with duress is to say that
no bargains -are ever free from duress, and to swallow up freedom of contract by an
unprincipled expansion of the principled limitations upon the basic rule. It is quite
enough that the contracts leave the parties better off than they were before. It is too
much to ask of any system of rules that it correct whatever asserted social imbalances
exist before the contract formation.
Epstein, supra note 218, at 1372.
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tentions, regardless of their outwardly benign behavior, directly under-
mined the conceptual basis of freedom of contract. Judges who
articulated beliefs that male workers were prone to violent acts and that
their group behavior either led to violence or was a signal to violence,
could not simultaneously argue that such workers were making rational,
economic choices. Violence and expressions of violent intentions are du-
ress. They are the imposition of the will of one person on the will of
another through compulsion, intimidation, and coercion. Violence exists
when bargain and free choice have not been resorted to or have failed; it
is not explainable as part of the workings of a market based on freedom
of contract.
When judges suggested that certain peaceful union collective action
inevitably resulted in a veiled threat of violence or a signal to violence,
they assumed away the capability for rational, good faith behavior which
was the premise of contractualism. Physical harm, unlike economic
harm, was concrete and unambiguous in its evil. Violence thus provided
a way to resolve the instability in the market posed by combinations of
workers. But in attributing violent and malicious intentions to workers
and their unions, the courts revealed the fallacy of freedom of contract as
a basis for governing the employment relationship. Workers who im-
posed their will through duress and coercion, by implicit threats of vio-
lence, were not workers who could be trusted to enter into or carry out
contracts. The court in Plant revealed clearly its understanding about the
ability of unions to coerce through peaceful behavior, "mild" language,
and "suave" words:222
It is true they [the union agents] committed no acts of personal violence, or
of physical injury to property, although they threatened to do something [to
strike for a closed shop] which might reasonably be expected to lead to such
results. In their threat, however, there was plainly that which was coercive
in its effect upon the will. It is not necessary that the liberty of the body
should be restrained. Restraint of the mind, provided it would be such as
would be likely to force a man against his will to grant the thing demanded,
and actually has that effect, is sufficient in cases like this.22 3
If violent threats were perceived in labor activity that was admit-
tedly peaceful, they arose in the minds of the beholders. Thus the deter-
mination of liability or illegality of worker actions depended on the
subjective views of employers and judges who were already predisposed
to be suspicious of workers who came from different social class and eth-
222. 176 Mass. at 497, 57 N.E. at 1013.
223. Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015.
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nic backgrounds. It was difficult for unions to know before the fact what
collective activity would be viewed as inherently violent. It could have
been argued that closed shop disputes were more likely to result in vio-
lence because they involved contests between rival unions, or between
pro-union and anti-union adherents. This, indeed, seems to be what the
court in Plant attempted to do in a somewhat circuitous fashion. Like-
wise, secondary boycotts could have been outlawed on the basis that dis-
putes involving third parties, employers outside the immediate
employment relationship, had a high probability of arousing the anger of
outsiders, thus leading to violence.
Such assumptions would have been based on conjecture, not empiri-
cally verified reality. There was no reason to expect, for instance, that a
primary strike for wages in which the employees' jobs had been taken by
scabs would result in any more or less violence than a strike for a closed
shop or a secondary boycott. Yet the primary strike or boycott was toler-
ated and legal even though it could lead to violence, while the strike for a
closed shop or secondary boycott was barred in part because it had a
high probability of resulting in violence.
Thus, the fear of violence engendered by workers engaging in peace-
ful collective action was the foundation for liability under common law
restraint of trade doctrine in circumstances that were normally beyond
the reach of tort and criminal law. If strikers engaged in violence or
threats of violence, their behavior and words were actionable under state
tort law or indictable under state criminal laws. Peaceful behavior and
language devoid of threats of physical violence, however, were not illegal
or restrainable under the tort and criminal law which protected persons
and property from physical harm. Nor could union agents or members
be held liable for the violence of others, such as the employer's agents,
other workers, or outsiders, unless they intentially provoked or instigated
the violence. The Massachusetts court in Plant acknowledged its frustra-
tion with the inability of the tort and criminal laws to deal with peaceful
labor activity:
Even if the intent of the strikers, so far as respects their own conduct and
influence, be to discountenance all actual or threatened injury to person or
property or business, except that which is the direct necessary result of the
interruption of the work, and even if their connection with the injurious and
violent conduct of the turbulent among them or of their sympathizers be
not such as to make them liable criminally or even answerable civilly in
damages to those who suffer, still with full knowledge of what is to be ex-
pected they give the signal, and in so doing must be held to avail themselves
of the degree of fear and dread which the knowledge of such consequences
1988/89]
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will cause in the mind of those-whether their employer or fellow work-
men-against whom the strike is directed .... 224
The court here strained the conceptions of harm, danger, and coer-
cion beyond their logical limits. In effect, the court asserted that all
peaceful collective action by unions which has adverse economic conse-
quences to anyone was harmful, dangerous, and coercive. If the union
were strong and the union members' jobs could not easily be filled, the
employer would feel "coerced" to accept union demands purely by the
threat of the economic harm of a strike. To label this as coercion was to
call all bargaining between parties of unequal bargaining power coercive,
thereby collapsing the doctrinal foundations of freedom of contract.225
Such an analysis would bar even a peaceful primary strike for improved
wages, something the conservative Massachusetts court was not prepared
to do.226 Not wanting to acknowledge the coercion inherent in superior
bargaining endowments that unions might possess, the late nineteenth
century courts looked elsewhere for coercion and found it in the belief in
the inevitability of worker violence.
The majority opinions in Vegelahn and Plant reiterated within the
context of common law tort and restraint of trade the concerns with vio-
lence that Taft had voiced only a few years earlier in Phelan. Holmes's
views on labor in his dissents in Vegelahn and Plant appeared to reject
the distrust and fear of worker violence shared by his associates on the
Massachusetts high court. Holmes instead focused on the necessity of
workers acting collectively or singly to achieve economic goals within
competitive markets. He affirmed the ideology of liberal individualism
and its relationship to the growth of capitalism. Vegelahn and Plant thus
revealed the disjunction between the liberal world view of Holmes and
the conservative reaction to that view developed by Taft. Although this
disjunction seemed to persist in unchanged form through the first de-
cades of the twentieth century, Taft's later jurisprudence on the Supreme
Court illustrated the accomodation of the two views.
224. Id at 497, 57 N.E. at 1013.
225. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 271 (1917) (Brandeis, J. dissent-
ing) (discussion of the coercion of contract). See also infra text accompanying notes 531-33, 399-401.
See generally Dawson, Economic Duress--An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. Rnv. 253 (1947);
Hale, Bargaining Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943).
226. See Plant, 176 Mass. at 498-99, 57 N.E. at 1013-14.
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V. REGULATION OF SECONDARY BoycoTTs
UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
A. The Broad Sweep of the Antitrust Laws-
Attacking "the evil in its entirety"
Many employers hoping to use the federal courts to defeat unions
initially faced procedural barriers. Under article III of the United States
Constitution, jurisdiction of the federal courts is primarily limited to two
types of cases: cases that arise under federal law-federal question juris-
diction-and cases that are disputes between citizens of different states-
diversity jurisdiction.227 While diversity jurisdiction was potentially
available for employers bringing state law claims against unions and em-
ployees under theories of tort and common law restraint of trade, the
threshold requirement of alleging and proving diversity of citizenship be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants limited access to the federal courts for
many employers. Frankfurter and Greene observed that "[t]he eagerness
of employers to be heard by a federal court is clearly revealed by the
devices to which they resort in order to present an alignment of parties
that meets the requisite diversity of citizenship." '228 The Sherman Act
opened a new avenue of federal question jurisdiction for employers, as
well as providing new federal remedies which could be effectively used to
discourage unionization. 229
Although the Sherman Act was passed by Congress as a means of
dealing with the devastating economic consequences of monopolistic
business practices, the statute was used effectively against unions long
before it was used against the giant business trusts. In 1895, barely six
months after Debs, Phelan, and other labor leaders were found in con-
tempt of injunctions issued under the Sherman Act and receivership ju-
risdiction, "[a] death-blow to enforcement of the Sherman act [against
business trusts] was delivered by the Supreme Court .... "23o In the E. C.
Knight case,23 1 the Court halted the government's effort to break the mo-
nopoly on the price of sugar which the American Sugar Refining Com-
227. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
228. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 49, at 13-14.
229. Frankfurter and Greene recognized that the introduction of federal jurisdiction based on
the antitrust laws did not diminish the significance of diversity jurisdiction. Based on data in an
unpublished study by W.C. Waring, Jr., The Use of the Injunction in Labor Disputes by the Federal
Courts (available in Harvard Law School Library), Frankfurter and Greene estimated that between
1891 and 1927 approximately two-thirds of the labor cases in the federal courts were based on claims
of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 210 & n.20.
230. 1 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 144.
231. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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pany had achieved through its control of ninety-eight percent of the
sugar refineries in the United States. The government's suit against the
sugar company foundered on the Court's conclusion that the company's
contracts and acts "related exclusively to the acquisition of the Philadel-
phia refineries and the business of sugar refining in Pennsylvania, and
bore no direct relation to commerce between the States or with foreign
nations." '232 Thus, despite the giant sugar trust's control of sugar refin-
eries throughout the nation, and its monopoly on the sale and price of
sugar, the Sherman Act was, for a time, an empty promise as a govern-
ment weapon against business trusts. Indeed, William Howard Taft later
wrote that
[t]he effect of the decision in the Knight case upon the popular mind,
and indeed upon Congress as well, was to discourage hope that the statute
could be used to accomplish its manifest purpose and curb the great indus-
trial trusts which.., were making every effort to restrict production, con-
trol prices, and monopolize the business.233
Following the Knight case, President Cleveland and Attorney Gen-
eral Olney "concluded that the evil must be controlled through State leg-
islation, and not through a national statute. ' 234  Taft complained that
"the protection which has long been afforded to the ordinary criminal,
and the leniency with which the law treats an accused, have enured
greatly to the benefit of these wealthy and powerful violators of the law"
who have an "immense fund at their disposal" and "are able to secure
the most acute counsel. ' 235 The McKinley administration came and
went with "not a single indictment" against business under the Sherman
Act, and "[e]nforcement virtually ceased until, in February 1902, Presi-
dent Roosevelt ordered a suit against the Northern Securities Company
"236
232. Ia at 17.
233. W.H. TAFr, supra note 156, at 60.
234. Id
235. W.H. TAFr, FOUR ASPECTS OF Civic DUTY 52 (1906). [hereinafter W.H. TAFT, Civic
DUTY]. Probably one of Taft's greatest achievements as a judge of the court of appeals was his
decision in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271 (1898), finding the pipe manufacturer
in violation of the Sherman Act. The case was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, on the basis
of Taft's analysis. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Taft later wrote about the case that "Ithe purposes and
action of the combination, through the treachery of a stenographer, were laid before the court, so
that minute dissection was possible .... It would be difficult to state a case of contract for sales
among vendors more certainly restrictive and more selfish and monopolizing in character than this
was." W.H. TAFT, supra note 156, at 71-72.
236. 1 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 144. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904). For an important evaluation of the antitrust laws of the period, see generally M. SKLAR, THE
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Taft later reiterated his faith in the system of private property de-
spite "the abuses that grow out of the possession of great wealth by un-
scrupulous men."' 237 In a 1906 Yale lecture titled, "The Duties of
Citizenship Viewed from the Standpoint of a Judge on the Bench," Taft
said:
I do not for a moment sympathize in the view that everything is cor-
ruption and that all the picture should be dark and black. I think that we
have had during our last ten years a decade of prosperity never before
known in the history of the country; and in the immense sums which have
been made for the benefit of all of us in the prosperity that we all have
enjoyed, there are some who have taken a larger and an ill-gotten share, and
who are attempting to maintain and increase this share by methods that
should be reprobated and punished. It is impossible that such abuses should
not have occurred in prosperity so unprecedented. But the abuses furnish
but little reason for condemnation of the system unless it can be first shown
that the prosperity has not been general, and unless it can be further shown
that the abuses of the concentration of much wealth in a few hands are a
greater detriment than the general prosperity is an advantage.2 3 8
But the decade that began in 1895 saw the continued legal curtail-
ment of laborers' efforts to use unions to obtain a larger share of the
"general prosperity." In the year after the Pullman boycott, the Supreme
Court upheld the use of the injunction against Eugene Debs. 239 As the
new century began, employers vigorously pursued legal and equitable
remedies in state and federal courts to restrain the union activities of
their employees 4.2 1 The Sherman Act was but one of these legal weapons
against union organization, but it held great potential in its remedial
scheme, providing for government injunctions and treble damages to pri-
vate plaintiffs. A proposed section of the congressional bill intended to
exclude labor unions from the Sherman Act did not survive the commit-
tee process, and the Act was silent on the issue.2 a Thus it was left to the
CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW,
AND POLITICS (1988).
237. W.H. TAFT, CivC DUTY, supra note 235, at 51.
238. Id. at 53-54.
239. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
240. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 49, at 21-24.
241. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 621 (1976). Historian Arnold Paul notes that "[tihe Senate Judiciary Committee, some
members of which favored including labor under the law, substituted broader language in its final
report; that the Congress as a whole, however, was aware of the full implications of this change is
unlikely." A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 110 n.16. But see Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American
Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEx. L. REv. 919, 950-51 (1988) (arguing that the evidence on the legislative
history "suggests that Congress fully considered whether to exempt labor but decided that no combi-
nations, either capital or labor, should be exempted").
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courts to decide whether unions were an appropriate object of antitrust
litigation.
B. Loewe v. Lawlor-The "intimidation" of the Danbury Hatters
The remedial scheme under the Sherman Act proved to be a power-
ful offensive weapon against unions. Section 7 of the Act permitted pri-
vate parties to sue for treble damages for injuries resulting from acts
found to violate the antitrust laws.2 42 Furthermore, the United States at-
torneys were required under section 4 of the Act to "prevent and restrain
violations" of the Act through "proceedings in equity."243 The effective-
ness of federal injunctions, as well as the expanding scope of federal sub-
stantive law, had not gone unnoticed by employers who had observed the
union defeats in the receivership cases and in the common law cases
brought in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction.244
When, in 1893, a British ship-owning company attempted to use the
new federal antitrust law to restrain the "unlawful and well-nigh violent
combination" of persons organizing shipping crews, District Judge Ed-
ward C. Billings held that only the United States government could sue
for injunctions under the Sherman Act.245 Within months of this deci-
sion, the United States Attorney in New Orleans appeared in Judge Bill-
ings's court seeking to enjoin a union under the Sherman Act; as a result,
Judge Billings "became the first judge to apply the Sherman Act to la-
bor. '246 In that case, United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Coun-
cil, he articulated an expansive interpretation of the legislative history of
the Sherman Act:
I think the congressional debates show that the statute had its origin in
the evils of massed capital; but, when the congress came to formulating the
prohibition which is the yardstick for measuring the complainant's right to
the injunction, . . . . [t]he subject had so broadened in the minds of the
legislators that the source of the evil was not regarded as material, and the
242. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), repealed by ch. 283 Pub. L. 137 § 3, 69
Stat. 282, 283 (1955). Section 7 of the original Sherman Act was replaced with Pub. L. 97-290, § 7,
96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982)). The provision for private suits
for treble damages became section 15 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982)).
243. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
244. See, ag., F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 49, at 13-14.
245. Blindell v. Hagan, 54 F. 40, 41 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893), affid, 56 F. 696 (5th Cir. 1893). In
Blindell, Judge Billings permitted the suit to proceed nevertheless on the broader ground of the
court's general equity jurisdiction. For a discussion of the Blindell case, see A. PAUL, supra note 55,
at 107-08.
246. A. PAUL, supra note 55, at 108-09.
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evil in its entirety is dealt with.247
While other views of that legislative history are possible,248 the fed-
eral courts frequently interpreted the words of section 1 of the Sherman
Act that declared illegal "[e]very... combination... or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce" 249 to include many otherwise lawful ac-
tivities by unions.210 But it was not until 1908 that the Supreme Court in
the Danbury Hatters case-Loewe v. Lawlor2 1 '-finally placed its impri-
matur on the use of the Sherman Act to sue combinations of workers.
In July of 1902, in an attempt to unionize the Loewe hat factory in
Danbury, Connecticut, the United Hatters of North America called a
strike at the factory and declared a nationwide boycott against the Dan-
bury hats and the wholesale dealers in numerous other states who
purchased the hats. With the American Federation of Labor, the United
Hatters engaged in a large-scale publicity campaign, distributing circu-
lars, employing union agents to visit wholesale dealers and their custom-
ers, and publishing reports of the boycott and strike in their newspapers,
The Journal of the United Hatters of North America and The American
Federationist. 2 2 The United Hatters union label, which the union owned
and controlled "absolutely," provided the strikers with "a ready, conve-
247. United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994, 996 (C.C.E.D. La.
1893), aff'd, 57 F. 85 (5th Cir. 1893), quoted in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301-02 (1908).
248. After years of federal antitrust litigation directed at unions, Justice Stone in the 1940
Supreme Court case of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader argued that the Sherman Act was directed at
"another and quite a different evil." 310 U.S. 469, 491 (1940). Stone marshalled an exhaustive ac-
count of the legislative history of the Sherman Act to support his argument that
[i]t was enacted in the era of "trusts" and of "combinations" of businesses and of capital
organized and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in the
marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a mat-
ter of public concern. The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competi-
tion in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise
prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of
goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public
injury.
Id. at 492-93; see also id. at 491-95 nn.12-15 (legislative history). In addition, Justice Stone observed
that "[w]ith few exceptions the articles, scientific and popular, reflected the popular idea that the
[Sherman] Act was aimed at the prevention of monopolistic practices and restraints upon trade
injurious to purchasers and consumers of goods and services by preservation of business competi-
tion." Id. at 490 n.1l.
249. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)); but see
Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 488.
250. Professor Gorman notes that "[t]he courts in fact proceeded to hold unions liable for anti-
trust violations in more instances than manufacturers or distributors... ." R. GORMAN, supra note
241, at 621.
251. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
252. Id. at 286 n.1 para. 10, 287 n.1 para. 13, 291 n.1 para. 20 (quoting complaint).
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nient and effective instrument and means" of enforcing the boycott.25 3
Hat production was "cripple[d]" until "the latter part of" October 1902,
and wholesalers were "intimidate[d]" from dealing with the Danbury
hats because of the boycott, causing economic losses of $80,000 to the
Loewe Company.254 Loewe alleged that the United Hatters past organiz-
ing successes were attributable to the "intimidation of and threats made
to" the hat manufacturers and their customers, which "forced" the man-
ufacturers "to yield to their demand, and unionize their factories. 25
Despite the use of language in the allegations of the complaint, repe-
titiously describing the "intimidation," "threats," and "coercion," of the
United Hatters secondary boycott tactics, the only "harm" which the
union threatened was economic. No actual violence or threat of violence
was alleged, and the attorneys for the plaintiffs acknowledged in their
argument before the Supreme Court that the defendants "did not...
resort to the actual seizure of the plaintiffs' hats while in transit or other-
wise physically obstruct their transportation." But the Sherman Act did
not require physical harm to products in the interstate "stream" of com-
merce or physical obstruction of the interstate "flow" of goods. Under
section 7 of the Sherman Act, "[a]ny person.., injured in his business or
property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything for-
bidden or declared to be unlawful" under the Act could sue in federal
court "without respect to the amount in controversy" and would "re-
cover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee." '256 The unlawful acts under the
federal antitrust statute were the making of combinations or conspiracies
"in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations" or the attempt to monopolize or the monopolization of any
part of this interstate or international trade.257 The question thus before
the Supreme Court was whether the United Hatters secondary boycott
constituted an unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.258
253. Id. at 286 n.1 para. 11 (quoting complaint).
254. Id. at 291 n.1 para. 20, 292 n.1 para. 21, 296 n.1 para. 22 (quoting complaint), id. at 307,
309. In the first few years of the century, the United Hatters had used the boycott to unionize at least
seventy out of eighty-two hat factories in America. Id. at 305, 289 n.I para. 17 (quoting complaint).
255. Id at 289 n.1 para. 16 & 17 (quoting complaint).
256. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)). See
supra note 242.
257. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982)).
258. The district court had sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed the complaint in
Loewe on the ground that "the combination stated was not within the Sherman Act." 208 U.S. at
283. In reviewing the entire complaint on appeal, the Supreme Court held unanimously that the trial
court had erred in sustaining the demurrer, and that on the basis of the Court's reading of the
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The plaintiffs' attorneys in their argument had insisted that
[t]he complaint must be considered as an entirety. A combination so great
in scope, and complex in its operations necessarily contains elements, which
in and by themselves are either innocent or beyond Federal jurisdiction ....
It is impossible for the plaintiffs to set forth all the defendants' secret opera-
tions with definiteness and particularity.259
Thus when Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the Court, he
noted that "the Anti-Trust law has a broader application than the prohi-
bition of restraints of trade unlawful at common law .... The object and
intention of the combination determined its legality."'26°
Fuller recalled that in 1893, Judge Billings had enjoined "a gigantic
and widespread combination of the members of a multitude of separate
organizations" which had violated the Act by "the successful effort of the
combination... to intimidate and overawe others who were at work in
conducting or carrying on the commerce of the country.1261 But the por-
trayal of the awesome power of the United Hatters boycott was com-
pleted with Chief Justice Fuller's invocation of the memory of the
Pullman strike and the prosecution of Eugene Debs.262
The 1894 Pullman strike injunctions and contempt cases and Loewe
complaint, "the combination described ... is a combination 'in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States,' in the sense in which those words are used in the act .... ." Id. at 292.
The Loewe Company was permitted to proceed with its action for treble damages.
259. Id. at 275 (Argument for Plaintiffs in Error).
260. Id. at 297. Fuller also quoted lengthy exerpts from an earlier Supreme Court opinion by
Justice Holmes, who in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904), had written, "The most
innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot,
and if it is a step in a plot neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the
punishment of the plot by law." See Loewe, 208 U.S. at 299.
261. United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994, 995, 1000 (C.C.E.D. La.
1893), quoted in Loewe, 208 U.S. at 301, 302.
262. Fuller noted that the bill in In re Debs alleged that the American Railway Union "asserted
that they could and would tie up, paralyze and break down any and every railroad which did not
accede to their demands." Loewe, 208 U.S. at 303. The events of the Pullman strike-the solidarity
of the railway workers in support of the boycott, the fear and violence that ensued, and the economic
damage suffered by the railway corporations and the Pullman Palace Car Company-were certainly
vividly recalled by the members of the Loewe court. Although the circuit court in the Debs case had
enjoined the boycott and strike on the authority of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court had decided
the case "upon the broader ground that the Federal Government had full power over interstate
commerce and over the transmission of the mails." Id The Debs court had reserved decision on the
applicability of the Sherman Act to labor combinations for another day, and that day had arrived for
the Danbury Hatters. Justice Brewer in the Debs case had asked, "If a State with its recognized
powers of sovereignty is impotent to obstruct interstate commerce, can it be that any mere voluntary
association of individuals within the limits of that State has a power which the State itself does not
possess?" In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 581 (1895), quoted in Loewe, 208 U.S. at 304. Chief Justice
Fuller in Loewe responded, "The question answers itself .... 208 U.S. at 304.
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were linked in their shared images of danger, the evocation of what Taft
had called "secret terrorism," and what the plaintiffs' attorneys in Loewe
had called the "secret operations" of workers joined together in unions.
The complaint in Loewe, with its assertions that the union boycott was
experienced as "intimidation" and "threats," was sufficient to state a
cause of action under the Sherman Act because the actions alleged fit
into a clear, but frightening, vision of a world which threatened the "invi-
olability of corporate property. ' 263 A world in ivhich "mere voluntary
associations" of working class people could "threaten," "intimidate,"
"force," "coerce," and "overawe" factory owners "to unionize their
shops... and to subject [them] to the direction and control of persons,
other than the owners... in a manner extremely onerous and distasteful
to [them]" was a world turned on its head. 264 The Sherman Act would
restrain not only the "evils" of massed capital, but the threat posed to the
social order by the "evils" of massed labor.
From the workers' perspective, however, the Danbury Hatters boy-
cott, far from being violent and intimidating, was marked by its solidar-
ity, its careful planning and dissemination of information, and its control
of the union label which symbolized the pride of the craftsmen in their
work. Unlike the "plots" or "secret operations" that characterized the
activities of corporations attempting to restrain trade to increase profits,
the union boycott, by its very nature, was a public and open campaign to
protect the wages and skills of workers. Furthermore, the literature of
the Danbury Hatters boycott showed that the hatters, like the artisans of
earlier generations, exhibited the characteristics of "good" Americans-a
strong sense of community, pride in their work, loyalty to their country,
and fierce independence. Translated into the workplace structures of the
turn-of-the-century factory, these characteristics led them to fear and re-
ject the "outsiders"-immigrants, unskilled workers, women and chil-
dren, native Americans from different ethnic groups-who undercut
their wages and their skills. Factory owners, however, exploited the fact
that the workforce represented highly stratified social structures and
identifiable communities, as well as diverse skills, abilities, and
resources.
265
The perspectives of work and workers and their relationship to
263. Taft, supra note 24, at 232.
264. 208 U.S. at 305 (quoting complaint).
265. See D. MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE
STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVSM, 1865-1925, at 116-23 (1987) (discussing changes in job




unionization as seen from the bench and from the factory floor clashed
irreconcilably. To judges like Taft, Fuller, and even Holmes, the union
organizer was an "outsider" and a potential threat to the cohesion of the
community. To skilled workers like the Danbury hatters, the union orga-
nizer was an "insider" who represented and solidified the interests of
their community. From the former vantage point, collective action of
workers meant disorder, social disruption, and even violent overthrow of
the capitalistic system of property ownership. From the latter vantage
point, collective action for most American union members meant order,
social connection, and rationalization of the workplace.
In the Danbury Hatters case, the Supreme Court linked the images
and language of violence and disorder to the reality of the economic
power of the union's highly organized-but peaceful-secondary boy-
cott. These links justified increasing the scope of the Sherman Act be-
yond its purpose of proscribing economically harmful business or
corporate behavior to proscribing certain types of economically harmful
union behavior. Furthermore, in 1908, Chief Justice Fuller noted in
Loewe that the Sherman Act "has a broader application than the prohibi-
tion of restraints of trade unlawful at common law." '2 66 Because "[t]he
object and intention of the combination determined its illegality, 267
judges could interject their own ideas of appropriate and inappropriate
economic goals for workers and unions.
C. Duplex v. Deering-"Polite" but "sinister" threats
Although private parties could sue labor unions for treble damages
under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court eventually held that the
Sherman Act did not permit private parties to seek injunctive relief.268
Thus, for a time, the regulation of union activity by federal injunctions
under the antitrust laws was left to the United States attorneys, and em-
ployers had to be content with either federal suits for damages or reme-
dies available under state common law. This jurisdictional hiatus was
remedied by passage of the Clayton Act in 1914.269
266. 208 U.S. at 297; see also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 438 (1911)
(discussing the scope of the Sherman Act).
267. 208 U.S. at 297.
268. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1917) (holding that a private party cannot
sue for an injunction under the Sherman Act).




Hailed by Samuel Gompers as "Labor's Magna Carta, ' 2 7° sections 6
and 20 of the Clayton Act had given unions cause for hope that the fed-
eral antitrust laws would no longer be used against the activities of work-
ers. For, as Justice Brandeis later wrote in his dissenting opinion in
Duplex v. Deering, "[tihis statute was the fruit of unceasing agitation,
which extended over more than twenty years and was designed to equal-
ize before the law the position of workingmen and employer as industrial
combatants. 2 71 Section 6 of the Act declared the law of the United
States:
That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid
the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organiza-
tions, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof;
nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed
to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.272
But for many years the Clayton Act proved to be labor's undoing. Signifi-
cantly, as the Supreme Court affirmed in Duplex, section 16 of the Clay-
ton Act explicitly gave "private parties a right to relief by injunction in
any court of the United States against threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the anti-trust laws. '273 For over twenty years following the
passage of the Clayton Act, employers vigorously asserted their right to
proceed against union activities by injunctions based on alleged antitrust
violations.
Brandeis noted in Duplex that "[a]side from the use of the injunc-
tion, the chief source of dissatisfaction with the existing [interpretation of
the Sherman Act] lay in the doctrine of malicious combination .... ,, 74
The nineteenth century federal judges applying the Sherman Act to
union activities had justified criminal penalties, injunctions, or civil dam-
age awards based on notions that union conduct which was "socially
bad" was "animated by malice" because it was done intentionally.2 7 S
270. 2 S. GOMPERS, supra note 63, at 299; see also S. GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND
LABOR: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 186 (N. Salvatore ed. 1984).
271. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 484 (1921).
272. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982)).
273. 254 U.S. at 464-65.
274. Id. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
275. These notions derived from English and American common law criminal conspiracy and
restraint of trade cases. J. BRYAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONSPIRACY
(1909), quoted in Duplex, 254 U.S. at 485 n.1.
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Brandeis explained that "[by] virtue of [the] doctrine [of malicious com-
bination], damage resulting from conduct such as striking or withholding
patronage or persuading others to do either,... became actionable when
done for a purpose which a judge considered socially or economically
harmful and therefore branded as malicious and unlawful." '27 6
But before becoming a Supreme Court justice, Brandeis himself was
ambivalent about the legality of certain union objectives and methods. In
testimony which Brandeis delivered to the Senate Committee on Inter-
state Commerce in 1912 he said:
Mr. Brandeis: ... While I believe that the closed-shop idea is radically
wrong and is illegal, in the sense that no court could enforce it (and to a
certain extent the courts--our Massachusetts court-has interfered by in-
junctions with the closed shop) yet I should not think that the necessities of
the situation were such as to require the same protection against the union
which we now require against trusts ....
Senator Newlands: In other words, you do not think that the labor
union consititutes the same menace to society that the capitalistic union
does?
Mr. Brandeis: I do not.
Senator Newlands: But if it does you would be prepared to act on that?
Mr. Brandeis: Absolutely, I think. Society must protect itself.2 77
The Clayton Act attempted to alter the perspective that the courts
had developed on the "menace" to society of the labor union as com-
pared to the "capitalistic union"r-the business trust. But far more signif-
icant than the Clayton Act's declaration of the legality of unions under
federal antitrust law, was its limitation on the power of federal courts to
issue injunctions against certain types of labor activity in labor disputes.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act declared it to be the law of the United
States
[t]hat no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court
of the United States... in any case between an employer and employees, or
between employers and employees, or between employees, or between per-
sons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out
of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless neces-
276. 254 U.S. at 485.
277. Hearing on S. Re& 98 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1173 (1912) (testimony of Louis D. Brandeis), reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE 1789, at 246 (W. Letwin ed. 1961) [hereinafter DOCUMEN-
TARY HIsTORY]. At the time of this hearing Louis Brandeis was a wealthy corporate attorney who
had become a public advocate of legislative reforms supported by the labor movement, such as mini-
mum wage laws and protective legislation for women. In 1916, Woodrow Wilson appointed him to
the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, where he served until his retirement in 1939.
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sary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the
party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy
at law .... 278
The remaining paragraph of section 20 of the Clayton Act listed acts
which "any person or persons, whether singly or in concert" could en-
gage in, without prohibition by a restraining order or injunction issued
by a federal court, and which could not "be considered or held to be
violations of any law of the United States."2 79 At issue in the Duplex case
was the meaning of that part of section 20 of the Act which prevented the
federal courts from prohibiting "any person or persons.., from ceasing
to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recom-
mending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so
to do."' 280 On its face, the words seemed to protect the secondary boy-
cott, which had been found unlawful in Loewe v. Lawlor.
The labor dispute in Duplex was similar to the dispute in Loewe.
Members of a union of skilled workers-the International Association of
Machinists-engaged in a strike and boycott to put economic pressure on
the Duplex Printing Press Company. The goal was to unionize the Du-
plex factory in Michigan, which manufactured newspaper printing
presses, and to protect the wage scale and working hours the union had
achieved elsewhere. In support of the strike, the union requested "its
members and the members of affiliated unions not to work on the instal-
lation of presses which [Duplex] had delivered in New York." '281 It was
the legality of this secondary boycott that was at issue in the Duplex case.
The Duplex Company brought its action in federal district court
invoking jurisdiction on the grounds of diversity of citizenship and of the
substantive federal question-were officials of the machinists union en-
gaged in a conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act? Duplex sought to enjoin several officials of the International Associ-
ation of Machinists from continuing the union boycott. After the suit was
initiated, but before the final hearing in the United States District Court,
Congress passed the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914. On appeal, the
Clayton Act, in its first and most decisive test,28 2 was applied to the facts
278. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. 254 U.S. at 480.
282. After the hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint, and the Second Circuit subse-
quently affirmed that decision, with one judge-Circuit Judge Rogers-dissenting. District Judge
Learned Hand and Circuit Judge Hough wrote separate opinions affirming the lower court. Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 252 F. 722 (2d Cir. 1918). Upon reaching the United States Supreme
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of the Duplex dispute.
The Court first held that section 16 of the Clayton Act extended to
private parties the right to injunctive relief from threatened property
losses caused by violations of the federal antitrust laws. Justice Pitney
stated that "clear and undisputed evidence" proved that Duplex Printing
Company's "business of manufacturing printing presses and disposing of
them in commerce is a property right"; "a widespread combination [of
Machinists Union members] exists"; and Duplex "has sustained substan-
tial damage to its interstate trade, and is threatened with further and
irreparable loss and damage in the future." '283 Consequently, the plain-
tiffs were entitled to an injunction if the union's actions were proscribed
by the Sherman Act as it had been amended by the Clayton Act.
The Court then gave a very restrictive reading of the parties pro-
tected from federal equitable remedies under section 20 of the Clayton
Act.284 Whereas the majority of the circuit court of appeals interpreted
the words "employers and employees" in section 20 to mean "'the busi-
ness class or clan to which the parties litigant respectively belong,'" the
Supreme Court held the words to apply only to parties standing in the
proximate relation described in the statute.28 Under the facts of Duplex,
the defendant union officials who were orchestrating the boycott were
Court in 1921, however, Duplex justified what Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene described as
"application of a familiar bit of French cynicism: The more things are legislatively changed, the
more they remain the same judicially." F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 49, at 176. The
Supreme Court, with Justice Pitney writing for the majority, reversed the decision of the circuit
court, holding that the the activity of the Machinists Union was enjoinable by a federal court. Bran-
deis dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Holmes and Clarke. Frankfurter and Greene later
observed that
[h]ow much of the life of a statute dealing with contentious social issues is determined by
the general outlook with which judges view such legislation, lies on the very surface of
the Duplex Case. Thirteen federal judges were called upon to apply the Clayton Act to
the particular facts of this case. Six found that the law called for a hands-off policy in the
conflict between the Duplex Printing Company and the Machinists; seven found that the
law called for interference against the Machinists. The decision of the majority of the
Supreme Court is, of course, the authoritative ruling. But informed professional opinion
would find it difficult to attribute greater intrinsic sanction for the views of the seven
judges, White, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McReynolds and Rogers than for
the opposing interpretation of the six judges, Holmes, Brandeis, Clarke, Hough, Learned
Hand and Manton.
Id. at 169.
283. 254 U.S. at 465.
284. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)); see infra
note 366.
285. 254 U.S. at 471.
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not employees of the plaintiff employer. In fact, no employees of Duplex
were directly involved in the boycott activity.
Justice Pitney observed that section 20 of the Clayton Act "imposes
an exceptional and extraordinary restriction upon the equity powers of
the courts of the United States and upon the general operation of the
anti-trust laws, a restriction in the nature of a special privilege or immu-
nity to a particular class, with corresponding detriment to the general
public."2"6  Therefore, "[flull and fair effect" would be given to the
"guarded language" Congress used in the statute if the "exceptional priv-
ilege" were confined to "parties affected in a proximate and substantial,
not merely a sentimental or sympathetic, sense by the cause of dis-
pute. '28 7 Union officials or other union members who were not, at the
time of the suit, employees of the employer seeking equitable relief did
not fall under the Clayton Act's savings provisions. Pitney observed that
"Congress had in mind particular industrial controversies, not a general
class war. 288
Justice Brandeis countered that "a strict technical construction" of
the words in section 20-"employers and employees" and "persons em-
ployed and persons seeking employment"-would make the statute inap-
plicable to most labor disputes, "since the very acts to which it applies
sever the continuity of the legal relationship."28 9 Also, in his analysis of
the legality of the secondary boycott under the common law, Brandeis
pointed out that none of the defendant union officials or the machinists
who refused to work on installing the Duplex presses was "an outsider,
an interloper."290 Brandeis queried, "May not all with a common interest
join in refusing to expend their labor upon articles whose very produc-
tion consititutes an attack upon their standard of living and the institu-
tion which they are convinced supports it?" '29 1
The undercurrent of a fear of violence--of "class war"--runs
through Pitney's opinion in Duplex. Pitney described the acts of the de-
fendants in carrying out their secondary boycott as follows: "warning
customers" not to purchase or install the presses and "threatening them
with loss" if they do so; "threatening customers with sympathetic strikes
in other trades"; "threatening" a trucking company "with trouble" if it
286. Id.
287. Id. at 472.
288. Id
289. Id at 488 (Brandeis, 3., dissenting).




should haul the presses to the customers; "inciting" employees of the
trucking company and the Duplex customers to strike their employers;
"coercing union men by threatening them with loss of union cards and
with being blacklisted as 'scabs' if they assisted in installing the presses";
and "resorting to a variety of other modes of preventing the sale of the
[Duplex] presses in New York City... such as injuring and threatening
to injure [Duplex's] customers and prospective customers, and persons
concerned in hauling, handling, or installing the presses." '292 Pitney went
on to emphasize that "[i]n some cases the threats were undisguised, in
other cases polite in form but none the less sinister in purpose and
effect."
2 93
According to the Court, the Clayton Act did not permit "a normally
lawful organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade. ' 294 Thus the fact that the machinists secon-
dary boycott was outwardly peaceful did not change its "sinister" and
"threatening" character. Peaceful economic pressure carried out through
the secondary boycott-or what Taft had earlier described as "a cruel
instrument" that "coerce[s] the whole community" 29 5-- implicitly con-
tained the threat of violence. Pitney wrote in Duplex that the restraint of
the secondary boycott "produced by peaceable persuasion is as much
within the prohibition [of the antitrust laws] as one accomplished by
force or threats of force." 296 The distinction between economic coercion
and coercion by violence was too ambiguous. The peaceful and "polite"
language of persuasion could too easily be a "cloak" for "sinister" threats
of force. This ambiguity justified the prohibition of even peaceful
297persuasion.
Brandeis, on the other hand, rejected the Court's characterization of
the machinists' boycott as potentially violent. He observed that the union
officials had not been charged with "inducing employees to break their
292. Id. at 463-64.
293. Id. at 464.
294. Id
295. Address by William Howard Taft, Secretary of War, at Cooper Union, New York City
(Jan. 10, 1908), reprinted in R. DuNN, WILLIAM HowARD TAFr, AMERICAN 219, 248 (1908) [here-
inafter Taft, Cooper Union Address].
296. 254 U.S. at 467-68.
297. At the conclusion of the majority opinion, Pitney declared that the defendants, the Ma-
chinists Union, and all its members should be enjoined "from causing or threatening to cause loss,
damage, trouble, or inconvenience [to any person dealing or trading with Duplex] .... and also and
especially from using any force, threats, command, direction, or even persuasion" with the purpose
or effect of causing anyone to refuse to work for a Duplex customer or any firm involved in delivery
or installation of Duplex printing presses. Id. at 478.
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contracts. '298 "Nor," Brandeis continued, "is it now urged that defend-
ants threaten acts of violence." 299 Congress had intended by the Clayton
Act to declare that "the relations between employers of labor and work-
ingmen were competitive relations, that organized competition was not
harmful and that it justified injuries necessarily inflicted in its course.'" 300
Congress had chosen "to remove all restrictions which now prevent the
freedom of action of both parties to industrial disputes, retaining only the
ordinary civil and criminal restraints for the preservation of life, property
and the public peace.""3 1 Brandeis believed that both the common law
and the federal antitrust laws declared "the right of industrial combat-
ants to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of self-
interest. ' ' 3o2
The congressional plan, however, was not to sanction violence.
Rather, Brandeis argued, the legislative legalization of the secondary
boycott was a means of avoiding violence. Brandeis concluded his dis-
senting opinion in Duplex with the following comment:
All rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which they exist;
above all rights rises duty to the community. The conditions developed in
industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle
without danger to the community. But it is not for judges to determine
whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of
permissible contest and to declare the duties which the new situation de-
mands. This is the function of the legislature which, while limiting individ-
ual and group rights of aggression and defense, may substitute processes ofjustice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.303
Earlier, in the year that the Clayton Act was passed, William Howard
Taft had rejected the argument that the secondary boycott should be per-
mitted because it would channel forces into "processes of justice" that
would otherwise lead to "trial by combat." In his book, The Anti-Trust
Act and the Supreme Court, Taft wrote:
The suggestion is made that the working-men ought to be allowed to
use the secondary boycott, because if they do not, then they will resort to
298. IM at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis was referring to the holding of Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917), that a union official's peaceful attempts to per-
suade employees to break their "yellow dog" contracts by joining the union and unionizing their
mine was enjoinable.
299. Duplex, 254 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 486.
301. Id at 486-87 n.2 (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 136
(1915)).
302. Id. at 488.
303. Id
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force. This seems to be a very poor argument. It assumes that militancy and
the use of criminal means to further a cause should be recognized as an
effective method of changing law.304
Thus, what unions correctly perceived as their most effective eco-
nomic "weapon" came to be seen as either a veiled threat of violence or a
rational response to avoid violence. The fact that the success of a secon-
dary boycott depended on skilled leadership, effective communication,
responsive organization, strong individual loyalty and solidarity, and
community support was irrelevant. Rather, the organization of the sec-
ondary boycott became, for many jurists, the makings of "sinister" plots
that could be prosecuted and enjoined under the federal antitrust laws.305
304. W.H. TAFT, supra note 156, at 25.
305. During the 1920s, the courts, including the Supreme Court, continued to use the Sherman
Act, as amended by the Clayton Act, to prohibit secondary boycotts that involved interstate trade.
In 1927, relying on the analysis of Duplex, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction against the
Journeymen Stone Cutters Association, forbidding them to refuse to work on stone cut by men who
were members of an "independent union" set up by the Bedford Cut Stone Company following a
lockout of the journeymen. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
(1927). Brandeis again wrote a strong dissent, also joined by Holmes, in which he described the
behavior of the members of the Journeymen's union:
They were innocent alike of trespass and of breach of contract. They did not picket.
They refrained from violence, intimidation, fraud and threats. They refrained from ob-
structing otherwise either the plaintiffs or their customers in attempts to secure other
help. They did not plan a boycott against any of the plaintiffs or against builders who
used the plaintiffs' product. On the contrary, they expressed entire willingness to cut and
finish anywhere any stone quarried by any of the plaintiffs, except such stone as had been
partially "cut by men working in opposition to" the [Journeymen's] Association.
Members of the Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association could not work anywhere on
stone which had been cut at the quarries by "men working in opposition" to it, without
aiding and abetting the enemy. Observance by each member of the provision of their
constitution which forbids such action was essential to his own self-protection. It was
demanded of each by loyalty to the organization and to his fellows. If, on the undisputed
facts of this case, refusal to work can be enjoined, Congress created by the Sherman Law
and the Clayton Act an instrument for imposing restraints upon labor which reminds of
involuntary servitude.
Id. at 59, 64-65.
For a description of Chief Justice Taft's struggle to get a majority of the Court to follow Duplex
in the Bedford Cut Stone case, see A. MASON, supra note 105, at 228-30. Mason notes that Taft
wrote his son that " 'Brandeis has written one of his meanest opinions .... Holmes sides with him,
and while Sanford and Stone concur in our opinion, they do it grudgingly, Stone with a kind of
kickback that will make nobody happy."' Id. at 230 (quoting letter from William Howard Taft to
Robert A. Taft (Apr. 10, 1927)).
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VI. REGULATION OF PICKETING UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE
ANTITRUST LAWS: THE TAFT OPINIONS
A. Introduction-Injunctions "by the bushel"
William Howard Taft took his seat as Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court on October 6, 1921, less than a year after the Du-
plex decision was handed down.1 6 Before the year was out, he had writ-
ten the opinions for the majority of the Court in two important cases
involving labor picketing-American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council and Truax v. Corrigan.3 "7 The first case, American Foun-
dries, concerned the effect of the Clayton Act on the scope of an injunc-
tion barring union picketing outside a steel factory. The second case,
Truax, was a determination of the validity under the United States Con-
stitution of a state's interpretation of its "little Clayton Act." Both cases
were significant for union endeavors to use the picket line as a method of
organizing and striking, particularly in the wake of Duplex's proscription
of the secondary boycott.
The appointment of Taft to head the highest court did not bode well
for the cause of organized labor. Taft's eight-year tenure on the Sixth
Circuit during the last decade of the nineteenth century had given him a
reputation as an antilabor judge. When in 1901 Theodore Roosevelt, then
McKinley's vice president, had written a magazine article suggesting
Taft's suitability for the office of president of the United States, 308 Taft
had written to his brother Charles:
The idea that a man who has issued injunctions against labour unions, al-
most by the bushel, who has sent at least ten or a dozen violent labour
agitators to jail, and who is known as one of the worst judges for the main-
tenance of government by injunction, could ever be a successful candidate
on a Presidential ticket, strikes me as intensely ludicrous; and had I the
slightest ambition in that direction I hope that my good sense would bid me
to suppress it.309
After serving as governor of the Phillipines and then as secretary of
war in Roosevelt's cabinet, Taft, at Roosevelt's urging, "suppressed his
good sense" and ran for the presidency in 1908. That year, in his address
306. Duplex, 254 U.S. 433, was decided on January 3, 1921.
307. American Foundries, 257 U.S. 184, was decided on December 5, 1921, and Truax, 257 U.S.
312, was decided on December 19, 1921.
308. The article in Outlook magazine was occasioned by Taft's appointment in 1901 as the first
civil governor of the Phillipines. A. MASON, supra note 105, at 25.
309. Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft (date unknown) in H. TAFr, RECOL-
LECTMONS OF FULL YEARs 223 (1914), quoted in A. MASON, supra note 105, at 26.
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at the Cooper Institute in New York City to an "East side audience of
workingmen and socialists"-some 3,000 strong-Taft attempted to dis-
pel some of the labor bias against him.310 The speech was designed to
demonstrate the unity of interests of labor and capital-"that there is a
wide economic and business field in which the interests of the wealthiest
capitalist and of the humblest laborer are exactly the same."' 311 This
"common interest" which Taft identified as the desire "to increase the
fruits of production," did not, however, keep capital and labor from be-
ing "plainly opposed" to each other "in determining the share of each in
the product." '312 Labor unions are "necessary" because "capital will
surely have the advantage unless labor takes united action. ' 313 Taft
equally disparaged the "abuses" of capital and labor, particulary the
business trust and the secondary boycott. But he reiterated his views on
the legality of unions and peaceful strikes-a position he had expressed
in unequivocal terms in his 1894 opinion convicting Phelan of con-
tempt,31 4 and had maintained steadfastly throughout his career as a poli-
tician and a jurist.
In attacking the "abuses of capital," Taft emphasized that wage
earners are "seriously affected" by corporate anticompetitive practices
which raise the "prices of the necessities of life," thereby reducing "the
purchasing power of the wages which the wage-earners receive. ' 31 5 Like-
wise, Taft deplored the "rare instances corporate managers have entered
into a course of violence to maintain their side of a labor controversy"
and the employer tactic of "blacklisting... laboring men, solely because
they may have been advocates of a strike.
316
Turning to the abuses of labor, Taft first criticized the use of "open
violence and threats of violence to prevent the employment of other
workingmen in the places which such members have left on a strike.
31 7
Although such violence and threats "are, of course, unlawful, and are
strongly to be condemned," Taft continued, "[p]ersuasion not amounting
in effect to duress is lawful."3 ' After attacking labor's use of the secon-
310. R. DuNN, WILLIAM HowARD TAFT, AMERICAN 167 (1908).
311. Taft, Cooper Union Address, supra note 295, at 229.
312. Id.
313. Id. In this sense, Taft's views on labor were consistent with those of Holmes. See the dis-
senting opinions of Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896),
and Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1900).
314. In re Phelan, 62 F. 803, 817 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894).
315. Taft, Cooper Union Address, supra note 295, at 244-45.
316. Id at 245-46.
317. Id at 246.
318. Id at 247.
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dary boycott, Taft concluded his speech with a lengthy discourse on the
use of the injunction in labor disputes. Taft presented a brief history of
the writ of injunction, a defense of its benefits and usefulness, and a rea-
soned critique-of its abuse by employers and judges in cases when strikers
"had no intention of doing anything unlawful or doing any violence. '319
Taft observed that because of what he believed were procedural defects in
the granting of labor injunctions, "a number of injunctions have been
issued that ought never to have been issued. '32 °
For a judge who was denounced by labor leaders32 1 for handing out
labor injunctions-in Taft's own words, "by the bushel"-Taft's Cooper
Union speech was a remarkable performance. For a politician, it nicely
served the needs of the Republican Party, which was attempting to ad-
dress some of the important labor issues which the Democratic Party had
raised. 22 Not surprisingly, at the end of Taft's speech, a member of the
audience submitted the written question, "Why has your attitude toward
workingmen changed since you were on the bench in Ohio?" Taft re-
plied, "It hasn't. 323
In a way, Taft was right, for the elements of his views on the legal
rights of workers, as well as the economic harm flowing from corporate
monopolies of trade, existed in his early opinions written while serving as
a judge first on the Ohio Superior Court and and then on the United
States Court of Appeals.324 One historian of Taft's judicial career wrote
that "[lt was [Taft's] fate to be holding high judicial posts at periods
when there were numerous sharp clashes between labor and capital. This
was especially so during his early years on the circuit bench and again in
319. Id. at 257.
320. Id at 256.
321. David H. Burton noted that "[d]uring the 1908 Presidential campaign, Democratic speak-
ers constantly reminded audiences of [Taft's] fondness for rule by injunction during his years as an
Ohio judge." D. BURTON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 134 (1986). Alpheus
T. Mason noted that Gompers called Taft the "injunction standard bearer" and Bryan referred to
him as "the father of injunctions." Mason, supra note 139, at 601.
322. Taft later wrote:
I found that Mr. Bryan was constantly referring to me as the father of injunctions, and
that Democratic managers were making as much of this part of the issues of the cam-
paign as possible, and I concluded, therefore, that the only thing for me to do was to seek
an opportunity to tell what I had decided (in labor cases) to audiences composed as
largely of labor men as possible, and then leave it to their sense ofjustice whether their
attacks upon me as an enemy of labor were justified.
Taft, Judicial Decisions as an Issue in Politics, 33 McCLuRE's MAO. 201, 208 (1909), quoted in
Mason, supra note 139, at 601 n.39.
323. R. DUNN, supra note 310, at 176 (quoting William Howard Taft).




the first few years of his service as Chief Justice." '3 2 5 In reconciling the
rights of property owners with the rights of workers, Taft responded in
1921 much as he had as a circuit court judge in 1894; he protected prop-
erty rights at the expense of the rights of workers to engage in picket-
ing.326 Alpheus Mason wrote that Taft's
enduring aim was to safeguard private property-the bulwark of civiliza-
tion. The Constitution, he believed, precludes social and economic experi-
mentation. At the storm center for nearly half a century, he tried to dam
the surging tide of progressivism. For him the final barrier against social
disaster was the United States Supreme Court.3 2 7
Taft viewed the labor injunction, administered with appropriate pro-
cedural protections, as the central social mechanism for "safeguarding"
private property.3 28 Even though the abuses of the labor injunction-and
Taft's role as the "Father of Injunctions" 329-- had been a problematical
issue in his presidential campaign in 1908, Taft strongly defended the
labor injunction in his inaugural address:
Another labor question has arisen which has awakened the most excited
discussion. That is in respect to the power of the federal courts to issue
injunctions in industrial disputes. As to that, my convictions are fixed. Take
away from the courts, if it could be taken away, the power to issue injunc-
tions in labor disputes, and it would create a privileged class among the
laborers and save the lawless among their number from a most needful rem-
edy available to all men for the protection of their business against lawless
invasion. The proposition that business is not a property or pecuniary right
which can be protected by eq3uitable injunction is utterly without founda-
tion in precedent or reason.
325. A. RAGAN, CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT 18 (1938).
326. See id. Ragan provided a more sympathetic view of Taft's labor decisions than the views
put forward by labor and "those in sympathy with their cause" during Taft's lifetime. Ragan wrote
that
[a]lithough as a rule supporting property rights when those rights were in conflict with
the rights of labor, as a judge he was not a rank partisan for his social stratum. His
deeply ingrained respect for law and order, however, was responsible for the numerous
judicial checks which he administered to certain acts of labor groups.
Idt
327. A. MASON, supra note 105, at 15-16.
328. As president, Taft recommended that Congress reform the procedures used in federal
courts in issuing writs of injunction in labor cases. See A. RAGAN, supra note 325, at 22-23.
329. This was Samuel Gompers's name for Taft during the 1908 election campaign. Id at 18-19;
see also supra note 321.
330. Inaugural Address of William Howard Taft (Mar. 4, 1909), reprinted in 15 A COMPILA-
TION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7368, 7378 (J. Richardson ed. 1897-
1917), quoted in A. RAGAN, supra note 325, at 22 n.54. Taft's statement prefigures his opinion in
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). See infra text accompanying notes 472-80.
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Thus, coming to his first Supreme Court case involving the labor injunc-
tion, Taft brought a resolve to protect business against the "lawlessness"
of some laborers. These views, first expressed in his judicial decisions in
the late nineteenth century, became more fully developed during his
years as president and later as a professor at Yale Law School.331
Before he arrived on the Supreme Court bench, however, Taft's ser-
vice on the National War Labor Board gave him a "firsthand relation-
ship with such issues as the minimum wage, the right to organize and the
eight-hour day." '32 Those fourteen months, beginning with his appoint-
ment by President Wilson in April of 1918, have been described "as an
educational experience for him of the first importance. ' 333 During his
tenure on the Board, Taft traveled to the southern United States to con-
duct hearings on disputes over working conditions in munitions and tex-
tile mills. 3 34 He apparently was shocked by what he observed. When Taft
returned from the hearings, he asked the secretary of the War Labor
Board, "'Why didn't you tell me about the conditions down there?...
Why, I had no idea! How can people live on such wages!' ,331 "By Taft's
order, approved by the board, the wages in question were doubled and
tripled. 336
The mandate for resolution of labor disputes, under which Taft had
accepted the joint chairmanship of the War Labor Board with Frank P.
Walsh, aroused oppposition from employers. But other than the estab-
lishment of "a living wage"-which Taft's biographer, Henry F. Pringle,
described as "more or less revolutionary" 337-most of the principles set
forth in the presidential proclamation of April 8, 1918, were fully consis-
tent with Taft's views on the rights of workers .33 Taft wrote, "My expe-
rience on the National War Labor Board... satisfies me that there ought
to be a board upon which labor and capital shall both be represented to
331. In 1913, after losing his bid for reelection, Taft accepted an offer to become Kent Professor
of Law at Yale. In 1914 Taft published his book, The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court which
set forth his understanding of the economic relationship between labor and capital and the role of the
Sherman Act in regulating restraints of trade.
332. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 915. See generally V. CONNER, THE NATIONAL WAR
LABOR BOARD: STABILITY, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND THE VOLUNTARY STATE IN WORLD WvAR I
(1983).
333. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 915.
334. Id at 916.
335. Conversation reported in letter from W. Jett Lauck to Henry F. Pringle, Oct. 5, 1937,
quoted in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 916.
336. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 916.
337. Id. at 918.
338. The proclamation stated:
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continue a refuge for both sides, after they have tried economic powers, as
they call it, and reached no result." 339
Taft's service on the War Labor Board proved to be an enlightening,
but not a transformative, experience. It informed but did not fundamen-
tally alter his approach to labor cases on the Supreme Court. He had
earlier written, "Judges are men. Courts are composed of judges, and one
would be foolish who would deny that courts and judges are affected by
the times in which they live, as well by the defects of those times as by
the higher ideals prevailing." 3" Taft's social darwinism was tempered by
his belief in the ability of judges, through careful interpretation of the
antitrust laws, to control the "abuses" of capital and labor. Though the
"times" of the twenties called for restraint of judicial excesses in issuing
broad, sweeping injunctions against labor unions, the problems for Taft
lay more in procedural defects than in substance. Although he had been
exposed to the lives of working people while serving on the War Labor
Board, when he approached his first labor cases on the Supreme Court,
his fear of violence overshadowed his belief in the right of workers to
picket. He could not forget Frank W. Phelan.
The right to unionize and bargain collectively is recognized and affirmed and may not
be "denied, abridged or interfered with by the employers in any manner whatsoever."
Employers must not discharge workers for union membership nor "for legitimate
trade-union activities."
The workers shall not coerce their fellows to join unions.
Where the union shop already exists it shall continue.
Shops with both union and nonunion workers are permitted, but this does not bar the
organization of a closed shop.
Established health and safety regulations are not to be relaxed.
Women doing men's work receive the same wages as do men.
The basic eight-hour day continues where specified by law. In other cases the working
day is to be determined by war needs and the health of the workers.
Maximum production in all war industries is to be maintained.
Wages and hours are to be fixed with due regard to conditions in the locality affected.
All workers, including common laborers, are entitled to a living wage. The minimum
wage is to "insure the subsistence of the worker and his family in health and reasonable
comfort."
Presidental proclamation, Apr. 8, 1918, quoted in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 918. The War
Labor Board also refused to enforce "yellow dog" contracts in exchange for the workers' waivers of
their right to strike.
339. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 920-21.
340. W.H. TAFr, supra note 156, at 33.
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B. American Steel Foundries- "Running the gauntlet"
1. Introduction. The dispute in the American Steel Foundries341'
case occurred eight years before William Howard Taft heard the appeal
from the Supreme Court bench. In November of 1913, American Steel
Foundries, a New Jersey corporation, shut down the operations of one of
its plants located in Granite City, Illinois. When operating at full capac-
ity, the plant had employed 1,600 men, many of them skilled workers
who were members of trade unions. On April 6, 1914, the plant "re-
sumed operations with about 350 of its regular men, 150 of whom be-
longed to the skilled trades, electricians, cranemen, mill hands,
machinists and blacksmiths. '342
The plant manager had testified at trial: "'When we opened April
6th we employed whoever we saw fit, whoever applied for employment at
the gate. We only had called for in round numbers 300 men, and laid off
approximately 1300 men. Eighty or ninety per cent of the employees
were old men. I assume these men were members of various organiza-
tions .... ,4 Half of the skilled workers who were recalled "were given
wages at rates from two cents to ten cents an hour below those paid
before the plant had shut down." 3"
About April 15, the Tri-City Central Trades Council-a labor or-
ganization comprised of representatives from thirty-seven trade unions in
the Illinois towns of Granite City, Madison, and Venice-received word
that American Steel Foundries was paying wages below union scale.345
The recall of a fraction of the workers to the steel foundry, accompanied
by the wage cuts of the skilled workers, threatened to undermine wages
in the skilled trades in other industries in the community. A Trades
Council committee appointed "to secure reinstatement of the previous
wages" was told by the plant manager that "he ran an open shop, did not
recognize organized labor and would not deal with the committee, but
would entertain any complaint by an employee."
In his 1908 Cooper Union Address, Taft had advised his audience:
[T]he labor union... is a permanent condition in the industrial world. It
has come to stay .... Under existing conditions the blindest course that an
employer of labor can pursue is to decline to recognize labor unions as the
341. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
342. Id at 195-96.
343. Id at 196 (quoting trial testimony).
344. Id
345. See id at 195-96.
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controlling influence in the labor market and to insist upon dealing only
with his particular employees ....
... What the wise managers of corporate enterprise employing large
numbers of laborers will do, is to receive the leaders of labor unions with
courtesy and respect and listen to their claims and arguments as they would
to the managers of another corporate enterprise with whom they were to
make an important contract affecting the business between them.346
If the manager of the American Foundries plant had heard Taft's advice,
he would have had reason to ignore it. The large pool of laid-off foundry
workers, eager for work at any price after five months of unemployment,
would certainly spell defeat for a strike. Yet, in what must have been a
desperate move in light of the economic realities of the situation, the
Trades Council called a strike. Only two men-out of 350 at the plant-
responded to the strike call and left their jobs at the foundry. One, de-
fendant Churchill, "was a member of the Machinist's Union"; the other,
defendant Cook, "was not a member of any union. '347
a Unionization in the steel industry. The strike at the Granite City
steel foundry was evidence of the precarious status of the trade unions in
the steel industry in the last years of the nineteenth century and well into
the early years of the twentieth century. 348 Rapid industrialization and
reorganization of work tasks threatened the many highly skilled workers
involved in the production of steel and the manufacture of steel products
with loss of control over their crafts. Moreover, the influx of immigrant
workers available to perform many of the newly deskilled tasks in and
about the factories depressed wages for all workers, particularly during
the recurring recessions and depressions of the period.349 In his testi-
mony before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce in 1912,
Louis Brandeis had remarked that
the whole tendency in the steel industry-indeed, in a large part of all in-
346. Taft, Cooper Union Address, supra note 295, at 232-33.
347. 257 U.S. at 196.
348. David Montgomery has written that
[i]n every industrial country of the world, except England, the steel industry was notori-
ous for the weakness of its unions before World War I. But the work practices and moral
codes of America's nineteenth-century craftsmen had given them the strength to wage a
formidable and persistent battle to oppose the employers' power with their own collec-
tive regulation of the industry.
D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 265, at 43. See generally D. BRODY, STEELWORKERs IN AMERICA:
THE NONUNION ERA (1960); Stone, The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry, 6 REv. oF
RADICAL POL. ECON. 115 (1974).
349. See generally D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 265, at 9-44.
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dustries-is to the limitation in numbers of skilled workmen and to the
rapid increase of the unskilled labor.
Now, the formation of a union under all circumstances is extremely
difficult with unskilled labor. It becomes a matter almost of impossibility,
when you are dealing as you do in the steel industry-and you must in so
many of the large trades, with not only foreign labor but with the tempo-
rary foreign labor-the labor in which the inflow and outgo each year or
every few years is such as to make labor practically as fluid as capital.
Now, under these conditions the formation and the control of the
union within the control of a large part of the working people is a very
difficult proposition. It is extremely difficult to hold the organization
together.350
Because most unions operating within the steel industry were
formed along craft lines which excluded unskilled and semi-skilled work-
ers, their ability to succeed in a strike depended on their ability to band
together in organizations such as the Trades Council."' To the extent
that the jobs they performed in the plants required a high degree of skill
and experience, the craftsmen could slow down production or shut down
a factory, even without the support of the unskilled workers. But this was
not possible unless most of the skilled workers in those trades in the com-
munity were members of the union and could be persuaded to support
the strike.
As Brandeis suggested, the prospect of organizing unskilled workers
in the steel industry was unpromising because of the transiency and va-
ried foreign origins of many of the laborers who survived at the margins
of the production processes.35 2 Yet, maintaining union solidarity and loy-
alty within the trade unions, which were generally composed of workers
of fairly homogeneous ethnic and racial backgrounds who had strong ties
to the community, was an equally daunting task in times of high unem-
ployment and fierce competition for scarce jobs. The struggle of the un-
ions to maintain control of their membership sometimes erupted in
violence. Describing the status of unions in the steel mills of the 1890s,
David Montgomery has written:
[B]ecause the technology, the managerial controls, and the very size of the
new steel mills made ... self-discipline increasingly difficult to enforce, the
350. See Hearing on S. Re% 98, supra note 277, at 1173, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 277, at 245-46.
351. See, eg., D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 265, at 22-44 (discussing the history of the Amal-
gamated Association and the Knights of Labor).
352. David Montgomery has estimated that by 1910, southern and eastern European immi-
grants made up nearly one-half of the workforce in the American steel industry, as compared to less
than ten percent in 1890. Id. at 42 & n.101.
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union members had to resort to ostracism, boycotts, and threats of violence
against deviants, and when strikes came, they used mass picketing, sympa-
thetic strikes, and even armed force. As this happened, the employers ap-
pealed increasingly to the community at large to support the freedom of
property owners and of individual workers from "union tyranny," and to
support "law and order., 353
The inevitable tension between workers' desires for union solidarity
and their desires for jobs often contributed to the violence in the mills.
Despite the fact that strikebreaking undermined the long-term prospects
of wage stability and improved working conditions, the immediate needs
to feed and house families often prevailed over the uncertain and distant
economic advantages unionization and collective bargaining might pro-
vide. The union representative's role in such a situation was ambiguous:
part friend, part enemy, he epitomized the struggle within the worker's
mind between group loyalty and self-preservation. All too often, this
struggle was played out on the picket line.
b. Violence in Granite City. On the day in late April 1914 that the
Trades Council declared its strike against the American Steel Foundries
plant, members "displayed outside of the entrance to the plant a printed
notice announcing that a strike was on at the plant and calling on union
men and all labor to remain away from the works in order that an in-
crease in wages might be secured. ' 354 When only two workers-Church-
ill and Cook-responded, the Council established a picket outside the
timekeeper's gate to the plant. The picket consisted of three or four
groups of men, with from four to twelve men in a group, who would
"stand about" in various locations on a public street or near railroad
tracks which bordered the plant's twenty-five acre enclosure.355 In addi-
tion to the two striking employees and local union members who had not
been recalled to work but sympathized with the strike effort, a number of
union officials joined the pickets-Lamb, the national representative of
the Machinists Union at St. Louis; Galloway, the president of the Trades
Council; and Hartbeck, the business agent and secretary of the Black-
smith's Union.
Several of the foundry employees later testified that "just as the
picketing began, they were warned by some of the defendants that they
would be hurt if they did not quit." '356 During three to four weeks of
353. IdM at 36.
354. American Foundries, 257 U.S. at 196.
355. Id at 196-97.
356. Id. at 197.
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picketing "without intermission," strikebreakers were assaulted by pick-
eters in sporadic incidents-at least one of the confrontations provoked
by "insulting and profane" name calling by a strikebreaker.357 On May
13, an "assault occurred, which developed into a mob" of 200 men.35 8
Two of the company witnesses "swore positively" that Galloway, presi-
dent of the Trades Council, "was engaged in this disturbance and was
throwing bricks. ' 3 9 Company officials testified that wounded men were
brought into the plant. On May 18, the company, asserting federal juris-
diction on the basis of diversity of citizenship, obtained a restraining or-
der barring further picketing and "[a]ll disturbances ceased." 3"
The final injunction decree against the named defendants-the two
striking employees and various union officials-was comprehensive. In
addition to the usual litany of terms "perpetually" restraining the de-
fendants from using "threats, or personal injury, intimidation, suggestion
of danger or threats of violence of any kind" to interfere with employees
or prospective employees entering the steel plant or to induce them to
quit work, the court also prohibited the defendants' use of '!persuasion"
to accomplish these goals.361 The defendants were additionally prohib-
ited from "assembling, loitering or congregating about or in proximity
of" the plant to accomplish the "forbidden acts" of interfering with ac-
cess to the plant.3 62 Finally, the defendants were restrained "from picket-
ing or maintaining at or near the premises of the complainant, or on the
streets leading to the premises of said complainant, any picket or
pickets."3 63
The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit which "modified the
final decree by striking out the word 'persuasion' in the four places in
which it occurred, and by inserting after the clause restraining picketing
the following: 'in a threatening or intimidating manner.' ,,364 At this level
357. Id at 196, 199.
358. Id at 197, 200.
359. Id at 197.
360. Id at 193, 198.
361. Id. at 193-94. In the Argument for Respondents, defendants' counsel wrote, "To prevent a
workingman from exercising the right of persuasion would deprive him of the right of free speech,
guaranteed by the Constitution. To prohibit his right at or near the plant, on the streets leading to it,
or elsewhere, is too general." Id. at 192. The Supreme Court and the court of appeals avoided deal-
ing with the constitutional validity of the injunction by deciding this issue in defendants' favor on
other grounds.
362. Id at 194.
363. Id




of appeal, the defendants, the union officials and the two striking work-
ers, won a clear victory. But the plaintiff, American Steel Foundries, pur-
sued the case to the Supreme Court where, after the case was reargued
two times over a period of almost two years, the steel company won the
right to an injunction against "picketing," but not against "persuasion."
It was a mixture of victory and defeat for each side in the dispute.
2. The Clayton Act and the Federal Common Law. The Supreme
Court in American Foundries had to determine four questions: (1)
whether "property" or "a property right" included access to an em-
ployer's plant, (2) which defendants were persons specially protected by
the limitations on federal equitable remedies in the Clayton Act, (3)
whether federal courts could enjoin the act of "persuading" others to
refuse to work for an employer, and (4) whether federal courts could
enjoin "picketing." To resolve these questions, the Court was required to
interpret both section 20 of the Clayton Act36  and the federal common
law of restraint of trade. In doing so, the Court's understanding of the
role of injunctions in protecting the employer's business interests from
the effects of worker coercion was based on its assumptions about worker
violence.
a. Access to labor as a ' property right." The Court in American
Foundries held that "irreparable injury to property or to a property right
... includes injury to the business of an employer., 366 The federal courts
365. Between the issuance of the final injunction decree in American Foundries and the appeal of
the case to the court of appeals, the Clayton Act was passed. The circuit court held that the Clayton
Act applied to the case, and the Supreme Court affirmed this part of the circuit court decision on the
authority of the holding in Duplex. American Foundries, 257 U.S. at 201.
366. IA at 202. The first paragraph of section 20 of the Clayton Act prohibited the issuance by a
federal court of a restraining order or injunction "in any case," between an "employer and employ-
ees" or "between persons employed and persons seeking employment," "involving ... a dispute
concerning conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or
to a property right [of the plaintiff] for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law." Clayton
Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)). Thus, in labor disputes
involving persons within the statutory class of employers and their employees or prospective employ-
ees, federal courts could not issue injunctions on behalf of employers unless some "property right"
was threatened with an injury that was not readily compensable by means of a civil suit for damages.
This portion of the statute did no more than state the two key prerequisites for equity jurisdiction-
(1) future harm to property and (2) lack of an adequate remedy in the common law courts. Never-
theless, the meaning of "property" and "property right" as used in the statute had to be defined by
the Supreme Court. The Court in Duplex had held that "[t]he first paragraph [of section 20 of the
Clayton Act] merely puts into statutory form familiar restrictions upon the granting of injunctions
already established and of general application in the equity practice of the courts of the United
States." 254 U.S. at 470.
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could issue restraining orders and injunctions to avoid either economic
harm, such as injuries to the employer's interstate business posed by the
secondary boycott in Duplex,367 or physical harm, such as damage to the
employer's property involved in interstate trade. A physicalist interpreta-
tion of "property" would have permitted federal injunctions only when
the employer's land, buildings, equipment, tools, raw materials, or sup-
plies were threatened with damage.368 Labor disputes in which strikers
sat down on the job and took over the employer's physical plant, or in
which strikers trespassed on the employer's land, were situations in
which it was assumed significant damage might be done to the em-
ployer's physical property. Assaults on strikebreakers or other persons
employed by the company were not injuries to the employer's "property"
in a physical sense, because the employer did not "own" his
employees. 3
69
By the 1920s, however, narrow, physicalist conceptions of property
rights had long since given way to broad, abstract notions which encom-
passed the benefits flowing from both existing and prospective contrac-
tual relations.3 70 For example, in the 1871 Massachusetts case of Walker
v. Cronin, the plaintiff employer was held to have a property right in the
present and prospective advantages derived from his relationships with
his at-will employees, as well as in the "prospective advantage" antici-
pated from his "prospective" employees.37' Essentially, Walker had held
367. Duplex had held that the company's "business of manufacturing printing presses and dis-
posing of them in commerce is a property right, entitled to protection against unlawful injury or
interference." 254 U.S. at 465.
368. See Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Mod.
ern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 325 (1980).
369. Defendants' counsel, in the Argument for Respondents in American Foundries, contended
that "[t]he plant was not injured, and no injunction should have issued, because no property right
was involved. Labor is not a commodity (Clayton Act, § 6,) and an employer has no property right
in his workmen." 257 U.S. at 192 (citation omitted).
370. See, eg., Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century:
The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARM. L. RaV. 1510 (1980) [hereinafter
Note, Tortious Interference].
371. 107 Mass. 555. See discussion of Walker in Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 370, at
1528. In the Phelan case, Judge Taft gave the following synopsis of Walker:
In Walker v. Cronin, it was held that a count in a declaration which alleged that a
plaintiff was a manufacturer of shoes, and for the prosecution of his business it was
necessary for him to employ many shoemakers; that the defendants, well knowing this,
did maliciously and without justifiable cause molest him in carrying on said business,
with the unlawful purpose of preventing him from carrying it on, and willfully induced
many' shoemakers who were in his employment, and others who were about to enter it,
to abandon it without his consent and against his will; and that thereby the plaintiff lost
their services and profits and advantages and was put to great expense to procure other
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that the acts of third parties, such as nonemployee union members, in
persuading employees-present or prospective-to leave an employer
were malicious and without lawful excuse. 72 Such an injury by "third-
party interlopers" was a tortious interference with an employer's prop-
erty right which could be enjoined by a court of equity.373
In American Foundries, the employer's physical property was
neither damaged nor threatened with damage. The pickets never entered
or even threatened to enter the employer's twenty-five acre enclosure. All
picket line behavior-whether violent threats and assaults or peaceful
persuasion-occurred on public streets or rights of way adjoining the
plant or within several hundred feet of the timekeeper's gate of the
plant.3 74 Thus, injury-actual or threatened-to the employer's physical
property was not an issue in the case. The assaults and threats against the
strikebreakers, and, arguably, the peaceful persuasion of strikebreakers
or potential employees, though not directly physically injurious to the
employer's property, came within the more abstract definition of interfer-
ence with prospective advantage. The Supreme Court in American Foun-
dries defined this prospective advantage as the "property right of access
of the employer."' 3 "7 What was at stake in the case, then, was not avoid-
ance of physical harm to persons or property through the violence of the
pickets, but avoidance of any interference with the employer's right of
free access to the plant, in particular, the right to have strikebreakers
freely enter and leave.376
b. The Clayton Act "employees." Section 20 of the Clayton Act
appeared to create a special class of persons who were immunized from
broad federal restraining orders or injunctions in cases arising out of la-
bor disputes.3 77 The Supreme Court in Duplex v. Deering, however, had
suitable workmen, and was otherwise injured in his business,-stated a good cause of
action.
In re Phelan, 62 F. 803, 816 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894) (citation omitted).
372. 107 Mass. 555.
373. See Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 370, at 1528.
374. 257 U.S. at 196-97.
375. Id. at 204.
376. As in the late nineteenth century cases dealing with interference with prospective advan-
tage in the employment context, the Supreme Court in American Foundries emphasized that it was
protecting both "the rights of the employees to work for whom they will" and "the right of the
employer incident to his property and business to free access of such employees." Id. at 206. See,
e.g., Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 370, at 1532-35; Hurvitz, supra note 124, at 342-44.
377. These were persons who were parties "in any case between an employer and employees, or
between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons
seeking employment, involving, or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of em-
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held that union officials and union members involved in a labor dispute,
who were not technically employees of the employer, were not within
this statutory class, in part because they were not "affected in a proxi-
mate and substantial... sense by the cause of dispute. '3 78 Their interests
were "merely sentimental or sympathetic. 3 79 But the American Foun-
dries case required the Court to consider the application of section 20 to
new categories of persons-striking workers, laid-off workers, and local
union members in the trade who were potential employees.
Taft wrote in American Foundries that only two defendants,
Churchill and Cook, who were actually "employees" of the "employer"
at the time of the strike, were within the special class of persons "privi-
leged" by section 20 of the Clayton Act.38 Indeed, Brandeis had com-
mented in his dissenting opinion in Duplex that "[i]f the words [in
section 20 of the Clayton Act] are to receive a strict technical construc-
tion, the statute will have no application to disputes between employers
of labor and workingmen, since the very acts to which it applies sever the
continuity of the legal relationship." ' As if in response to Brandeis's
critique of the majority in Duplex, Taft made it clear that striking em-
ployees are "ex-employees" covered under the word "employees" in sec-
tion 20.382 It was a tortuous route to arrive at the common sense, if not
"legal," conclusion that employees who were on strike were still in an
employment relationship with their employers.383 Striking employees
named as defendants in an injunction suit were certainly "affected in a
proximate and substantial, not merely a sentimental or sympathetic,
sense by the cause of dispute. '384
All other named defendants in the American Foundries case were
union officials or union members. Since they were neither "employees"
or "ex-employees," they were not within the privileged class of section 20
of the Clayton Act. Also excluded were the "laid-off emplyees"-the
ployment .... Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
The Court in Duplex had held that "[i]t is very clear that the restriction upon the use of the injunc-
tion is in favor only of those concerned as parties to such a dispute as is described." 254 U.S. at 470.
378. 254 U.S. at 472.
379. Id.
380. American Foundries, 257 U.S. at 202. In Duplex, Justice Pitney had written that the Clay-
ton Act conferred a "special privilege or immunity to a particular class." 254 U.S. at 471.
381. 254 U.S. at 488.
382. American Foundries, 257 U.S. at 202, 208.
383. In the Argument for Petitioner, plaintiffs' counsel asserted that "[e]ven the two men who
quit the employ had no relation to the initiation of the strike and knew nothing of it until after the
strike had been launched." Id. at 186-87.
384. Duplex, 254 U.S. at 472.
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large pool of nearly 1,300 foundry workers who had not been employed
by the foundry after it ceased operations in November of 1913, and who
had not been recalled when the plant reopened in April of 1914.
Although these laid-off employees were not named as defendants, some
were witnesses to or participants in the threatening and violent incidents
on the picket line, either as picketers or as sympathizers. 385 The broad
terms of an injunction would apply to them. Because of Taft's narrow
conception of the word "employees" in the Clayton Act, many such
workers, who were sympathetically involved in the labor dispute and ec-
onomically dependent on its outcome, were potentially denied the "privi-
leges" which the Act seemed to promise. Ironically, these distinctions did
not matter much in the end. Taft interpreted the Clayton Act to be noth-
ing other than the law that had always governed the use of federal in-
junctions in labor disputes.386
c. Allowing 'ersuasion"--"all lawful propaganda. " As to the two
"employees"-the strikers Churchill and Cook-the district court's de-
cree in effect enjoined "persuasion by them at any time or any place. This
certainly," Taft wrote, "conflicts with § 20 of the Clayton Act." '387 But
the Supreme Court had to determine whether "the injunction against
persuasion" as it applied to the "Tri-City Trades Council and the other
defendants" was proper under general principles of tort and equity.
388
385. See American Foundries, 257 U.S. at 191 (Argument for Respondents).
386. See, eg., id. at 203.
387. Id. at 208. In the final decree of the district court in the American Foundries case, the court
prohibited the defendants' use of "persuasion to induce employees, or would-be employees to leave,
or stay out of, complainant's employ." Id. (emphasis added). The court of appeals had modified the
decree by striking out the word "persuasion" in the four places it appeared in the decree. Id. at 195.
The final decree is reprinted in the American Foundries opinion. Id at 193-94.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act bars the federal courts from issuing restraining orders or injunc-
tions prohibiting "employees" from "recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful
means" to terminate "any relation of employment" or to cease "to perform any work or labor." Ch.
323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)) (emphasis added). Section 20, in
addition, "privileges" an employer's striking "ex-employees" (1) to "attend" "at any place" that
they may "lawfully be ... for the purpose of peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain
from working"; and (2) to recommend, advise, or persuade "by peaceful and lawful means" other
persons to "cease to patronize" any party to the labor dispute. Id. (emphasis added). Because the
final decree in American Foundries violated the literal words of section 20 of the Clayton Act as
applied to the two "ex-employees," the Supreme Court held that "[t]he decree must be modified as
to these two defendants by striking out the word 'persuasion.'" 257 U.S. at 208.
388. 257 U.S. at 208. To analyze the legality of the use of persuasion to entice employees or
potential employees away from the employer, the Supreme Court turned to general principles of
common law as articulated by the state courts and by federal courts in cases interpreting state com-
mon law under diversity jurisdiction. It is important to note that federal jurisdiction in the American
Foundries case was obtained on the basis of diversity of citizenship, and the district court issued its
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These defendants-the union officials, laid-off employees, or union mem-
bers in the community who were potential employees-were not exempt
from being enjoined by a federal court under section 20 of the Clayton
Act. The question was whether it was unlawful for them to "entice" em-
ployees of the foundry away from their jobs by "persuasion" under the
federal common law. American Foundries had argued that these defend-
ants were "intruders into the controversy, and were engaged without ex-
cuse in an unlawful conspiracy to injure the American Foundries by
enticing its employees, and, therefore, should be enjoined. '389
Under the common law, however, the Supreme Court did not view
the "non-Clayton Act" defendants in the American Foundries case as
"intruders" into the labor dispute. Taft concluded that it was "probable
that members of the local unions were looking forward to employment
when [the foundry] should resume full operation and even though they
were not ex-employees within the Clayton Act, they were directly inter-
ested in the wages which were to be paid. ' 390 Thus, "interference of a
labor organization by persuasion and appeal to induce a strike against
low wages under such circumstances" was not "without lawful excuse
and malicious. '3
91
Here is evidence of the persistence of Taft's early belief in the legiti-
macy of labor unions and the legality of the primary strike for improved
working conditions.3 92 Taft recognized the need for union solidarity and
injunction prohibiting "persuasion" and "picketing" under the "rule" of Illinois common law. See
id. at 187 (Argument for Petitioner). The employer in Duplex had asserted federal jurisdiction both
on the basis of diversity of citizenship and federal question-the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 254 U.S.
at 461. In both Duplex and American Foundries, however, interpretation of the Clayton Act became
central issues since the Supreme Court held that the newly passed statute would apply to any pro-
spective relief, such as in a pending suit for an injunction in a labor dispute involving interstate
commerce. Id. at 464. But, whereas the employer in Duplex framed its antitrust arguments against
the defendant union officials in terms of the proscriptions of the Sherman Act, the employer in
American Foundries was making its case against the "non-Clayton-Act" defendants solely on com-
mon law restraint-of-trade principles as developed in both state and federal courts. In effect, then, for
that portion of its opinion which determined the legality of enjoining the "non-Clayton-Act" defend-
ants from "persuasion" of others to join the strike, the Court in American Foundries was articulating
a "federal common law" of restraint of trade, not interpreting a federal antitrust statute.
389. 257 U.S. at 208.
390. d
391. Id at 208-09.
392. In words reminiscent of views expressed in his opinion In re Phelan, 62 F. 803, 817
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894), Taft described the importance of unions and strikes to "laborers" and to the
"economic struggle" between employers and employees. American Foundries, 257 U.S. at 209. Taft
acknowledged both that "[1]abor unions are recognized by the Clayton Act as legal when instituted
for mutual help and lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects" and that "[t]hey have long been
thus recognized by the courts." Id Taft wrote:
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loyalty within neighborhood communities, as well as the interdependence
of workers in the skilled trades because of the competitive wage rates in
different shops within each locale. Taft wrote:
It is helpful to have as many as may be in the same trade in the same
community united, because in the competition between employers they are
bound to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade in the neighbor-
hood. Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their mem-
bership and especially among those whose labor at lower wages will injure
their whole guild. It is impossible to hold such persuasion and propaganda
without more, to be without excuse and malicious.393
This was, however, a relatively narrow view of the appropriate scope
of labor disputes. American Foundries was a dispute between an em-
ployer "in the community ' 394 and "local" unions who were represented
by their "local" Tri-City Trades Council-a council consisting of the un-
ions in three adjoining cities in one state. The union council's goal was to
preserve the wage scale of its "local" union members, many of whom
were laid-off foundry workers who had a a high probability of being
reemployed by the foundry in the future.3 95 The council, its constituent
local unions, and their members were thus "directly interested in the
wages which were to be paid." 39
6
Taft believed that these factors distinguished the American Foun-
dries case from other common law cases, such as Plant v. Woods, which
had permitted injunctions against persuading workers to leave their em-
ployers. 397 "[S]uggestions of coercion, attempted monopoly, deprivation
of livelihood and remoteness of the legal purpose of the union to better
its members' condition," Taft wrote, were "not present in a case like the
They [labor unions] were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single em-
ployee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his
daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to pay him
the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to
resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert influence upon him and to
leave him in a body in order by this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms
with them. They were withholding their labor of economic value to make him pay what
they thought it was worth. The right to combine for such a lawful purpose has in many
years not been denied by any court.
Id. This passage is a paraphrase of a similar passage which Taft wrote in the Phelan case, 62 F. at
817. See supra text accompanying note 133.
393. American Foundries, 257 U.S. at 209.
394. Id. at 212.
395. Id at 208.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 210-11 (citing Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900), among other
cases).
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present." '398 Furthermore, Taft argued, American Foundries was distin-
guishable from the two Supreme Court cases which had permitted in-
junctions against unions for "persuading" workers to join a union or to
quit working for an employer-Hitchman Coal399 and Duplex.'
Thus, Taft implicitly preserved the distinctions between "insid-
ers"-local employees and their unions-and "outsiders"-representa-
tives of large international unions from distant cities.4" Taft also
distinguished between purely local disputes-a strike at a local foundry
over wages-and disputes that threatened the national economy or in-
volved third-party "strangers"-such as the "formidable country-wide
and dangerous character" of the "plan" to unionize the mine in Hitch-
man Coal, the "coercive" interference in a company's interstate trade by
means of a secondary boycott in Duplex, or the "starvation of a nation"
by means of the boycotts and strikes in the Pullman cases. The union
activity in American Foundries had been open and direct-the Trades
Council representatives had approached the employer forthrightly with
their request for a raise in wages before calling the strike. In Hitchman
Coal and in the Phelan case the unions had kept "secret" lists of the
names of union members, had held "secret" meetings, or engaged in "se-
cret terrorism."
Taft rejected union attempts to organize and engage in collective
action on a nationwide scale-involving thousands of workers in many
communities and across many trades and industries-to protect strikers
and union members from being fired and blacklisted by employers, to
extend the economic effects of their ability to withhold labor and pa-
tronage through strikes and boycotts, and to expand their objectives be-
yond the immediate economic demands of the employees of a particular
firm. He found these activities illegal because they involved "outsiders,"
or because they involved thousands of workers in a "class war," or be-
cause they injured "strangers" to the dispute, or because they were "se-
cret." And "persuasion" of others to join in such union endeavors could
not be "lawful propaganda."
d. Prohibiting 'icketing"--but allowing "'missionaries." The
method that labor "propagandists" in a strike for wages traditionally
398. Id. at 210-11.
399. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
400. 254 U.S. 443.
401. For discussion of the implications of those distinctions in Hitchman Coal, see Orren, Or-
ganized Labor and the Invention of Modern Liberalism in the United States, 2 STuD. AM. POL. DEV.
317, 320-22, 326 (1987).
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used to "persuade" other workers to join the strike was the picket line.
Picket lines could be effective for reasons completely unrelated to what
the Supreme Court in the American Foundries case characterized as "the
necessary element of intimidation in the presence of groups as pick-
ets."'  Picket lines communicated the issues in a labor dispute to em-
ployees and other workers entering and leaving the employer's place of
business. The act of joining a picket line was a public demonstration of
loyalty to the union or sympathy with the union's goals. By the same
token, crossing the picket line, whether by an employee strikebreaker or
by another worker delivering goods or supplies, was a public admission
of disloyalty to the union, or more, of contempt. Thus, the very existence
of the pickets-the public identification of who was for the union and
who was against it-was itself a form of moral persuasion. To the com-
munity at large, picket lines were a dramatic way of publicizing the labor
dispute, as well as involving members of that community-family,
friends, neighbors-in conducting the "patrol" itself. Finally, the
number of people in the picket line and supporting it, its organization, its
persistence day after day, was an indication to the employer and the
strikebreakers of the strength and cohesiveness of the union. Picketers
could accomplish all this without violence or threats of violence.
Indeed, the possibility that picketing could exist without violence
was contemplated by the Seventh Circuit in the American Foundries
case.4 03 The circuit court had added the words, "in a threatening or in-
timidating manner," to the clause of the original decree which prohibited
the defendants "from picketing or maintaining at or near the premises of
the complainant, or on the streets leading to the premises of said com-
plainant, any picket or pickets."'  For the Supreme Court, however,
there could be no such thing as "peaceful" picketing, for the word "pick-
eting" itself was a "sinister name" which "indicated a militant purpose,
inconsistent with peaceable persuasion." 4 5
The Court thus upheld the original decree because the qualification
added by the court of appeals seemed "inadequate." To permit picketing
in any form would leave "compliance largely to the discretion of the
pickets," would ignore "the necessary element of intimidation in the
presence of groups as pickets," and would not "secure practically that
which the court must secure and to which the [employer] and his work-
402. 257 U.S. at 207.
403. 238 F. 728 (1916).
404. 257 U.S. at 195, 194 (emphasis deleted).
405. Id. at 207, 205.
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men are entitled." 6 The Court concluded that "[tihe phrase really rec-
ognizes as legal that which bears the sinister name of 'picketing' which it
is to be observed Congress carefully refrained from using in § 20 [of the
Clayton Act]." 4 7
The Supreme Court held, however, that section 20 of the Clayton
Act introduced "no new principle into the equity jurisdiction" of the fed-
eral courts" and was "merely declaratory of what was the best practice
always." 8 And the "best practice" had been to permit federal courts to
enjoin "picketing," whether peaceful or not. For the defendants in Amer-
ican Foundries, then, it did not matter that two of them-the striking
"ex-employees" Churchill and Cook-were found explicitly to be
"within the Clayton Act" 9 so that they could "invoke in their behalf
§ 20. "41o The Clayton Act gave them no additional privileges that they
did not already have under general principles of federal equity jurisdic-
tion. Thus the striking "Clayton Act" employees were treated the same
as union representatives, "recent" employees, and "expectant" employ-
ees.4 1 1 The artificial lines between persons "proximately" and "substan-
tially" involved in the labor dispute and those only "sympathetically" or
"sentimentally" involved were not relevant for determining the legality
of picketing. All "picketing" per se was enjoinable.
According to Taft, when Congress enacted section 20 of the Clayton
Act and when federal equity courts addressed labor picketing cases prior
to the Clayton Act, the "object and problem" had been to balance and
406. Id. at 207.
407. Id It was true that Congress had not used the word "picketing" in the list of "privileged"
labor activities in section 20 of the Clayton Act. After quoting section 20 of the Clayton Act in full,
the Supreme Court observed that section 20 prohibited the federal courts from issuing injunctions in
labor disputes against three specifically described types of conduct that were "material" to the Amer-
ican Foundries case:
first, recommending, advising or persuading others by peaceful means to cease employ-
ment and labor, second, attending at any place where such person or persons may law-
fully be for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or
peaceflily persuading any person to work or to abstain from working; third, peaceably
assembling in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes.
Id at 203 (paraphrasing Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52
(1982))). Peaceful picketing is, quite literally, "attending" or "peaceably assembling" "in concert" in
a "lawful manner" and in a place that picketers "may lawfully be" for the "lawful purpose" of
"peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to
work or to abstain from working."
408. 257 U.S. at 203.
409. Id at 207-08.
410. Id at 202.
411. Id. at 208, 203.
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reconcile the relative merits of two conflicting rights.412 "[O]n the one
hand," were "the rights of the employer in his business and in the access
of his employees to his place of business and egress therefrom without
intimidation or obstruction. 413 "[O]n the other" hand was "the right of
the employees, recent or expectant, to use peaceable and lawful means to
induce present employees and would-be employees to join their
ranks.
,414
Taft's condemnation of picketing in American Foundries thus grew
out of his desire to protect property, to avoid violence, and to "civilize"
the forms in which the workers' struggles with their employers were ex-
pressed.415 In reconciling the conflicting rights of employers, employees,
strikers, and unions, the "duty" of the Supreme Court was obvious:
If, in their attempts at persuasion or communication with those whom they
would enlist with them, those of the labor side adopt methods which how-
ever lawful in their announced purpose inevitably lead to intimidation and
obstruction, then it is the court's duty which the terms of § 20 [of the Clay-
ton Act] do not modify, so to limit what the propagandists do as to time,
manner and place as shall prevent infractions of the law and violations of
the right of the employees, and of the employer for whom they wish to
work.41
6
Taft asked, "How far may men go in persuasion and communication
and still not violate the right of those whom they would influence? '417
Protecting the employees' rights "[iun going to and from work" to "have
a right to as free a passage without obstruction as the streets afford, con-
412. Id. at 203.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. At the same time that Taft resolved to protect private property as Chief Justice he was also
determined to obtain from the Court unanimous decisions. The fact that he persuaded Holmes and
Brandeis to concur in his opinion in American Foundries was considered by some to be the high
mark of his first year as chief justice of the Supreme Court. See, eg., A. MASON, supra note 105, at
212. In American Foundries, Justice Brandeis concurred "in substance" in the opinion and judgment
of the Court, and Justice Clarke dissented without writing a separate opinion. The reason for Bran-
deis's concurrence may be surmised from something Brandeis had stated in a public debate with
Samuel Gompers years before he became an associate justice of the Supreme Court: "'If unions are
lawless, restrain and punish their lawlessness; if they are arbirtary, repress their arbitrariness; if their
demands are unreasonable or unjust, resist them; but do not oppose unions as such."' Remarks of
Louis Brandeis to Samuel Gompers, Debate before the Economic Club of Boston (Dec. 4, 1902),
quoted in A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 142 (1946). Mason wrote that "Brandeis
conceded" in this debate that there was "a tendency among labor unions to be impatient with the
requirements of civilized living." Id. at 142. Taft and Holmes very likely would have agreed with
that proposition.
416. 257 U.S. at 203-04.
417. Id at 204.
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sistent with the right of others to enjoy the same privilege" seemed to be
of paramount concern to the Court.418 Taft wrote:
We are a social people and the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive
way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss information with a
view to influencing the other's action are not regarded as aggression or a
violation of that other's rights. If, however, the offer is declined, as it may
rightfully be, then persistence, importunity, following and dogging become
unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of
intimidation. 419
This was a "gentleman's" code of polite behavior, perhaps appropri-
ate for the drawing room, the halls of Congress, or the chambers of the
Supreme Court, but a peculiar image to impose on the pickets and strike-
breakers outside a steel foundry. Taft's imagined "scab" was a polite and
sensitive workman, who had a right not to be offended and annoyed by
groups of pickets whose livelihood he supposedly threatened when he
crossed the picket line. Yet, ironically, this was a man who, by definition,
was defying powerful group and community norms by either continuing
to work during the strike or taking a striker's job. Taft's sympathetic
portrayal of the strikebreaker, "likely" to feel intimidated by group "per-
sistence, importunity, following and dogging," failed to account for the
necessity of coercion in a strike. To maintain social control, the union
needed to communicate its disapproval of the scab through groups of
persistent, urgent, demanding picketers.
Taft's strikebreaker thus had a "right to be free" from the stigma
and guilt of his violation of the group code of conduct. But this was not a
right that Taft viewed as residing in the worker as a person, independent
of the employer's interests in continued productivity. For example, a
worker persistently "importuned" or "dogged" on the street by a street
vendor, a religious zealot, or an angry creditor might have had a cause of
action only when the "importunity" actually became tortious-assault,
battery, or defamation. But Taft certainly was not concerned in general
that "persuasion" which was "persistent," that might have offended "civ-
ilized" standards, may have been an aspect of the daily social intercourse
of the streets, the taverns, the factories, the mills, and the homes of the
wage-earning class. Rather, he invoked the "gentleman's" code in the
limited context of the strike in the expectation that strikebreakers would
be free from annoyance by pickets during a strike. Thus elitist norms of





that protected the employer's business interests.420
Taft wrote that the "employer has a right to have [his employee]
free" from the importunate and persistent persuasion of the picket line;
moreover, "[t]he nearer this importunate intercepting of employees or
would-be employees is to the place of business, the greater the obstruc-
tion and interference with the business and especially with the property
right of access of the employer.""42 The employees and "would-be" em-
ployees were not protected from "importunate intercepting" by union
representatives or striking employees in order to protect their personal
sensibilities from being offended, but to make sure they could enter the
workplace of the employer insulated from the physical demonstrations of
the collective conscience of the union. The Court emphasized its concern
for the "primary... rights of the employees to work for whom they will,
and, undisturbed by annoying importunity or intimidation of numbers,
to go freely to and from their place of labor," as well as "the right of the
employer incident to his property and business to free access of such em-
ployees. '42 2 These rights had their source in the employer's paramount,
but unstated, "right" to keep the business running and maintain produc-
tivity in the face of a strike.423
The evidence in American Foundries had shown that, during the
three weeks of the strike, sporadic assaults and outbreaks of violence had
occurred, and, on one occasion a "mob" had gathered with some 200
men.424 Taft viewed these occurrences as inevitable and unavoidable in
the future. He wrote that "[a]ttempted discussion and argument" by
picketers in "proximity" to the employer's property was "certain to at-
tract attention and congregation of the curious, or, it may be, interested
bystanders, and thus to increase the obstruction as well as the aspect of
intimidation which the situation quickly assumes."425 Incident to the em-
ployer's rights in his property was the right to keep the "curious" or the
420. See, eg., Atleson, Obscenities in the Workplace: A Comment on Fair and Foul Expression
and Status Relationships, 34 BuFFALo L. REv. 693 (1985).
421. 257 U.S. at 204.
422. Id. at 206.
423. See J. ATLESON, VALuES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 2,3, 6-7, 58, 59
(1983). Atleson demonstrates the potency of the "hidden set of values and assumptions" in judicial
decisions under the National Labor Relations Act. He writes, "One of the most crucial assumptions
that seems to underlie legal decision making is that continuity of production must be maintained,
tempered only when statutory language clearly protects employee interference." Id at 7. Although
he is referring to post-1935 federal labor law decisions, the validity of Atleson's insight is borne out
in the earlier cases I examine as well.
424. 257 U.S. at 197, 200.
425. Id at 204.
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"interested by-stander" from obstructing the routes of access to the busi-
ness that were used by his employees or suppliers. Thus, the more the
community became involved in the picket line, whether out of curiosity
or sympathy, the greater the likelihood the picketing would be enjoined.
A large number of workers and bystanders gathered around the entrance
to the employer's plant connoted the violence of a mob.
Past violence, regardless of who caused it, was thus viewed as evi-
dence of the inevitability of future violence. Taft wrote, "When one or
more assaults or disturbances ensued, they characterized the whole cam-
paign, which became effective because of its intimidating character, in
spite of the admonitions given by the leaders to their followers as to law-
ful methods to be pursued, however sincere."426 And so violence of strik-
ing workers or union members, even when provoked by strikebreakers,
was attributed to the union leaders who were held to be responsible for
the foreseeable consequences of the picket line they had ordered.
In the American Foundries case, the union leaders claimed that they
had not authorized any unlawful acts on the picket line. Galloway, the
president of the Tri-City Trades Council, testified that the Trades Coun-
cil "did not instruct anybody to assault anyone, but told them to picket
the streets leading to the plant, and ask the men not to go into the plant
or take work under the reduced wages."427 Galloway "said he went down
there to see that things were going right.""42 Lamb, the national repre-
sentative of the Machinists Union at St. Louis "admitted saying.., that
the cut in wages was a severe one and that it looked as though they were
going to raise hell in the town because conditions were good; that he
didn't like to see a fight going on, but it looked as though it would
come."429 Lamb visited the picket line several times a week during the
strike and "did picket duty."43 Although Lamb "heard of some fights
which took place away from the plant," he said he "was in no way con-
nected with them." '431 He said that he had not seen any "assaulting" oc-
cur, nor had the union pickets "authorized any assaults." '32 According
to Lamb, the pickets were "merely there to convey information and ask
cooperation."433
426. Id. at 205.
427. Id. at 198.
428. Id
429. Id at 197.






From the accounts of the assaults and skirmishes that occurred, it
would have been difficult to pinpoint blame for the violence. It appeared
that the violence was sporadic and incidental rather than part of a pur-
poseful scheme of the union. The Supreme Court did not discuss any
evidence in the record of police attempts to break up the "mob" that
gathered or government attempts to prosecute picketers who admitted
they had been involved in fights.
But, because violence had occurred, the union would bear the re-
sponsibility and the penalty. Taft wrote:
All information tendered, all arguments advanced and all persuasion used
under such circumstances were intimidation. They could not be otherwise.
It is idle to talk of peaceful communication in such a place and under such
conditions. The numbers of the pickets in the groups constituted intimida-
tion. The name "picket" indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with
peaceable persuasion. The crowds they drew made the passage of the em-
ployees to and from the place of work, one of running the gauntlet ....
Our conclusion is that picketing thus instituted is unlawful and can not be
peaceable and may be properly enjoined by the specific term because its
meaning is clearly understood in the sphere of the controversy by those who
are parties to it.434
Taft explained that a restraining order or injunction prohibiting
picketing, without qualification, would prevent "earnest advocates of la-
bor's cause" from "subject[ing] the individuals who wish to work to a
severe test of their nerve and physical strength and courage." However,
consistent with the intent of Congress in passing the Clayton Act and
with the "principle of existing law which it declared," the courts were
required to allow "ex-employees and others properly acting with them
* . .to observe [employees] who are still working for the employer, to
communicate with them and to persuade them to join the ranks of his
opponents in a lawful economic struggle. '4 35
The rights of the strikers and their supporters were to be protected
by solitary "missionaries." Taft wrote for the Court:
We think that the strikers and their sympathizers engaged in the economic
struggle should be limited to one representative for each point of ingress
and egress in the plant or place of business and that all others be enjoined
from congregating or loitering at the plant or in the neighboring streets by
which access is had to the plant, that such representatives should have the
right of observation, communication and persuasion but with special admo-
nition that their communication, arguments and appeals shall not be abu-
434. Id. at 205.
435. Id. at 206.
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sive, libelous or threatening, and that they shall not approach individuals
together but singly, and shall not in their single efforts at communication or
persuasion obstruct an unwilling listener by importunate following or dog-
ging his steps .... The purpose should be to prevent the inevitable intimi-
dation of the presence of groups of pickets, but to allow missionaries.436
C. Truax v. Corrigan-
"Peaceful picketing was a contradiction in terms"
1. Introduction-The Court in Disarray. Chief Justice Taft's opin-
ion in his second labor case on the Supreme Court, Truax v. Corrigan,437
held that Arizona's interpretation of its state version of the Clayton Act
was unconstitutional. Arizona had, in effect, legalized peaceful labor
picketing under its "little Clayton Act." For Taft, however, the limita-
tion on state court jurisdiction to issue injunctions against such picketing
was a denial of due process and equal protection of the law. Arizona had
denied employers an injunction remedy in state court that they could
have obtained in federal court under American Foundries. The anoma-
lous consequences of the Arizona law did not conform to Taft's under-
standing of the role of the courts in protecting employers' property rights
against the inherent threat of violence in labor picketing.
Truax "was one of those five-to-four rulings which so greatly an-
noyed the Chief Justice" and "was to be criticized much more vigor-
ously" than his opinion in American Foundries.4 38 Reargument of Truax
was heard on the same day as the final argument in American Foundries
in the fall of 1921, and the opinion was issued just two weeks after the
American Foundries decision in late December of 1921.419 Taft "knew
that Holmes and Brandeis would dissent," as they did in separate opin-
ions, but the defections also included Justices Pitney and Clarke, who
joined in a third dissenting opinion written by Pitney."0 Taft wrote a
lengthy opinion, apparently compelled to "answer the arguments of his
mistaken, but cogent, associates."" 1 In the week after the Truax opinion
was issued, Holmes wrote his friend Harold Laski that "the C.J. [Chief
Justice] disappointed us after a happy success in uniting the Court" in
436. Id. at 206-07.
437. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
438. 2 H. PINGLE, supra note 73, at 1035.
439. 1 HOLMES-LAsKi LETmrs 374 n.2 (M. Howe ed. 1953); 2 H. PRINOLE, supra note 73, at
1035.




the American Foundries case." 2 Holmes continued his correspondence
on this subject several weeks later with the observation that "[tihe C.J.
disappointed us after a good start, as it seemed, in what we think the
right direction" in the American Foundries case, .but as for Truax, he
wrote, "I thought this performance rather spongy.""
Taft's "spongy" opinion in Truax, however, followed with an inexo-
rable logic the premises underlying American Foundries. What both
Holmes and Brandeis seemed reluctant to recognize was the profound
antilabor implications of Taft's holding in American Foundries that pick-
eting per se was unlawful and could be enjoined as such, but that workers
and their sympathizers would be permitted solitary "missionaries" at
each gate of the steel foundry to observe or communicate with other
workers. It was true that Taft had carefully limited the reach of Ameri-
can Foundries by noting that the Court's holding which permitted "one
representative for each point of ingress and egress in the plant or place of
business" was "not laid down as a rigid rule, but only as one which
should apply .to this case," and that "'[e]ach case must turn on its own
circumstances." 4" Nevertheless, his condemnation of the "inevitable in-
timidation" in "group picketing" and the "mob" which pickets "inevita-
bly" attracted meant that workers who engaged in peaceful picketing-
other than as single "missionaries"-could be readily enjoined by em-
ployers in the federal courts. Taft believed, as he stated in Truax, that
"peaceful picketing was a contradiction in terms."" 5 -
Holmes undoubtedly thought that American Foundries had been a
"good start" in the "right direction" because, in the final form in which
the opinion was written, Taft apparently incorporated many of the ideas
contained in a memorandum Holmes had circulated among the justices
that he described to Laski as "nothing much-a repetition of the dissent
in Vegelahn v. Guntner 25 years ago."" 6 Holmes's proposition in Vege-
lahn that "it cannot be said.., that two men walking together up and
down a sidewalk and speaking to those who enter a certain shop do nec-
essarily and always thereby convey a threat of force"" 7 was fully consis-
442. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Dec. 22, 1921), reprinted'in 1
HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS, supra note 439, at 389.
443. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 15, 1922), reprinted in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 439, at 398.
444. 257 U.S. at 206, 207, 206.
445. 257 U.S. at 340.
446. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Oct. 9, 1921), reprinted in 1
HOLMES-LAsIU LETTERs, supra note 439, at 374.
447. 167 Mass. 92, 105, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (Holmes, 3., dissenting). Holmes had noted
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tent with Taft's acceptance of the presence of solitary missionaries at
each plant gate in American Foundries. Taft's restrictions on the behavior
of the labor missionary in American Foundries, though limited to the
facts of the case, "appeared to imply that the members of a picket line
could dissuade workers or win recruits only by speaking in low and culti-
vated voices."" This "civilized" conception of labor picketing-a patrol
of one or two well-mannered, polite workers-apparently satisfied
Holmes's criteria for carrying out the "battle" between capital and labor
in a "fair and equal way."" 9 Holmes, nevertheless, was willing to put
aside his own views on the appropriate conduct of labor's battle in defer-
ence to the "social experiments" approved by the state legislatures.45 0
Taft and the majority of the Court could not go so far in relinquishing
the authority of the courts to protect property.
Brandeis, too, had seen in American Foundries what he wanted to
see. In his dissent in Truax, Brandeis wrote that American Foundries had
"held that peaceful picketing is not unlawful"45 1-a broad proposition
that Taft would certainly have disavowed. It was a true statement only if
Brandeis believed that "peaceful picketing" and the stationing of solitary
labor "missionaries" at plant gates were essentially equivalent forms of
conduct. Brandeis's concurrence "in the substance" of the American
Foundries case, without a written concurring opinion, almost certainly
buried deeper disagreements he had with Taft's views on labor picket-
ing--disagreements he glossed over, perhaps, to join with Holmes or to
avoid friction with the newly seated Chief Justice. Brandeis's dissent in
Truax, however, contained a lengthy discourse on the "history of the
rules governing contests between employer and employed" under the
laws of England and America, in which he made clear the conceptual
distance between his own views and the views of the Chief Justice.45 2
Justice Clarke had dissented quietly in American Foundries, without
a written opinion, so Taft could not have been greatly surprised when
Clarke joined one of the dissenters in Truax. It was the author of the
in Vegelahn that "[tihere was no proof of any threat or danger of a patrol exceeding two men." Id. at
104, 44 N.E. at 1080 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
448. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 1035.
449. Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at 108, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
450. Truax, 257 U.S. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
451. Id. at 371 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
452. Id. at 357 &passim. Holmes wrote to Laski concerning Brandeis's dissent in Truax that it
was "a very elaborate study. He said what is true that it was not proper for a judicial opinion,
ordinarily, but people are so ignorant that it was desirable that they should know and I dare say he
was right." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Dec. 22, 1921), reprinted In 1
HOLmEs-LASKI LETrERS, supra note 439, at 389.
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third dissent, Justice Pitney, a Taft appointee to the Supreme Court,
whose apparent betrayal of his own and Taft's principled conceptions of
law and order and the primacy of property rights must have been most
disturbing to the new Chief Justice. Alexander Bickel observed that
[a]s a state judge in New Jersey, Pitney had made what the Senate
opposition to his confirmation as Supreme Court Justice not unfairly con-
sidered an anti-labor record. And it was Pitney who, writing for the major-
ity in the notorious case of Coppage v. Kansas, struck down as
unconstitutional a statute outlawing "yellow-dog" contracts .... It was
Pitney also who wrote for the majority in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell, enjoining as an unlawful interference with contractual relations
efforts of the United Mine Workers to organize a mine that had extracted
from its employees yellow-dog agreements. And it was Pitney finally who,
in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, held that the Clayton Anti-Trust Act was
not the Magna Carta labor had thought it was upon its enactment, but
rather permitted issuance of an injunction against a union boycott. This was
Pitney.45 3
Pitney's dissent in Truax was in reality a very narrow departure4 4 from
the views he had expressed in Coppage,4 5 Hitchman,456 and Duplex.457
When Truax was first argued before the Supreme Court, Pitney "was
with the majority and received the assignment of the opinion. ' 458 After
reading Brandeis's dissenting opinion, which had been circulated as a
memorandum in November of 1920, and after hearing the reargument of
the case in the fall of 1921, Pitney changed his vote and wrote his own
dissent.45 9 The task of writing the majority opinion in Truax thus fell to
Taft, who used the case to impose on the states his own version of the
federal common law of labor relations.
2. The "English Kitchen" Boycott and Picket-"Violence could not
have been more effective." The labor dispute in Truax began in April
1916, with a strike by the cooks and waiters at the "English Kitchen"
restaurant in Bisbee, Arizona, over the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment. The strikers were members of the Restaurant Workers Union
453. A. BicKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 66-67 (1957).
454. See id at 67.
455. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
456. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
457. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
458. A. BICKEL, supra note 453, at 67.
459. 257 U.S. at 344. See A. BICKEL, supra note 453, at 67. This dissent was consistent with his
earlier acceptance of the state workmen's compensation legislation which the Supreme Court upheld
in the Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919) in a majority opinion which he
wrote. See A. BicKEL, supra note 453, at 62-67.
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which had called the strike; the union, in turn, belonged to a local trades
assembly which endorsed the strike. The strikers and union officials con-
ducted peaceful picketing and handbilling in front of the restaurant for
the purpose of persuading potential patrons to boycott the restaurant.
The consumer boycott took its toll. The restaurant's "daily receipts,
which had been in excess of the sum of $156 were reduced to $75.''46°
When the restaurant proprietor, William Truax, and his partners
sued in state court for an injunction against Michael Corrigan and other
members of the union, the complaint was dismissed, upon demurrer of
the defendants, on the basis of an Arizona statute461 that was "substan-
tially the same as" section 20 of the Clayton Act.462 The Supreme Court
of Arizona affirmed the judgment of the lower court.463 Truax and his
partners appealed to the United States Supreme Court claiming that the
Arizona statute, as construed by Arizona's highest court, deprived the
plaintiffs of their property "without due process of law" and denied the
plaintiffs "the equal protection of the laws" under the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.464 Five justices of the Supreme
Court agreed with Truax.
The Arizona Supreme Court had held that under the state's "little
Clayton Act" peaceful picketing, which had previously been unlawful in
Arizona because "it was presumed to induce breaches of the peace," was
"no longer conclusively presumed to be unlawful. '465 Taft understood
the "effect of this ruling" to be that "under the statute, loss may be in-
flicted upon the plaintiffs' property and business by 'picketing' in any
form if violence be not used .... ,466 Although the Arizona Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs made no allegations of violence,467 Taft's
biographer noted that after Taft had reviewed the facts alleged in the
complaint and the exhibits, Taft "concluded that violence, intimidation
460. 257 U.S. at 321.
461. Asuzm REV. STAT. ANN. I 1464 (1913).
462. 257 U.S. at 370 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
463. The Supreme Court of Arizona had held that "the gravamen of the complaint" was that
the union defendants were "merely inducing patrons to cease their patronage," that despite the
resulting injury to the goodwill of the restaurant, "'no man... has a vested property right in the
esteem of the public,'" that the union "had a right to advertise the cause of the strike," that "picket-
ing, if peaceably carried on for a lawful purpose, was no violation of the rights of the person whose
place of business was picketed," and that the plaintiffs "did not claim that defendants had by violent
means invaded their rights." Id. at 323-24.
464. Id. at 322.
465. Id. at 323.
466. Id. at 324.
467. See supra note 463.
[Vol. 37
1988/89] IMAGES OF VIOLENCE 101
and illegality had been rife."1' 8
Taft's recital of the allegations and exhibits stressed what he found
odious in the union's behavior.46 9 As Taft characterized the defendants
actions, there could be "no doubt" that the union's picketing campaign
employed "illegal" means.470 Taft wrote:
The libelous attacks upon the plaintiffs, their business, their employees, and
their customers, and the abusive epithets applied to them were palpable
wrongs .... The patrolling of defendants immediately in front of the res-
taurant on the main street and within five feet of plaintiffs' premises contin-
uously during business hours, with the banners announcing plaintiffs'
unfairness; the attendance by the picketers at the entrance to the restaurant
and their insistent and loud appeals all day long, the constant circulation by
them of the libels and epithets applied to employees, plaintiffs and custom-
ers, and the threats of injurious consequences to future customers, all linked
468. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 1036.
469. Taft described the plaintiffs' case as follows:
The defendants conspired to injure and destroy plaintiffs' business by inducing their
theretofore willing patrons and would-be patrons not to patronize them and they influ-
enced these to withdraw or withhold their patronage: (1) By having the agents of the
union walk forward and back constantly during all the business hours in front of plain-
tiffs' restaurant and within five feet thereof, displaying a banner announcing in large
letters that the restaurant was unfair to cooks and waiters and their union. (2) By having
agents attend at or near the entrance of the restaurant during all business hours and
continuously announce in a loud voice, audible for a great distance, that the restaurant
was unfair to the labor union. (3) By characterizing the employees of the plaintiffs as
scab Mexican labor, and using opprobrious epithets concerning them in handbills con-
tinuously distributed in front of the restaurant to would-be customers. (4) By applying in
such handbills abusive epithets to Truax ... and making libelous charges against him, to
the effect that he was tyrannical with his help, and chased them down the street with a
butcher knife, that he broke his contract and repudiated his pledged word; that he had
made attempts to force cooks and waiters to return to work by attacks on men and
women; ... that he was a "bad actor." (5) By seeking to disparage plaintiffs' restaurant,
charging that the prices were higher and the food worse than in any other restaurant,
and that assaults and slugging were a regular part of the bill of fare, with police indiffer-
ent. (6) By attacking the character of those who did patronize, saying that their mental
calibre and moral fibre fell far below the American average, and enquiring of the would-
be patrons-Can you patronize such a place and look the world in the face? (7) By
threats of similar injury to the would-be patrons-by such expressions as "All ye who
enter here leave all hope behind." "Don't be a traitor to humanity"; by offering a reward
for any of the ex-members of the union caught eating in the restaurant; by saying in the
handbills: "We are also aware that handbills and banners in front of a business house on
the main street give the town a bad name, but they are permanent institutions until
William Truax agrees to the eight-hour day." (8) By warning any person wishing to
purchase the business from the Truax firm that a donation would be necessary, amount
to be fixed by the District Trades Assembly, before the picketing and boycotting would
be given up.
257 U.S. at 325-27.
470. Id. at 327.
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together in a campaign, were an unlawful annoyance and a hurtful nuisance
in respect of the free access to the plaintiffs' place of business.471
Again, Taft returned to the notion of free access to the employer's
place of business that had been so significant in American Foundries, as
well as in Duplex v. Deering. Taft noted that "[p]laintiffs' business is a
property right and free access for employees, owner and customers to his
place of business is incident to such right. Intentional injury caused to
either right or both by a conspiracy is a tort."472 Holmes countered in his
dissent that "by calling a business 'property' you make it seem like land,
and lead up to the conclusion that a statute cannot substantially cut
down the advantages of ownership existing before the statute was
passed."4 "3
All the justices of the Supreme Court appeared to agree that the
plaintiffs in Truax had alleged facts sufficient to warrant a cause of action
at law. Their disagreement concerned whether the state could now con-
stitutionally deny previously available injunctions in cases of peaceful la-
bor picketing, where an injunction would be the only effective remedy
given the inability of striking workers to respond in damages.4 74 Taft, a
firm believer in the use of equitable remedies to protect "the advantages
of ownership," could not accept as constitutional a result which would,
in practical effect, leave the plaintiffs without a remedy.47 Thus he wrote
for the majority of the Court that "[t]o give operation to a statute
whereby serious losses inflicted by such unlawful means are in effect
made remediless, is, we think, to disregard fundamental rights of liberty
and property and to deprive the person suffering the loss of due process
of law."476 And he concluded, "The Constitution was intended, its very
purpose was, to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of
the individual. 47 7 Of course, the experiment which the Arizona State
Legislature contemplated in its "little Clayton Act" was a limitation on
the equity jurisdiction of the state courts in labor disputes, not immuni-
zation of labor activity from criminal prosecution or civil liability.
The Supreme Court also held that the statute denied equal protec-
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id at 342 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
474. See supra note 463.
475. The plaintiffs in Truax had alleged that "all the defendants were insolvent, and would be
unable to respond in damages for any injury resulting from their acts and the plaintiffs were there-
fore without any adequate remedy at law." 257 U.S. at 321.
476. Id. at 330.
477. Id. at 338.
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tion of the law by limiting the discretion of the state courts in granting
equitable relief in cases involving labor disputes between employers and
employees. Taft wrote that the case involved "a direct invasion of the
ordinary business and property rights of a person," which could, under
any other circumstances, be remedied in a court of equity because of its
unlawful nature and the lack of any adequate remedy at law.478 The ef-
fect of the statute was to deny equitable remedies to "injured" persons
when "invasions" of their property rights were "committed by [their] ex-
employees."47 9 According to the majority, "[i]f this is not a denial of the
equal protection of the laws, then it is hard to conceive what would
be." 480
In dissent, Justices Pitney and Clarke agreed with Taft's characteri-
zation of the unlawfulness of the union's conduct. Pitney wrote, "Upon
the facts, it hardly could be said that defendants kept within the bounds
of a 'peaceful' picket or boycott. They appear to have gone beyond mere
attempts to persuade plaintiffs' customers to withdraw their patronage,
and to have resorted to abusive and threatening language towards the
patrons themselves."1481 Nevertheless, Pitney viewed the question of the
legislative withdrawal of equitable remedies for certain types of conduct
in labor disputes as an appropriate exercise of the police power under
state law. "The use of the process of injunction to prevent disturbance of
a going business by such a campaign as defendants here have con-
ducted," Pitney wrote, "is in the essential sense a measure of police
regulation. '4 82
In deference to the federal system of government, Pitney acknowl-
edged that "[i]n truth, the States have a considerable degree of latitude in
determining, each for itself, their respective conditions of law and order,
and what kind of civilization they shall have as a result." '483 Significantly,
the Arizona statute had not modified "substantive rule[s] of law" and
"[o]rdinary legal remedies" remained intact.484 The "undue favoritism"
to the class of "ex-employees" which the majority found to be a denial of
equal protection was no different than the special legislative classifica-
tions previously upheld in challenges to state employers' liability and
478. Id at 335.
479. Id at 336.
480. Ia
481. Ia at 346 (Pitney, J., dissenting).
482. Id at 348.




workmen's compensation laws.4" 5
Holmes, in his separate dissenting opinion, agreed with "the more
elaborate expositions" of Pitney and Brandeis, but portrayed the issues in
broader, less technical terms than Pitney had used.486 He recognized that
the Arizona statute could deny the "extraordinary" remedy of the in-
junction in a particular class of disputes "without legalizing the conduct
complained of" in the Truax case.487 Holmes wrote, "Legislation may
begin where an evil begins. If, as many intelligent people believe, there is
more danger that the injunction will be abused in labor cases than else-
where I can feel no doubt of the power of the legislature to deny it in
such cases." '488 Here Holmes almost certainly was recalling his dissents
in the labor injunction cases of Vegelahn v. Guntner 489 and Plant v.
Woods,49 in which he urged judicial restraint in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in labor disputes.491 And he concluded his dissent with his
now familiar words, at once embracing and distancing himself from the
"social experiments" of the times:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even
though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those
whose judgment I most respect.492
Brandeis concurred in Holmes's sweeping condemnation of the use
of substantive due process to strike down state attempts at legislative re-
form. But he attempted to place the issues in the case squarely within
their social and political context by a fourteen-page recitation of the his-
485. Id. at 350-53.
486. ML at 344 (Holmes, ., dissenting).
487. IdM at 343.
488. Id.
489. 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
490. 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
491. Holmes had written a memorandum relying on Vegelahn for the Court's consideration in
American Foundries, supra text accompanying note 446. Moreover, Holmes had, in October 1921,
received recent confirmation from abroad of the wide acceptance of his views by "intelligent" people.
Holmes wrote to Laski, "By good luck a decision of the English Court of Appeals--1921 3 KB 40
[Ware and De Freville, Ltd. v. Motor Trade Association] has just come out in which Scrutton refers
to my opinion as one of the best statements and agrees with it. F.P. [Sir Frederick Pollock] had just
sent me a note of his on it in the L. Q. Review [37 L. Q. Rav. 395 (1921)]." Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Harold 3. Laski (Oct. 9, 1921), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-LAS KI LETTERS, supra
note 439, at 374 (bracketed material in editor's notes, id, at 374 nn.4-5).
492. Truax, 257 U.S. at 344 (Holmes, L, dissenting).
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tory of the labor injunction and the legislative responses to it.493 He
wrote, "Whether a law enacted in the exercise of the police power is
justly subject to the charge of being unreasonable or arbitrary, can ordi-
narily be determined only by a consideration of the contemporary condi-
tions, social, industrial and political, of the community to be affected
thereby. ,49
4
It was these "contemporary conditions" that Taft refused to ac-
knowledge. Taft's view of the facts of Truax, and the Arizona Supreme
Court's application of the state statute to the facts, led him to conclude
that Arizona had, in effect, legalized conduct that was as coercive as vio-
lence. Indeed, in Taft's characterization of the union's picketing and
handbilling as a form of "moral coercion," his use of language reveals his
belief that the union's conduct, not unlike the picketing in American
Foundries, had violent and physically threatening overtones.495 Taft
wrote that the union's picketing and handbilling in front of the English
Kitchen
was not lawful persuasion or inducing. It was not a mere appeal to the
sympathetic aid of would-be customers by a simple statement of the fact of
the strike and a request to withhold patronage. It was compelling every
customer or would-be customer to run the gauntlet of most uncomfortable
publicity, aggressive and annoying importunity, libelous attacks and fear of
injurious consequences, illegally inflicted, to his reputation and standing in
the community. No wonder that a business of $50,000 was reduced to only
one-fourth of its former extent. Violence could not have been more effec-
tive. It was moral coercion by illegal annoyance and obstruction and it thus
was plainly a conspiracy.
496
The "gauntlet" is defined as "two rows of men facing each other and
armed with clubs or other weapons with which they strike at an individ-
ual who is made to run between them."497 The recurrence of this power-
ful and highly evocative image of the individual being forced to "run the
gauntlet" in the Truax case, after it had been used with such dramatic
effect in describing the picketing in American Foundries,498 is very re-
vealing. The "abusive" words, the stares, the loud voices, the "aggressive
493. Id. at 357-70 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
494. Id. at 356.
495. Over fifteen years later, Brandeis adopted this view ofTruax to distinguish it from a similar
case in which he argued that "the only means authorized by the statute and in fact resorted to by the
unions have been peaceful and accompanied by no unlawful act." Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301
U.S. 468, 480 (1936).
496. 257 U.S. at 327-28.
497. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATiONAL DICTIONARY 941 (1971).
498. 257 U.S. at 205; see supra text accompanying note 434.
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and annoying importunity" of the strikers, as well as the physical "ob-
struction" of their bodies arrayed only feet away from the restaurant en-
trance were as effective a deterrent in Taft's mind as a gauntlet-a barrier
of men with clubs. "Social experiments" might compensate workers for
their workplace injuries without violating the Constitution, but experi-
mentation went too far when it condoned behavior that was not only
tortious, but uncivilized as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
Violence played an important role in the history of the American
labor movement, and many working people and their families were
caught up in the crucible of their struggles as instigators, perpetrators,
supporters, or victims of violence. The violence of the clashes between
the wage-earning communities and their employers dominated the public
consciousness of the times, from the 1892 Homestead Strike, when Pin-
kerton detectives were "forced to run a bloody gauntlet of men, women,
and children," barely escaping with their lives, to the 1914 Ludlow Mas-
sacre, when Colorado National Guardsmen entered the tent camp of
striking coal miners and their families, "burning tents, shooting people,
and smashing accordians and violins"-killing thirteen women and chil-
dren-and executing three striking miners "on the spot."4 99
During the first World War, the Espionage Act of 1917 legitimized
arrests, jail terms, deportation, and systematic violence against workers.
"[L]ocal patriots in the Arizona mining community of Bisbee, working in
close association with state officials, 'captured' over 1,200 IWW copper
miners, the majority of whom were American-born citizens, loaded them
into cattle cars with minimal provisions, and deported them into the
New Mexico desert."" °° At the end of the war, strikes spread across
the nation-from the Boston police to the steel workers. January 1920
brought the first of the "Palmer Raids," the mass arrests of 2,758 men
and women-suspected radicals, revolutionaries, and "alien" labor agita-
tors-by Justice Department agents under Attorney General Mitchell
Palmer. Hundreds were subsequently deported.501 Racist, antilabor, and
anti-alien attitudes found expression in the prosecution of Sacco and
Vanzetti, the lynchings of blacks by the Ku Klux Klan, and the cold-
blooded shooting "by Anaconda Copper Company guards" of "[tiwenty
striking miners, peacefully and legally picketing on the public highway
499. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 265, at 37, 346.
500. N. SALVATORE, supra note 57, at 288.
501. See R. GINGER, supra note 63, at 416.
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near Butte, Montana."5 "2
It should not be surprising, then, that judges too were preoccupied
with violence as they sat in courtrooms across the nation, deciding the
fate of many workers and articulating the legal boundaries of collective
action. When William Howard Taft conducted the contempt trial of
Frank W. Phelan, "[t]he court room was always crowded with strikers,
who, despite repeated warnings that the court room would be cleared if
quiet were not maintained, gave noisy vent to their approval or disap-
proval of testimony as it was elicited."5 °3 Taft resolutely saw the trial
through to its conclusion "in the face of danger from numerous 'lunat-
ics' " and "menacing notes sent him by strikers." ' But as the legal
issues moved further from the tense and sometimes explosive drama of
the trial courts to the presumably more rarified and dispassionate atmos-
phere of the appellate courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, the un-
derstanding of labor violence became more deeply embedded in legal
doctrine. Severed from its origins in the streets, in factories, in company
towns, labor violence became an idea which took on different meanings
in appellate judicial opinions.
The events of the Pullman boycott in the summer of 1894, and the
contempt trials and jail sentences that were the legal response to it, were
crucial events in the lives of two men: William Howard Taft and Eugene
V. Debs. For Taft, the strike was a personal, transformative event. His
task as judge was made clear-to prevent the destruction of property
rights and order which the working class threatened through their un-
ions. To accomplish this, he needed a theory that would accomodate
both the recognition of unions as legal associations and the denial of their
power to coerce employers through most forms of economic pressure.
The theory came together in his portrayal of the "secret terrorism" insti-
gated by the "outsiders"-Debs and his lieutenant, Phelan. Responsibil-
ity for all violence in the Phelan case lay with the "outsiders," and the
broad communitarian goals of the Pullman boycott were recharacterized
as the "starvation of a nation." Behind all economic pressure was the
coercion of violence and the threat of violence.
In a sense, Taft was doing no more than expressing as judicial opin-
ion what many radicals and reformers of the period understood to be the
502. Id.
503. H. Dum, WILLIAM HowARD TAFr 40 (1930).
504. J. ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 63.
505. H. DuFtY, supra note 503, at 41.
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necessity of force in the collective actions of labor unions. In 1891, Henry
George had written:
Labor associations can. do nothing to raise wages but by force; it may be
force applied passively, or force applied actively, or force held in reserve,
but it must be force; they must coerce or hold the power to coerce employ-
ers; they must coerce those among their members disposed to straggle; they
must do their best to get into their hands the whole field of labor they seek
to occupy and to force other workingmen either to join them or to starve.
Those who tell you of trades unions bent on raising wages by moral suasion
alone are like those who would tell you of tigers who live on oranges.50 6
Not surprisingly, in the face of sentiments like these, Taft feared more
than just militant union action; he saw in the labor movement the poten-
tial for "class warfare" or "anarchy."
For Debs the Pullman strike was equally transformative, equally
radicalizing. It set him on the path to socialism-through the Socialist
Party-and industrial unionism-through the IWW, the Industrial
Workers of the World. In each election between 1900 and 1912, Debs ran
for president on the Socialist Party ticket; in two of these elections-1908
and 1912-he was running against William Howard Taft, and running
effectively. Despite the fact that in the 1912 election "[t]he reform plat-
forms of Roosevelt and Wilson probably hurt Debs badly ..... because
they had "adopted several planks from the Socialist platform," Debs gar-
nered 900,672 votes, more than doubling his popular vote of the 1908
election. 0 7 Woodrow Wilson's victory in the 1912 election, as well as the
entry into that race by Taft's former mentor and friend, Theodore
Roosevelt, embittered Taft, who left electoral politics for the remainder
of his life. Thus, in an ironic twist of fate, just as Eugene Debs and the
Socialist Party seemed to be gaining political ground, William Howard
Taft, conservator of the faith of the Republican Party, became a law pro-
fessor at Yale where he remained a vocal, but for a time disempowered,
critic of the forces of change that had driven him from office.
Taft had only to await the election of the next Republican president,
Warren G. Harding, for appointment to the post he had always coveted,
Chief Justice of the United States. By 1921, Taft, on the Supreme Court,
was again in a position of power, and in yet another twist of fate, Eugene
506. H. GEORGE, THE CONDITION OF LABOR: AN OPEN LETTER TO POPE LEO XIII 86
(1891), quoted in M. OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 71 (1965).
507. R. GINGER, supra note 63, at 331, 329. For voting statistics in presidential elections, see
WEBSTER'S GUIDE TO AMERICAN HISTORY: A CHRONOLOGICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, AND BIO-
GRAPHICAL SURVEY AND COMPENDIUM 767-70, 769 (C. Van Doren & R. McHenry eds. 1971).
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Debs was in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, a sick and aged man
serving out the second year of two concurrent ten-year sentences for vio-
lation of the Espionage Act of 1917 and its 1918 amendments.5 08 Debs's
conviction for an antiwar speech delivered in Canton, Ohio, on June 16,
1918, had been upheld by the Supreme Court in a brief unanimous opin-
ion-Debs v. United States 09-written by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes. Holmes wrote his friend, Sir Frederick Pollock, "I am beginning
to get stupid letters of protest against a decision that Debs, a noted agita-
tor, was rightly convicted of obstructing the recruiting service so far as
the law is concerned .... There was a lot of jaw about free speech, which
I dealt with somewhat summarily in an earlier case ...." 510
From his prison cell, Debs-the "noted agitator"-had run for pres-
ident for the fifth and last time in 1920. Although the ratification of the
nineteenth amendment to the Constitution 511 enabled women to vote in
the 1920 presidential election, the "vastly increased... electorate" failed
to alter the fortunes of the Socialist Party. 12 Though the election results
"finally established" that "the Socialist Party had almost disappeared as
an organized movement,"5 13 Nick Salvatore, in his biography of Debs,
argued that "[iln a fundamental way neither Debs nor the American So-
cialist movement failed. That they were not victorious is evident, but in
an important fashion both Debsian Socialists and later interpreters pos-
ited the wrong question. Failure assumes the possibility of success, but
that was never a serious prospect for the Debsian movement. " 5 1 4
508. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, as amended by Act of May
16, 1918, oh. 15, § 1, 40 Stat. 553 (1918 amendments repealed 1921); see also R. GINGER, supra note
63, at 398, 413.
509. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
510. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETRs 7 (M. Howe ed. 1941), quoted in R. GINGER, supra note 63,
at 402-03. The "earlier case" he was referring to was Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
To his close friend, Harold J. Laski, Holmes wrote condescendingly, "I wonder if Debs really has
any ideas. What I have read of his discourse has seemed to me rather silly-and what he said about
the judgment against him showed great ignorance, if as I am ready to believe he is not dishonest."
Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold J. Laski (April 20, 1919), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LET-
TERs, supra note 439, at 197. Laski replied to Justice Holmes: "In re Debs, I think most cool-minded
people know that he is a well-meaning, obstinate mule--damnably sincere and a clear case for par-
don. If the Court ever makes unofficial recommendations to the executive on this head, it has a great
chance here to take the sting out of bad feeling. But no one I have met thinks the decision at all open
to question-what was stupid was the act [the Espionage Act of 1917] with the substance of which
you weren't concerned." Letter from Harold J. Laski to Justice Holmes (April 23, 1919), id. at 198.
511. Ray Ginger wrote that Debs "had been campaigning for this amendment for more than
forty years." R. GINGER, supra note 63, at 424.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. N. SALVATORE, supra note 57, at 271. (1982).
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Why this is so is largely a tangential question. But one aspect of that
question is important for present purposes: Debs's understanding of the
role of violence in the labor movement. Debs had hoped to achieve so-
cialism through nonviolent, political means, and for Debs, industrial
unionism had this explicit political content. But by the 1912 election, the
Socialist Party was breaking into factions, divided in part over the issue
of the use of violence as a tactic in labor disputes. Ray Ginger described
Debs's attack on the "left-wing tendencies" in the Socialist Party as
follows:
[Debs] stated that he had no respect for capitalist laws and would not have
"the least scruple about violating them," but such violations were fool-
hardy. Most American workingmen were law-abiding and completely re-
jected violent tactics. Violence actually played into the hands of the
employers, who welcomed it because it assured them of public support.
Moreover, individual action was the method of an anarchist, not a socialist,
because it did not promote but destroyed the solidarity of labor. The con-
clusion was clear enough: "I am opposed to any tactics which involve
stealth, secrecy, intrigue, and necessitate acts of individual violence for their
execution."515
The middle ground which Debs sought was rejected by others- so-
cialists, communists, anarcho-syndicalists-who maintained that vio-
lence was essential to revolution. An example of renewed intellectual
discussions about violence, the first edition of Reflections on Violence by
Georges Sorel, appeared in 1908. It was an exploration of the moral and
mythic dimensions of "[p]roletarian violence, carried on as a pure and
simple manifestation of the sentiment of the class war." '516 In 1913, Sorel
added an appendix to the third edition in which he wrote:
It is in strikes that the proletariat assert its existence. I cannot agree
with the view which sees in strikes merely something analogous to the tem-
porary rupture of commercial relations which is brought about when a gro-
cer and the wholesale dealer from whom he buys his dried plums cannot
agree about the price. The strike is a phenomenon of war. It is thus a seri-
ous misrepresentation to say that violence is an accident doomed to disap-
pear from the strikes of the future.517
On July 11, 1916, Harold J. Laski began his correspondence of nearly
twenty years with Justice Holmes by sending him a "bread-and-butter
note... following the first meeting of the two in the Justice's summer
515. R. GINGER, supra note 63, at 326.
516. G. SOREL, REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE 98 (T. Hulme & J. Roth trans. 1950).
517. Sorel, Apology for Violence, in id. at 274 app. 2.
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home at Beverly Farms, thirty miles north of Boston." '18 Accompanying
this note was a gift-Sorel's book, Reflections on Violence. 19
In the generation during which Taft and Holmes began and ended
their judicial careers-and during which Debs traveled from the leader-
ship of the Pullman boycott in Chicago to the deprivations of the federal
penitentiary in Atlanta-the mainstream American labor movement
abandoned Debs's political vision for "business unionism." Fora brief
moment in the summer of 1921, Samuel Gompers, the labor leader who
had built up the American Federation of Labor in opposition to socialism
and industrial unionism, confronted Debs in a meeting in the Atlanta
penitentiary:
Thirty-five years earlier Gompers had been the more radical of the two
young trade unionists. But he had grown steadily more conservative while
Debs moved the other way. Their paths split sharply after the Pullman boy-
cott. The socialist leader had found his place with the unskilled work-
ingmen, the unorganized farmers, the disinherited convicts, at the bottom
of the social heap. Gompers had consciously chosen to speak for the skilled
craft unionists. Now they met again: the squat and well-tailored confidant
of industrialists and statesmen; the gaunt intimate of criminals, wearing his
shabby prison stripes. 20
When Chief Justice Taft sat with the Supreme Court in the fall of
1921 hearing the rearguments of the cases of the 1914 foundry workers'
strike in Granite City, Illinois, and the 1916 restaurant workers' strike in
Bisbee, Arizona, the political and social events of the intervening years
were telescoped and viewed through a lens of fear. Taft's opinions in
American Foundries21 and Truax 22 reflected the fear of outsiders, of
518. Howe, Foreword to 1 HOLMES-LAsKI LETrEas, supra note 439, at xiii.
519. Laski wrote, "I have sent you Sorel on Violence-perhaps it will pass some idle hour."
Letter from Harold J. Laski to Justice Holmes (July 11, 1916), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LET-
TEES, supra note 439, at 3. Holmes replied several days later, "Sorel came yesterday and I began it at
once eagerly. I am not ready with opinions-except that I do not share his following of Bergson."
Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold J. Laski (July 14, 1916), reprinted in ia This was followed by,
"I finished Sorel and wrote a few remarks to Frankfurter. His first principles are left to be divined I
should suppose .... Sorel's myth formula is fine, but naturally I don't make much of his general
conclusions." Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold J. Laski (July 19, 1916), reprinted in iL at 5.
520. R. GINGER, supra note 63, at 429. For Samuel Gompers's description of this meeting, see 1
S. GOMPERS, supra note 63, at 416. Ironically, in 1907 Gompers received a one-year prison sentence
for speaking out in support of the metal polishers' union boycott of Bucks Stove and Range Com-
pany. The company obtained a sweeping injunction prohibiting the boycott and all speech concern-
ing the strike. Although Gompers considered the Bucks Stove & Range litigation and appeals that
ensued over "seven long years" to be "my most grilling experience with injunctions," Gompers,
unlike Debs, never went to jail. 2 id. at 219, 205. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418 (1911); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
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anarchy, of violence which characterized Taft's 1894 decision in the Phe-
lan case,5 23 and drew sustenance from the postwar hysteria of the Red
Scare. In July of 1922, Taft wrote to Ambassador Harvey:
The situation in the United States now is... quite critical in respect to
the coal strike and the railway strike ....
The war and general lawlessness everywhere stimulate bloody, mur-
derous violence on the part of the strikers and their sympathizers, but that
is not so much a dangerous symptom as it is a symptom of the times. Debs
has now rushed in with a general declaration of war, while Gompers contin-
ues his vaporings, but I don't think they help the labor people. They rather
tend to solidify conservative public opinion.5 24
And so, once again, the injunction was preserved as an offensive weapon
against unionism.
The consequences of this decision were profound. Leon Fink has
written that "[d]uring the decade of the twenties, injunctions rose to a
new peak-in the pivotal 1922 railroad shop craft strike alone some three
hundred restrictive injunctions were issued." '525 The threat of injunctions
and the ease with which employers could obtain them undoubtedly
played a role in the "dramatic decline" of strike incidence in the
1920s.526
The confluence of events in the winter of 1921 was symbolic. Within
days after Truax was handed down by the Supreme Court, President
Harding commuted Debs's prison sentence. Response was predictable.
Holmes wrote to Laski: "I too was glad at the release of Debs-although
I hardly can believe him honest (not that that has anything to do with his
522. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
523. 62 F. 803.
524. Letter from William Howard Taft to Ambassador William Harvey (July 21, 1922), quoted
in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 1031.
525. Fink, Labor, Liberty, and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the American Con-
stitutional Order, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 904, 918 (1987). Leo Troy has written:
From its pinnacle in 1920, the American labor movement lost in excess of two million
members by 1933, when it touched a low of just under three million. The drop began
with a decline in employment in the industries that experienced most of the wartime
growth-shipbuilding and metalworking. The sharp business recession of 1920-1921
caused a further and broader reduction in membership. In addition, the unsuccessful
shopmen's strike on the railways in 1922, involving an estimated 400,000 workers, cur-
tailed much of the wartime union growth in that industry. By the end of 1923--only
three years after attaining a high of more than five million members-the American
labor movement's losses ran to nearly 1.5 million.
L. TROY, TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP, 1897-1962, at 4 (1965).
526. P. EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 14.
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being kept in or let out)." '5 27 Yet for Chief Justice Taft, "Debs was still a
villain in 1922. 1528 As Debs left the Atlanta penitentiary on December
24, 1921, the legality of collective action by working people was more
constrained than it had ever been before. The Supreme Court had or-
dained that federal legislation such as the Clayton Act, or the state stat-
utes modeled after it, did not really alter the "federal common law" of
picketing and boycotting.
Just as Taft in 1894 had feared violence in labor activity, the major-
ity of Supreme Court justices in 1921 seemed not to understand that la-
bor violence could have multiple meanings and multiple sources. It could
be purposive or situational, planned or spontaneous. It could be the de-
liberate political tactic of a radical group. Or paradoxically, it could be a
consequence of the collective actions of those identified with a more con-
servative ideology, for as Mancur Olson, Jr. has written:
The conservative or "business unionism" philosophy typical of American
labor unions was no doubt less offensive to conservative ideologues than
communism, socialism, or anarchism: yet it seems to have led to much
more violence. The correct explanation surely centers around the need for
coercion implicit in attempts to provide collective goods to large groups.
52 9
The fact that labor violence under Gompers-style business unionism
continued long after the influence on unions of various left-wing political
groups had waned, was to a great measure the result of the necessity of
coercion which Olson has identified.530 While many federal and state
judges assumed violent coercion in labor disputes was directed to subver-
sive, "secret" political ends, in fact the explanation for the violence was
most often if not always quite different. Masked behind the imagery of
the violent worker as a scheming, threatening outsider whose words and
actions-however innocent in appearance-concealed ominous mean-
ings, was the reality of the worker who, out of pure economic necessity,
openly sought to coerce others to choose collective interests over those of
the individual.
Similarly, in 1894 as well as 1921, many judges (not unlike many
Americans in the same period) were unable to see and understand the
necessitous worker, and therefore could not accept labor's use of eco-
nomic coercion, though economic coercion had long been accepted as
527. Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 15, 1922), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-
LASK LETrERs, supra note 439, at 397.
528. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 73, at 1030.
529. M. OLSON, JR., supra note 506, at 71.
530. See id. at 66-97.
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part of an employer's basic right of liberty and property in the guise of
freedom of contract. Part of the difficulty for Taft and other judges lay in
determining where economic coercion ended and violent coercion began,
as well as in speculating where violence might lead. Thus, within the
social and historical context of the events of real labor violence and the
conflicting strands of political and economic goals expressed by unions,
the Supreme Court was poorly positioned to do more than sketch out the
crudest boundaries for legal collective action. As the justices attempted
to define, for the first time, the parameters of legally sanctioned coercion,
they almost inevitably fell back on the rudimentary and unsophisticated
understandings of both workers and their unions that had survived intact
from nineteenth century case law. For Taft and Holmes, as well as
others, this meant looking back to their own legal decisions written sev-
eral decades earlier.
Certainly Brandeis had identified the legal issue and its underlying
economic context in his dissent in Hitchman Coal.531 Brandeis wrote:
[C]oercion, in a legal sense, is not exerted when a union merely endeavors
to induce employees to join a union with the intention thereafter to order a
strike unless the employer consents to unionize his shop. Such pressure is
not coercion in a legal sense. The employer is free either to accept the agree-
ment or the disadvantage .... If it is coercion to threaten to strike unless
plaintiff consents to a closed union shop, it is coercion also to threaten not
to give one employment unless the applicant will consent to a closed non-
union shop. The employer may sign the union agreement for fear that labor
may not be otherwise obtainable; the workman may sign the individual
agreement for fear that employment may not be otherwise obtainable. But
such fear does not imply coercion in a legal sense.532
In thus acknowledging explicitly the legality of the economic coercion of
labor groups, Brandeis implicitly recognized both the necessity of coer-
cion to ensure the survival of the union and the balancing function which
such coercion served in a laissez-faire economy as a type of "corrective"
to the freedom which employers possessed to coerce employment agree-
ments. And on this point, his analysis harkened back to the economic
notions which Holmes articulated in Vegelahn regarding the role of law
in ensuring that the "battle" between the employer and the employee can
be "carried on in a fair and equal way.")533
To legalize the economic coercion of the picket line and the secon-
531. 245 U.S. 229, 263 (1917).
532. Id. at 271.




dary boycott, however, entailed more risks than protecting the primary
strike alone. First, pickets and boycotts were public extensions of strike
activity and were potentially far more coercive economically than strikes
alone. Second, if it were assumed that workers, either by nature or by
design, were prone to violence, the very public nature of picket lines and
boycotts would tend to encourage acts of violence as a means of coercion.
Thus, the shared imagery of workers as secretive, violent outsiders, pro-
foundly influenced judicial decisions to constrain sharply the legal
boundaries of these economically potent forms of collective labor
activity.
At the same time that judges acted to limit pickets and boycotts,
they struggled to legalize unions and place them, with corporations, into
a universe of atomistic, .rational actors.534 In a sense they succeeded;
some union action was accepted as legal. But the intellectual price was
high. The contradictions in the images of workers seem irreconcilable.
Workers were one moment perceived as rational and responsible, the
next as irrational and violent. From an economic perspective the worker
was a depersonalized commodity; from a paternalistic perspective he or
she was a weak, dependent member of the human family. Judges selec-
tively called forth these images, but particularly the images of violence,
associated somehow with the weak and dependent worker, to shape and
explain their legal decisions. What they failed to recognize was the inter-
relationship of the images which only superficially revealed the complex
reality of workers' lives and personalities. For example, violence might be
construed as a rational response of workers to the frustrations of both the
534. The fear of the violent worker manifested in labor jurisprudence might seem at first to be in
direct historical contradiction to the increased statutory and juridical recognition of workers' rights.
Why should rights have been granted in the face of perceived, and occasionally real, violence? Did
violence or its imagery influence ideas or events so that abstract rights were granted to relieve the
fear or threat of violence? How can a concern for violence over time be consistent with a so-called
liberalization of rights rather than a further suppression of rights?
The resolution of the seeming paradox lies in the social context against which the fear of violence
was developed. Taft, Holmes, and Brandeis all assumed that a social world governed by the conven-
tion of gentlemanly conduct should be the norm. Autonomous, calculating individuals behaved by
the rules of the game. By imposing that norm on working class conduct, judicial actors sought to
answer their own fears of violence. The rules of labor relations were defined to eliminate violent
action, but at the same time to create a free range of economic activity that included legitimate,
marketplace coercion. The categories of legal coercion were class-bound, designed to move the work-
ing class towards accepted and appropriate forms of behavior. The emerging contractual/collective
bargaining model, therefore, was an attempt to force organized labor to abide by the rules for ra-
tional, economic bargaining. The liberalization of rights was consistent with, and not in contradic-
tion, to the fear of violence. The enforcing of the contractual model was perceived as an ordering
mechanism in the face of the fear of violence.
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commodification of the labor market and the degrading paternalism of
employers in the workplace-real conditions that often did violence to
them. Many judges of Taft's generation, however, seemed to want to
hold only one image in focus at a time, for to do otherwise would force
them both to confront the contradictions in their justifications for creat-
ing and defending legal rules and their lack of insight in formulating their
understanding of reality.
As Taft led the retreat into the security of legal rules that would, for
over a decade, tightly circumscribe the ability of labor unions to engage
in effective economic coercion, he unwittingly prepared the way for the
acceptance of economic coercion by employees as a fundamental element
in the legal structure of labor relations under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. 5 In time it made no sense to declare unions to be legal as-
sociations and simultaneously to deny them the ability to engage in the
kinds of peaceful economic coercion that would assure their continued
existence and enable them to overcome the "inequality of bargaining
power" between employers and employees. 36 The conceptual hurdles
were, first, to acknowledge the legality of coercive collective labor activ-
ity-in particular the picket line and the secondary boycott-which had
significant impact on an employer's trade, and, second, to acknowledge
that such activity could be coercive without being violent. Although the
Clayton Act was ostensibly based on these concepts, the Supreme Court,
as late as 1921, was not prepared to abandon its understanding of the
evils in union coercion which were formed by the images of violent work-
ers from the early cases of common law restraint of trade and federal
antitrust law. It was not until the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
in 1932,131 withdrawing federal equity jurisdiction over most peaceful la-
bor activity, as well as the subsequent changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court, that the rationale of modern liberal labor relations and
its privatized, contractual assumptions fully confronted the myths and
realities behind the images of violence in labor jurisprudence.5 38 The re-
sults of that confrontation changed a number of the legal rules and the
535. Labor Management Relations (Comery-Wagner Labor Relations) Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49
Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
536. Id.
537. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, §§ 1-15,47 Stat. 70-73 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
15 (1982)).
538. For an argument about the influence of contractarian reasoning on the drafting of the
Wagner Act and development of modem labor relations, see Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978).
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ways in which they were argued, but not, ultimately, the enduring power
and presence in labor law of the image of the violent worker.

